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ABSTRACT 
 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) has been a topic of discussion since the dawn of 
democracy in April 1994. Due to the entrenched inequalities of the past, economic 
empowerment is very important for the economic growth of the majority of South 
Africa’s citizens.   However, significant economic enrichment of black people has not 
been made, despite, economic success, legislation, state policies and programme 
interventions.  This economic growth is to be realised through the use of preferential 
procurement as a policy tool for BEE.  
 
Whilst sufficient legislation has been enacted to regulate preferential procurement, to 
favour black people, much still seems to be lacking in the enforcement of the laws in 
public procurement. Central to the challenges of preferential procurement is the 
disharmony between the Framework legislation governing preferential procurement and 
BEE. This discord has seen two visions being followed for preferential procurement; the 
Procurement Act refers to the beneficiaries of BEE as historically disadvantaged 
individuals (HDI; s) and the goals for BEE are measured through specific goals which 
promotes narrow empowerment; the BBBEE Act on the other hand defines black people 
as the recipients of BEE and through the BEE Codes broad-based empowerment is 
promoted through seven core elements. This congruency has not served the promotion 
of preferential procurement, it has created a hindrance that frustrates economic growth 
for those it is intended.  The other quandary that undermines the success of preferential 
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procurement is willful practices engaged by both tenderers and public officials; skills 
deficiency in the adjudication of tenders and self-interest.  The success of BEE through 
preferential procurement is dependent on a coherently legislated procurement 
environment fortified by perceptive public officials. 
 
The objective of this thesis is to analyse the impact of these challenges on the success 
of preferential procurement. The study will highlight the main practices that defeat the 
use of preferential procurement. This will include an analysis of the various legislation 
and the amendments thereto. In addition the enquiry will examine the proficiency of 
public officials in the adjudication of public tendering. 
 
Recommendations for a successful preferential public procurement environment will be 
made. The proposed thesis will utilise, inter alia, relevant legislation, case law, theses, 
journals, books and policy documents.  
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CHAPTER 1  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background to the study 
 
During the apartheid-era, public procurement was used both to economically advance 
and protect large white-owned enterprises and to discriminate against black-owned 
businesses.1  According to Gounden the public procurement policies of the past were 
racially defined by restricting the participation in public tendering to white people.2 This 
was done by making public tender procedures very complicated to suit and favour large 
white-owned enterprises, to the exclusion and the detriment of small emerging black-
owned businesses.3 The white minority were thus the primary participants and 
beneficiaries of public sector procurement.4 This contributed to the current situation in 
South Africa where black people make up the political majority but an economic 
minority.5 
                                                          
1
Bolton P ‗Government Procurement as a Policy Tool in South Africa‘ (2006) 6 Journal of Public 
Procurement, abstract. 
2
Gounden S The Impact of the Affirmative Procurement Policy on Affirmable Business Enterprises in the      
South African Construction Industry (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Natal, 2000) para 3.11.  
3
Williams S ‗The Use of Exclusions for Corruption in Developing Country Procurement: The Case of 
South Africa‘ (2007) Journal of African Law 2. 
4
Gounden S (2000) para 3.11. 
5
In City Council of Pretoria v Walker 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC); 1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC) para 45 the court 
held that ‗the postscript to the interim Constitution refers to our ―past of a deeply divided society‖.‘ 
Differentiation made on the basis of race was a central feature of those divisions and this was a source 
of grave assaults on the dignity of black people in particular. It was however not human dignity alone that 
suffered. White areas in general were affluent and black ones were in the main impoverished. Many 
privileges were dispensed by the government on the basis of race, with white people being the primary 
beneficiaries. The legacy of this is all too obvious in many spheres, including the disparities that exist in 
the provision of services and the infrastructure for them in residential areas.‘ 
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The pre-democratic era was characterised by a legacy of dispossession of assets, 
particularly land, which led to the disempowerment of black people.6 This system, which 
excluded black people7 from economic power started with dispossession of land as far 
back as the 1800s and continued throughout the twentieth century.8 During this period 
the apartheid government engaged in capital-intensive development for which semi-
skilled black labourers was used,9 causing black people to work as cheap labour.  
 
This produced a country with a landless black majority, restricted in accessing skills 
development due to vastly inferior education.10 The consequence was the exclusion of 
black people from capital accrual resulting in stunted economic growth for black people. 
This abuse of power saw the apartheid regime only investing in the white minority.11  
This manifested in vast structural distortions in the economy: the result led to a crisis in 
the apartheid economy still prevalent today.12  
 
1.2 The importance of black economic empowerment (BEE) 
                                                          
6
Department of Trade and Industry South Africa’s Economic Transformation: A Strategy for Broad-Based   
Black Economic Empowerment (2003) (hereafter DTI Policy Strategy) para 1.9. 
7
Refer to black, coloured and indian people. 
8
DTI Policy Strategy (2003) para 2.2.2. 
9
Crankshaw O Race, Class and the Changing Division of Labour Under Apartheid (1997) 50. Also see 
BEE Commission Report ‗A National Integrated Black Economic Empowerment Strategy‘ (2001) 35. 
(hereafter BEE Commission Report). 
10
DTI Policy Strategy (2003) para 2.2.4. 
11
Barnard R Apartheid and Beyond: South African Writers and the Politics of Place (2007) 5 states that   
apartheid represented territorialisation of power. 
12
BEE Commission Report (2001) 3. 
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The importance of BEE can be read into the preamble to the Constitution13 which 
provides that the people of South Africa collectively commit to the transformation of the 
South African society. The promotion of those who are economically disadvantaged was 
further addressed by including a procurement clause to this effect in the Constitution.14 
This inclusion of preferential procurement to promote economic transformation 
highlights the importance placed on economic empowerment for those historically 
excluded from economic participation.15 Ultimately the constitutional prescript16 to 
economic empowerment was legislated in the Preferential Procurement Policy 
Framework Act (Procurement Act).17 To complement this Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act (BBBEE Act)18  was effected three years later to promote the 
achievement of the constitutional right to equality and to increase broad-based and 
effective participation of black people in the economy.  
 
The response of the government to the pre-apartheid position was to articulate a policy 
that would develop an economy that could provide for the needs of all its economically 
                                                          
13
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 (hereafter the Constitution). We, the 
people of South Africa..., Recognise the injustices of our past... Heal the divisions of the past and 
establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights.... 
14
Section 217 (1) When an organ of state in the national, provincial or local sphere of government, or any 
other institution identified in national legislation, contracts for goods or services, it must do so in 
accordance with a system which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not prevent the organs of state or institutions referred to in that subsection from 
implementing a procurement policy providing for-  
   (a) categories of preference in the allocation of contracts; and  
   (b) the protection or advancement of persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair  
discrimination. 
(3) National legislation must prescribe a framework within which the policy referred to in subsection (2) 
must be implemented. See para 1.3 for discussion on the procurement clause. 
15
Bolton P (2006) 203. 
16
Section 217(3). 
17
Act 5 of 2000. 
18
Act 53 of 2003, 
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active people and enterprises, in a sustainable manner by 2014.19 This vision of 
economic equality was developed through the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) of 1994 and can be traced back to the Freedom Charter.20 
 
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), tasked with the promotion of BEE was 
concerned that increased inequality and uneven development presented a real danger 
for both industrialised and developing economies.21 That is why it encouraged economic 
growth for the political majority through preferential procurement which was identified as 
the source to the sustainable growth and development.22 Essentially public sector 
procurement was seen as essential in the quest to remedy the prejudicial practices of 
the past23 so as to counter the apprehension that absence of shared economic growth 
would lead to lower levels of growth thereby restricting demand which is detrimental to 
any economy.24  Broad-based growth is consequently the key to the success of the 
South African economy. But primarily the promotion of BEE must be associated with 
good governance that aspires to the principles of transparency and fairness as required 
in terms of the Constitution.  
. 
                                                          
19
DTI Policy Strategy (2003) para 1.1. 
20
RDP as published in Government Gazette No. 16085 of 23 November 1994. DTI Policy Strategy (2003) 
para 1.3 
21
DTI Policy Strategy (2003) para 2.2.5 states that: ‗The marginalisation of black people, eventually 
resulted in a deteriorated growth rate placing the apartheid economy in a crisis- GDP growth fell to zero 
between 1970 and 1979 with high levels of unemployment.‘ 
22
DTI Policy Strategy (2003) para 3.22 refers to HDIs as collective reference to African, Coloured and 
Indian South African citizens unfairly discriminated against during the apartheid-era. 
23
Bolton P ‗The Use of Government Procurement as an Instrument of Policy‘ (2004) 121 SALJ 624. 
24
DTI Policy Strategy (2003) para 3.4.4.2. 
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Despite this vision and the comprehensive programme to provide a legislative 
framework for equality and economic transformation,25 credible economic 
transformation is still evading the majority of the citizens. Ten years after the DTI policy 
document (2003), promoting BEE was written the full potential growth of South Africa is 
still undermined by economic disparities and is characterised by racial and gender 
inequalities insofar as access to wealth, income, skills and employment is concerned.26 
South Africa still has the world‘s most unequal distributions of income due to the fact 
that the South African economy continues to exclude black people from financial and 
economic resources.27 
 
1.2.1 The present position of BEE  
 
Post democratic zeal by government in enacting procurement laws to advance 
economic empowerment has resulted in preferential procurement thwarted by the failure 
to heed the legislative prescripts on the on hand and nefarious practices on the other.  It 
is believed that BEE in South Africa has not worked because it created millionaires and 
superstars instead of equipping people with basic skills: this is due to the clumsy way it 
                                                          
25
Promotion of Equality  and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000, to address deracialisation 
and engendering; Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 which address land dispossession;  
Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 to address unfair discrimination in the workplace by requiring 
enterprises, employing more than fifty-five people to take affirmative action within a defined  time 
period. Competition Act 89 of 1998 in order to provide all South Africans equal opportunity to participate 
fairly in the national economy. 
26
DTI Policy Strategy (2003) para 1.5. 
27
BEE ‗Overview‘ available at http://www.yokogawa.com/za/cp/overview/za-bee.htm (accessed on 30 July 
2010). 
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(BEE) had been implemented.28 Friedman intimates that BEE is not a failure because it 
still needs to be adequately implemented. He believes what we have seen over the last 
17 years is a process that enabled politically connected individuals to access a large 
portion of the BEE pie in the hope that the problem will go away.29  Comments from the 
mining industry are that South Africa‘s laws over the past 16 years had opened the 
market for all but the BEE policy had led to enriching only a few.30 This viewpoint 
alluded to the fact there was virtually no transformation in the mining industry. 
Furthermore it seems that the attempts at gradual economic transformation brought 
about a failed BEE project due to corruption; this has seen the erosion of 
entrepreneurship. 31 
 
 What is prevalent today is that BEE as commonly practiced ‗creates a small class of 
unproductive but wealthy black crony capitalists and thus strikes a blow against the 
emergence of genuine entrepreneurship.‘32 This is because the vision for BEE has been 
distorted in that preferential procurement benefits those for whom it is not intended.33 
This situation does not accord with the government‘s vision that describes an economy 
that must be susceptible to greater ownership participations, by a greater majority of its 
                                                          
28
Booysen V 'BEE a failure' Fin 24 18 Sep 2008 this is according to Phosa (ANC Treasurer-general) 
addressing MBA students at the University of the Free State available at 
http://www.fin24.com/Business/BEE-a-failure-20080918 (accessed 17 November 2011). 
29
 Mammburu L Roberts J & Bratt M ‗BEE cannot be called a failure — Friedman‘ Business day 9 Nov 
2011 available at http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.aspx?id=158256 (accessed 17 
November 2011). 
30
Prinsloo L ‗Failure of BEE fuels nationalisation debate‘ Mining Weekly 22 June 2011 available at  
http://www.miningweekly.com/article/failure-of-bee-fuels-nationalisation-debate-bam-2011-06-22 
(accessed 17 November 2011). 
31
SAPA ‗Narrow BEE at the 'heart of corruption, SACP asserts‘ Polity.org 27 April 2011 
http://www.polity.org.za/article/narrow-bee-at-the-heart-of-corruption-sacp-asserts-2011-04-27 
(accessed 17 November 2011). 
32
Mbeki M Architects of Poverty: Why African Capitalism Needs Changing (2009) 69. 
33
BEE Commission Report (2001) 4. 
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people.34 These measures were codified in the BBBEE Act and Codes (BEE 
legislation)35 which provides a comprehensive and focused strategy for BEE.36 
Further cause for concern is raised by the recent Auditor–General of South Africa 
(AGSA) report that deviation by public officials from the prescribed procurement 
legislation and regulations during the execution of tender procedures, extends to 43 
percent of the projects selected for auditing. 37 The result of which is that between five 
and 94 percent procurement processes across provinces ignore the procurement laws. 
This deviation is aided by self- interest and the lack of oversight in supply chain 
management processes to monitor compliance to legislation and regulations.38 This 
behaviour intimates a flagrant disregard for plausible economic growth in South Africa. 
This is evident in that the current preferential procurement environment notionally 
favours a narrow ensemble of black participants, most of who are politically connected.  
 
The success of preferential procurement ultimately depends on whether the political will 
exists to ensure compliance on the one hand and the rooting out of the adverse 
practices beleaguering public procurement, on the other. Unfortunately, regardless of all 
                                                          
34
RDP White Paper (2000) para 3.8.1. Furthermore para1.2.7 states ‗No political democracy can survive 
and flourish if the majority of its people remain in poverty, without land, without their basic needs being 
met and without tangible prospects for a better life. Attacking poverty and deprivation will therefore be 
the first priority of the democratic government.‘  BEE Commission Report (2001) states that ‗the RDP is 
the country‘s blueprint for transformation- encapsulates clearly the vision and values of BEE‘ 1. 
35
 This thesis will refer to the BBBEE Act and BEE Codes as the BEE Legislation. 
36
DTI Policy Strategy (2003) para 2.2.6. 
37
AGSA report to Parliament on a performance audit of the infrastructure delivery process at the 
provincial departments of Education and Health (August 2011) para 2.2.3 (a) (hereafter AGSA report on 
Education and Health Departments). Paragraph1.3 details that two hundred and forty seven (247) 
projects amounting to R6, 635 billion were selected for detail auditing (between 2008 and 2011) 
available at 
http://www.agsa.co.za/Reports%20Documents/performance%20audit%20of%20the%20infrastructure%
20delivery%20process.pdf (accessed on 25 October 2011). 
38
AGSA report on Education and Health Departments (August 2011) para 3.2.3 (b). 
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the measures established, meaningful economic participation by the majority of South 
Africans remains far too limited.39  
 
The BEE legislation promotes the comprehensive inclusion of black people in the 
mainstream of the economy, whether as owners or employees.  This will mean that 
business patterns should change to include more black people accumulating wealth 
through, not only ownership but also skills development, in order to engage in business, 
in the existing and new economic activities.  
 
An underlying problem in the promotion of BEE is that public officials have 
demonstrated a flagrant disregard for those constitutional imperatives promoting 
economic prosperity.40 This behaviour negates good governance and compromises the 
fair application of preferential procurement. This undermines the use of preferential 
procurement because the majority of the population remains outside the mainstream 
economy. A good basis to start from is that every attempt should be made to deal with 
the acquiring of goods or services in the spirit of section 217 of the Constitution.41 
 
It will thus serve the government well to err on the side of caution and not use BEE to 
enrich a black minority (politically connected people) at the exclusion of the vast 
                                                          
39
See Gounden S (2000) for an analysis of the achievements of BEE through preferential procurement in 
the Construction Industry. 
40
AGSA report on Education and Health Departments (August 2011).  
41
Malinga M ‗Zero Tolerance against Fraud and Corruption Conference‘ National Treasury Supply Chain 
Management 25–26 September 2007 available at 
http://www.publicworks.gov.za/PDFs/AntiCorruptionConference/National%20Treasury%20-%20Mr.pdf 
(Accessed 12Jun 2010). 
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majority.42 Such a situation will parallel with the apartheid period because in both 
instances the minority were empowered and the majority disregarded.  
 
 
1.3 The procurement clause  
 
 
The Interim Constitution43 includes a procurement clause which requires the public 
procurement of goods and services, to be a fair, public and competitive administration 
by tender boards. Preferential procurement was clearly not addressed at this stage. 
However in order to remedy the ills of the past and include black people in the 
mainstream of the economy, the post apartheid government later embarked on a 
reconstructive and development initiative.44 A way of addressing this was to include 
preferential procurement in the procurement clause of the Constitution. 45 The 
procurement clause therefore embodies economic redress in the interest of equity by 
using preferential public procurement to bring about BEE. This has seen preferential 
public procurement as a constitutional principle meaning the spirit of section 217(1) 
should be observed in the adjudication of tenders.46  This spirit promotes good 
governance47 in that fairness, equitability, transparency, competitiveness and cost-
effectiveness must permeate the process of public tendering.   
 
 
                                                          
42
De Lange D ‗Corruption Bombshell‘ Cape Times 3 March 2011 1. 
43
Act 200 of 1993 s187.  
44
ANC ‗Discussion document on RDP‘ (no date)provides that ‗the RDP was developed to strike at the 
institutions, structures and social interests of those forces that have grown rich and powerful out of 
minority rule‘ available at www.anc.org.za (accessed on 19 February 2011). 
45
Section 217 (1). 
46
Penfold G & Reyburn P ‗Public Procurement‘ in Woolman S et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa 2ed (2004) 25-1. 
47
Gounden S (2000)1.3. 
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The reason for using public procurement to promote BEE is that due to its procurement 
budget size,48 government markets provide significant opportunities to influence 
economic growth.49  Through preferential procurement, the cause of black people is 
advanced by them being treated as the preferred bidders50 when government procures 
goods or services. The Constitution, correctly in my view, does not spell out precisely 
who the preferential bidders should be. The Constitution51  does not refer specifically to 
black people but rather to ‗persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination‘.  This omission may however be the source of all the confusion between 
the Procurement Act and the BBBEE Act.52  
 
Furthermore the procurement clause applies to all organs of state at all three levels of 
government that is, national, provincial and local, and any other institution identified in 
national legislation.53  Needless to say any level of government found flouting the spirit 
of section 217(1) will be undermining good governance and thereby the Constitution.  
 
 
1.3.1 The obligation to implement preferential procurement framework 
legislation: Section 217 (3)  
                                                          
48
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, United Nations, and United Nations Environment 
Programme ( 2008) states that the South African  government spends between 11 and 15 % of its gross 
domestic product, on public procurement available at 
http://www.environment.gov.za/Services/documents.html#.(accessed 2 February 2011).Mc Donald O 
(2008) 6 states that ‗government procurement accounts for approximately 4.5 per cent of developing 
countries gross domestic product (GDP) and that globally, government procurement is big business, with 
government‘s annual spending on tradable goods and services estimated at more than US$2,000 billion‘ 
3.  
49
Arrowsmith S ‗Public Procurement as an Instrument of Policy and the Impact of Market Liberalisation‘ 
(1995) Law Quarterly Review 236. 
50
See chapter two para 2.3 for a discussion on the objectives of preferential procurement. 
51
Section 217 (2) (b) the protection or advancement of persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged 
by unfair discrimination.  
52
 See chapter two for a discussion on the discord between the Acts. 
53
Section 217(1). 
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Emanating from the procurement clause54 is that that government entities engaged in 
public procurement must implement a preferential procurement policy.  Those policies 
must observe the Procurement Act55 that serves as the framework for preferential 
procurement.  The Constitutional Court also confirmed that if there is a preferential 
procurement policy to be followed, there is a duty on the government that its discretion, 
insofar as it relates to procurement, must be exercised in accordance with such policy.56  
The National Treasury further notes that ‗open and effective competition is best served 
by a framework of procurement laws, policies, practices and procedure that is 
transparent and accessible to all potential bidders.‘57 
 
 
1.4 Title of the study: Frustrations plaguing preferential procurement of goods 
and services 
 
The objective of this thesis is to flesh out some of the frustrations that hinder the 
success of preferential procurement. The use of preferential procurement is inhibited by 
a number of challenges which impedes the success of BEE. An overarching problem is 
that government lacks enthusiasm in proper oversight and political commitment to the 
                                                          
54
Section 217(2) [d]oes not prevent the organs of state or institutions referred to in s217(1) from 
implementing a procurement policy providing for- (a) categories of preference in the allocation of 
contracts; and (b) the protection or advancement of persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged 
by unfair discrimination. 
55
Constitution s 217 (3) National legislation must prescribe a framework within which the policy referred 
to in subsection (2) must be implemented. 
56
Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others (2004) 4 SA 
490 (CC) (2004) BCLR 687 (CC) para 100. (hereafter Bato Star Fishing). 
57
National Treasury: General Procurement Guidelines (no date) 7 available at 
www.treasury.gov.za/legislation/pfma/supplychain/General Procurement Guidelines.pdf (accessed 4 
May 2010). 
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success of preferential procurement processes. Simply put, government is not seen as 
actively rooting out those practices that put strain on the public procurement 
environment. The head of the Special Investigation Unit (SIU), the agency that has 
proved to uncover the most corruption in public procurement states that  ‗[o]ur policies 
are pretty good but if there are not consequences for breaching them... a culture of 
impunity spreads pretty quickly.‘58  
 
The legislation 
 
The preferential procurement environment is facing several other challenges. The first 
area for examination is to determine whether the frame work legislation, the 
Procurement Act  and BBBEE Act share the necessary cogency  to bring about the 
broad-based empowerment that is intended.59 This study will draw attention to the 
amendments to the Procurement Regulations over the last eight years and its influence 
on the field of preferential procurement. Finally the Procurement Regulations 2011 has 
also gained attention through important changes.60 These changes need to be 
highlighted and its impact on the main framework Acts assessed.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
58
SAPA Government corruption: R30bn could be lost-SIU Media24 12 October 2011 available at 
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/Govt-corruption-R30bn-could-be-lost-SIU-20111012 
(accessed on 25 October 2011). See chapter three para 3.2. for discussion on corruption. 
59
 See chapter two for a discussion on the cogency of the Acts. 
60
Visser A ‗Momentum for broad BEE‘ Fin 24.com 9 October 2011 available at 
http://www.fin24.com/Economy/Momentum-for-broad-BEE-20111009 (accessed 24 October 2011) 
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Willful practices 
 
Secondly, billions of rands are reportedly being squandered on the procurement of 
goods and services for government, without following proper tender procedures and 
without having to deliver on the tender obligations.61 The competitive bidding arena is 
undermined by supply chain officials conflicted with self-interest. This practice sees non-
meritorious suppliers landing government contracts and thereafter failing to perform, 
resulting in more economic investment in new suppliers. 62  The reality is that the public 
procurement environment is facing challenges of some serious malpractices which 
undermine the proper application of the procurement and BEE legislation.  
 
These practices bear not only on the fiscus but also on the economic empowerment of 
the target groups.63 The SIU reported to parliament that the woes in public procurement 
have reached excessive levels. The unit is currently investigating 558 procurement 
contracts to the value of R1.9bn64 Further investigations are probing procurement 
irregularities to the tune of R330 million which is linked to the building and renovation of 
33 police stations.65 The SIU reported that government could lose as much as 20 
percent of its procurement budget (R30 Billion) to immoral behaviour. 
                                                          
61
De Lange D ‗Corruption Bombshell‘ Cape times 3 March 2011 1. 
62
AGSA report on Education and Health Departments (August 2011) para 2.2.3 (c) Education 
Department: original contract R45, 723,343 additional costs R63, 953,012. Health Department: original 
costs R313, 420,619 additional costs R536, 947,831. 
63
AGSA report on Education and Health Departments (August 2011) para 2.2.3 (c )  
64
Ndaba B ‗Yet another Gauteng ministry faces a fraud lawsuit‘ The Star 12 October 2011 
http://www.iol.co.za/the-star/yet-another-gauteng-ministry-faces-a-fraud-lawsuit-1.1155279 (accessed 
25 October 2011) 
65
SAPA ‗Government corruption: R30bn could be lost-SIU‘ Media24 12 October 2011 available at 
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/Govt-corruption-R30bn-could-be-lost-SIU-20111012 
(accessed 25 October 2011). 
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Skills 
 
Thirdly it seems that good governance is undermined by public officials displaying 
alarming degrees of ineptitude in applying legislation concerning the economic 
development of black people.66 The observance of empowering provisions during 
competitive bidding suffers because officials in supply chain management are not 
adequately trained for the job. There needs to be an enquiry into the existence of 
training important skill to decipher the legislative prescripts in order to execute the 
objectives of the legislation during tender adjudication.  
 
Recent media reports reveal that skills deficiency is costing provincial government R800 
million in law suits by service providers, for contract bungling by state officials in supply 
chain management.67 In addition contracts are not effectively monitored which leads to 
delays in completion which negate cost-effectiveness. Essentially this situation exists 
due to lack of technical68 and project management skills.69  The AGSA found that the 
ability for proper record keeping was also undermined by procurement officials; this 
failure compromises accountability as documents cannot be submitted for auditing.70  
 
                                                          
66
Intertrade Two (Pty) Ltd v Mec for Road and Public Works (2008) 1 All SA 142 (CK). 
67
Ndaba B ‗Yet another Gauteng ministry faces a fraud lawsuit‘ The Star 12 October 2011 
http://www.iol.co.za/the-star/yet-another-gauteng-ministry-faces-a-fraud-lawsuit-1.1155279 (accessed 
25 October 2011) 
68
AGSA Report on Education and Health (August 2011) para 2.3.3 (a) for 70% of the projects selected for 
detailed auditing, the projects were completed late or were still being constructed although the 
contractual completion dates had passed.  
69
AGSA Report on Education and Health Departments (August 2011) paras 3.2.4; 3.2.5. 
70
AGSA Report on Education and Health Departments (August 2011) para 3.2.1. 
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Conflict of interest 
 
Fourthly the SIU reports that South Africans are losing between R25 and R30 billion 
every year to conflict of interest and incompetence in public service.71 This unit is 
currently investigating 360 cases involving conflict of interest by public officials, 
amounting to R3.4 billion. 72  The SIU investigations of staff proved that the Department 
of Public Works paid at least R35 million to entities where staff held an undeclared 
interest. This self interest leads to choosing suppliers that lack capacity to deliver on the 
contract on the one hand and undermines cost-effectiveness on the other.73 Rose-
Ackerman argues that the procurement system should limit private gain available to 
officials because corruption and self interest by public officials can defeat procurement 
efforts to the contrary. 74 This seems pretty much the situation in South Africa; the 
measures in place are failing because there is a tendency of noncompliance to 
declaration of interest policies.     
  
Precautionary measures are often not enough because conflict of interest sometimes 
exists at the highest echelons of government who profit from their inside knowledge of 
                                                          
71
De Lange D ‗Taxpayers fleeced of R30bn‘ IOL News 13 October 2011  
available at http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/taxpayers-fleeced-of-r30bn-1.1156259 (accessed 13 
October 2011). 
72
SAPA ‗Government corruption: R30bn could be lost-SIU‘ Media24 12 October 2011 available at 
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/Govt-corruption-R30bn-could-be-lost-SIU-20111012 
(accessed 25 October 2011). 
73
AGSA Report on Education and Health Departments (August 2011) para 2.2.3 (b). Paragraph 1.1.3 (a) 
five months after beginning construction of the school on 19 January 2006, 89% of the contract value 
had already been paid to the contractor. The project was suspended as the school was situated on the 
Mbombela soccer stadium site and had to be demolished to make way for the new stadium. The budget 
increased from R508 953 to R8, 5 million for the subsequent temporary structures that were built for the 
school‘s operation. However, these structures also have to be demolished as they were constructed on 
a railway site. Madonsela P ‗Public Protector a media briefing on the release of the SAPS lease report‘ 
22 February 2011 available. http://www.pprotect.org/index.asp (accessed 3 March 2011). 
74
Rose-Ackerman S Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform (1999) 68. 
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bids and political connections. Such ‗grand-corruption‘ is not always the focus but rather 
middle-level procurement decisions controlled by professional civil servants.75 ‗Grand- 
corruption‘ occurs where government transfers large financial benefits to private firms 
through procurement contracts and the award of concessions. Also bribes transfer 
monopoly rents to private investors with a share to the corrupt officials.76  The recent 
lease debacle is a case in point where senior officials were censored for by-passing 
tender procedures in leasing premises for the police. This conduct exists because public 
officials have the power to assign scarce benefits and enforce onerous costs.77 The 
fortunate aftermath of this matter is that the responsible minister has been removed 
from her post and has resigned as Member of Parliament: in addition the Department of 
Public Works has admitted that there is something serious amiss in the control of the 
department. 
 
Schwarz argues that if procurement distinctions are properly managed, it will fade over 
time and give way to common economic empowerment to all which can lead to 
commonly produced enhanced strength in the market.78 This common economic 
empowerment is the concept that South Africans should aspire to and for this reason 
the government‘s economic success will be determined by the success of BEE. All 
indications are that if bad practices are not nipped in the bud, preferential procurement 
will not reap the desired result. 
 
                                                          
75
Rose-Ackerman (1999) 65. 
76
Rose-Ackerman (1999) 27 
77
Rose-Ackerman (1999) 39. 
78
Schwartz J ‗On Globalisation and Government Procurement (2003) in Arrowsmith S & Thybus M (eds) 
Public Procurement: The Continuing Revolution (2003) 40. 
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1.5 Aims and significance of the study  
 
Preliminary investigation has shown that the objective of preferential procurement is not 
being attained; gaining a significant number of black people into the mainstream of the 
economy has remained a challenge.79  This study will attempt to determine the reasons 
for this relative failure by enquiring into the objectives of legislation and the 
implementation of those objectives during public tendering. 
 
First this study intends to examine the legal regime that embraces preferential 
procurement and broad-based BEE. The transformation of the legislation over the last 
eight years will be highlighted, in order to express the influence of the amendments. In 
the discussion there will be a critical analysis of the Procurement Act and Regulations 
together with the BBBEE Act and BEE Codes. Although there is literature in the field of 
public procurement the coherence between the two main legislation governing 
procurement, (Procurement Act and the BBBEE Act) has not enjoyed close scrutiny.  
 
Secondly a further objective is to assess the conduct of officials in supply chain 
management (SCM) and the manner in which they exercise their responsibilities during 
the adjudication of tenders. Evidently the awarding of public tenders is notoriously 
subject to influence and manipulation and the constitutional requirements are more 
breached than observed.80 Thus the thesis will focus on the ability to observe the 
constitutional imperatives during competitive bidding procedures. This will in particular 
                                                          
79
Bolton P The Legal Regulation of Government Procurement in South Africa (published LLD thesis, 
University of the Western Cape, 2005) 608. 
80
Minister of Social Development v Phoenix Cash & Carry (2007)3 All SA 115 (SCA). 
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make reference to the way the legislation is applied during public tendering; an analysis 
of the various stages of competitive bidding will be pursued. It is during competitive 
bidding where the ability of SCM officials is tested.   Another area of conduct that 
compromises the integrity of preferential procurement is the flouting of the constitutional 
principles in the procurement clause. Scandalous reports of accounting officers in 
government disregarding the principles, recently came under scrutiny.81  In disregarding 
the principles of SCM, the constitutional principles in the procurement clause are 
flouted. 
 
Thirdly this thesis will analyse some of the willful practices that beleaguer the 
procurement environment. These malpractices82 have seen procurement laws being 
ignored and tender processes being by-passed. The way in which these malpractices 
are dealt with will be considered and improvements suggested. The significance of this 
study is to point out that the envisaged goal for reform by the year 201483 is being 
deferred by failure to root out or even suppress the practice of tender manipulation.  
 
 
1.6    Research question  
 
This study seeks to determine the causes for the failure in the objectives of preferential 
procurement. This will be done by first looking at the coherence between the 
Procurement Act and the BBBEE Act as well as the linkage between the respective 
                                                          
81
Madonsel P ‗Public Protector a media briefing on the release of the SAPS lease report‘ 22 February 
2011. 
82
See chapter three for a discussion on these malpractices. 
83
Zuma J ‗State of the nation address‘ 11 February 2010.     
www.statssa.gv.za/about_statssa/work_programmme_2010pdf  (accessed 20 April 2010). 
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regulations. Secondly, preliminary enquiries raise the belief that challenges of practices 
such as willful behaviour, incompetence and self-interest are negatively affecting the 
use of preferential procurement as an instrument. This research will dissect the 
implications of these practices on preferential procurement and attempt to provide some 
directions on how to inhibit these practices in the process of competitive bidding.  
 
1.7    Research methodology  
 
The information for this literature based thesis will be sourced from primary and 
secondary sources which will include, inter alia, relevant legislation, books, theses, 
journals, policy documents and newspaper articles. Case law forms a significant part of 
the enquiry in order to get the view of the court on the challenges met by public 
procurement. Furthermore, the latest amendments influencing preferential procurement 
and BEE will be researched.  
 
1.8    Overview of chapters 
 
The first chapter outlines the framework of this thesis. The second chapter explores the 
preferential procurement legislation in South Africa. This chapter will highlight the 
influence of the legislative measures on preferential procurement. In doing so the study 
will be investigating the alignment of the relevant framework Acts in order to highlight 
whether there is sufficient cogency between these Acts. There have been difficulties 
experienced as a result of the implementation of affirmative action in the framework 
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legislation. The enquiry will analyse how these Acts refer to the beneficiaries of BEE and 
the allocation of preferential points. 
 
Chapter three reviews the most pertinent challenges that are thwarting the success of 
preferential procurement. Recent reports and case law will be used to illustrate the 
extent and nature of these challenges. Attention will also be given to the various anti-
corruption measures implemented by government. 
 
Chapter four explains the process of competitive bidding, with the intention to illustrate 
the behaviour of public officials during the execution stage of the preferential 
procurement environment. The SCM system will be put under close scrutiny to uncover 
the mischief that officials display when planning, or during, public tender adjudication.  
 
Chapter five will conclude with recommendations which encourage the successful use 
of preferential procurement in promoting broad-based BEE. In the summation 
recommendations will be made on how to suppress or perhaps combat the challenges 
that defeats the efficacy of preferential public procurement. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE LEGAL REGIME DOMINATING PREFERENTIAL PUBLIC PROCUREMENT  
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
 
In view of the general acceptance that the procurement laws are not achieving their 
objectives,1 this chapter will look at the legislation regulating the field so as to determine 
the possible reasons for this relative failure. For this reason this chapter will pay close 
scrutiny to the interaction between the Preferential Public Procurement Framework Act 
(Procurement Act)2 and Procurement Regulations (2001, 2009, 2011)3 and how it relates 
to the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act (BBBEE Act)4 and BEE Codes5 
This study will entail an enquiry into the amendments brought about by the new 
Procurement Regulations 2011 which comes into effect on 7 December 2011. To analyse 
the procurement legislation this study will commence by explaining the basis for using 
public procurement to promote economic transformation.  
 
Furthermore the BEE legislation will be examined to illustrate how the BEE Codes seek to 
promote coherency and the same objectives that are needed for the proliferation of 
broad-based BEE. This chapter will explore salient points of the BEE legislation to draw 
attention to the core elements that the BEE Codes advance together with the way 
                                                          
1
See chapter one. 
2
Act 5 of 2000. 
3
Regulations in GN R725 GG 22549 of 10 August 2001; Draft Regulations in GN1103 GG 32489 of 2009; 
Regulations in GN R502 GG 34350 of 8 June 2011. 
4
Act 53 of 2003. Please note when referring to BBBEE Act together with the BEE Codes this study will call 
it the BEE Legislation. 
5
GN112 GG 29616 of 9 February 2007. 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
preferential points are allocated. These core elements that need to be considered for a 
more broad-based approach to BEE include ownership, management, skills development 
and preferential procurement with other black enterprises.  This discussion is essential to 
pin-point the target group and the manner in which benefits should accrue to them as 
prescribed by the legislation.6  
 
The Public Finance Management Act (PFMA)7 will receive a brief discussion in order to 
present its importance in the public procurement domain. This Act oversees all financial 
transactions in public administration and this chapter will explain how it is observed during 
procurement processes. 
 
2.2   Preferential public procurement promoting BEE  
 
The focus on BEE post apartheid was energised by the introduction of the use of 
preferential procurement as instrument of policy in 2000. This was realised through the 
preferential procurement legislation (Procurement Act and Regulations) together with the 
BBBEE Act and BEE Codes and was intended to bring about a coherent strategy for the 
implementation of a more broad-based focus for BEE.  
 
                                                          
6
BBBEE Act (2003) s1 refers to „broad-based black  empowerment‟ as the economic empowerment of all 
black people including women, workers, youth, people with disabilities and people living in rural areas 
through diverse but integrated socio-economic strategies. 
7
Act 1 of 1999. 
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The use of public procurement to extend economic prosperity to black people in South 
Africa is in parallel with international best practice.8  This is with particular reference to the 
use of state buying power to achieve its socio-economic objectives such as skills 
development, employment opportunities and economic empowerment for black people. 
To give credence to this, preferential procurement is addressed as a policy tool in the 
Constitution,9  whereby black people are given business opportunities to engage in the 
mainstream of the economy through procurement with government.10 In the main, 
preferential procurement is to be used to encourage and assist the emergence of black 
owned businesses, by providing black people with access to government contracts for 
goods or services.  When government is in need of goods or services, a tender process 
ensues whereby black people are the preferred bidders.11 In this way the government 
aims to relieve historically entrenched poverty. 
 
To help achieve this progress of black people, the public procurement system is governed 
by legislation12 that prescribes preferential points to this effect. It is self-evident that 
                                                          
8
Arrowsmith S „Public Procurement as an instrument of policy and the impact of market liberalisation‟1995  
Law Quarterly Review 243 notes that procurement in Northern Ireland was used to combat religious 
discrimination under the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Acts of 1976 and 1989. Non-compliance led 
to disqualification from participation in the procurement of Northern Island departments. 
9
Section 217. 
10
Watermeyer R „The Use of Targeted Procurement as an Instrument of Poverty Alleviation and Job 
Creation in Infrastructure Projects‟ (2000) Public Procurement Law Review 232. 
11
This is subject to a number of provisions see para 2.4.  
12
Procurement Act s2 (1) An organ of state must determine its preferential procurement policy and 
implement it within the following framework: 
    (a) A preference point system must be followed;     
    (b) (i) for contracts with a Rand value above a prescribed amount a maximum of 10 points   may be 
allocated for specific goals as contemplated in paragraph (d) provided that the lowest acceptable 
tender scores 90 points for price;     
         (ii) for contracts with a Rand value equal to or below a prescribed amount a maximum of 20 points 
may be allocated for specific goals as contemplated in paragraph (d) provided that the lowest 
acceptable tender scores 80 points for price; 
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procurement as a policy tool should be regarded as an integral part of the country‟s 
economic growth and transformation.13 The question is not whether South Africa can 
afford to use preferential public procurement as a policy tool, but rather whether it can 
afford not to. 
 
2.3 The objectives of preferential procurement 
 
 
The idea behind using preferential or targeted procurement is to provide black people with 
opportunities to participate in public procurement, despite their lack of the necessary 
resources, capacity or expertise. The environment, in which these aspirations are to be 
achieved, must have regard for the pressure it places on the public purse.14   
 
South Africa uses a „targeted procurement‟ system similar to what was successfully 
applied in Malaysia; in both cases the political majority is targeted for preferential 
procurement.15  Through targeted procurement small businesses can access markets and 
thereby create business opportunities for this sector. The success of preferential 
procurement in South Africa will, however, depend on appropriate planning, clear 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
BBBEE Act (2003) s9(1) In order to promote the purposes of the Act, the Minister may by notice in the 
Gazette issue codes of good practice on black economic empowerment that may include- 
   (b) qualification criteria for preferential purposes for procurement and other economic activities.  
   (c) Indicators to measure broad-based black economic empowerment. 
   See para 2.3 for a discussion on verification of BEE bidders. 
13
Bolton P Law of Government Procurement in South Africa (2007) 259. 
14
Bolton P „The Use of Government Procurement as an Instrument of Policy‟ (2004)121(3) South African 
Law Journal 625. 
15
Mc Crudden C „Integration of Social Policy into Sustainable Public Procurement: Using public 
procurement to achieve social outcomes‟ A study for the United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs (2004) 261 available at www.edf.org.uk/news/ChrisMcCruddenPaper.pdf (accessed 10 
June 2010).
 
Emsley I The Malaysian Experience of Affirmative Action Lessons for South Africa (1996). 
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identification of goals, and the willingness and ability to enforce appropriate sanctions on 
contractors failing to deliver on the social objectives to which they are contractually 
committed.16   
 
Furthermore the success of preferential procurement is largely due to the fact that it 
targets those „who ought to benefit‟ in a regulated manner.17 Most importantly, targeted 
groups (black people) should be motivated to take advantage of the preferential public 
procurement opportunities presented, and there should be measures in place by which 
the bona fides of target groups can readily be established.18  
 
 
For this reason verification agencies have been established through the BEE Codes19. 
The BBBEE Act20 provides that indicators should be put in place to measure broad-based 
black economic empowerment. These indicators are contained in the BEE Codes 21 
under the generic scorecard. Each of the seven core elements contained in the scorecard 
is measured in an enterprise in order to obtain a BBBEE status level.22  This status level 
of a bidder is the BBBEE status received by a measuring entity based on the bidder‟s 
overall performance using the generic scorecard. Once such evaluation is done the 
enterprise is issued with a BEE status level certificate through a South African National 
                                                          
16
Hawkins J & Wells J „Modifying Infrastructure Procurement to Enhance Social Development‟ (2008) 4 
ATDF Journal 61 available at http://www.atdforum.org/IMG/pdf_Modifying_infrastructure_John_Jill.pdf 
(accessed 10 June 2010). 
17
Watermeyer R (2000) 233. 
18
Watermeyer R (2000) 228. 
19
 Section 10. 
20
Section 9(1) (c). 
21
BEE Codes (2007) s8. 
22
BEE Codes (2007) s7. 
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Accreditation System, accredited verification agency or by registered auditors approved 
by the Independent Regulatory Board of Auditors.23 
 
2.4 The allocation of preferential points for BEE 
 
What is essential for, and characterises, the preferential procurement policy is the 
implementation of a preference point system that must be followed. 24  These preference 
points are predetermined by the BEE Codes to BEE compliant enterprises in a dual scale 
system.25 This basically means that price and preferential goals are the important criteria 
determining the tender award.  
 
Although price is important, other criteria such as equity ownership26  and development 
goals27 as contemplated by the scorecard also play a determining role in the award. This 
means that preference points scored must first and foremost include points for equity 
ownership28 by black citizens, and in addition preference points may also be scored for 
achieving the other six core elements provided for by the scorecard.  However preference 
                                                          
23
Procurement Regulations (2011) reg 10. 
24
Grinaker LTA Ltd and Another v Tender Board (Mpumalanga) and Others (2002) 3 All SA 336 (T) para 38 
(hereafter Grinaker). Procurement Act s2 (1) (a) A preferential point system must be followed. (emphasis 
added. 
25
Procurement Regulations 2011 reg 5 (1) states the 80/20 preference point system applies to contracts 
with a value equal to or above R30 000 up to R1 million, and regulation 6(1) states the 90/10 preference 
point system applies to contracts with a value of more than R1million. 
26
Penfold G & Reyburn P „Public Procurement‟ in Woolman S  et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 
2ed (2004) (2004) para 25-16 notes that: „[e]quity ownership is equated to the percentage of an 
enterprise or business owned by individuals or, in respect of a company, the percentage of a company‟s 
shares that are owned by individuals who are actively involved in the management of the enterprise or 
business and exercise control over the enterprise, commensurate with their degree of ownership at the 
closing date of tender.‟ 
27
Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) as in GG 16085 of 23 November 1994. RDP goals are 
now contained in the seven core elements of the generic scorecard provided by the BBBEE Codes. 
28
BEE Codes generic score cards code 000 provide for 20 points for ownership. Code 100 provides for the 
ownership key principles. Procurement Regulations (2011) reg 5(2); 6 (2) provides a B-BEE status level 
contributor table that includes those points for ownership. 
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points may only be scored to the maximum of 10 or 20 points, respectively, depending on 
the value of the tender.  
 
The reason for the dual-scale system is to redress past economic imbalances, which 
placed black people in the impoverished position they are in today. As a result they 
cannot compete effectively economically because they are unable to offer the best prices 
for government contracts; this is the reason that price cannot be the only determining 
criterion.29 Incidentally, the tender documents must specify which one of the dual-scale 
preference point systems will be utilised in the adjudication of tenders.30 Needless to say 
it is only after a bidder has submitted an „acceptable tender‟31 (which should include their 
BBBEE verification certificates), that the eligibility of preference points arises.  
 
2.5  Legislative provisions for preferential procurement 
 
 
The decision to award procurement contracts to black people is not taken arbitrarily, on 
the contrary it is a complex decision dominated by a host of Acts. Because, procuring 
goods or services for the state involves the spending of state resources the overarching 
legislation for this is the PFMA and Treasury Regulations. In addition it was necessary to 
have legislation to specifically promote preferential, to ensure that the economic 
promotion of black people is done fairly, as to avoid those it did not intend to benefit. For 
this reason the Procurement Act and Regulations was implemented to provide a 
                                                          
29
Penfold G & Reyburn P (2004) 25-16. 
30
Regulations (2011) reg 3 (b). 
31
Procurement Act s1 (i) “acceptable tender” „means any tender which, in all respects, complies with the 
specifications and conditions of tender as set out in the tender document.‟  
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framework to state entities to guide their policies for preferential procurement.  This Act 
provides for the allocation of preferential points to HDIs by measuring specific goals.  
Subsequent to this legislation, the BBBEE Act and BEE Codes were enacted to provide 
for a more broad-based approach, whereby seven core elements are observed when 
allocating preferential points which are prescribed. This legislation (BBBEE Act and 
Codes) was also aimed at bringing about a more coherent strategy for BEE. However this 
coherency was not to because the two Acts promote two separate visions. 
 
This disharmony has been the situation since the implementation of the BBBEE Act in 
2003.  Which means, for the past eight years the legislation promoting preferential 
procurement, has been causing disparity as to the recipients of preferential points and the 
evaluation of those points. 
 
The importance of the procurement legislation was highlighted in the CEO of the South 
African Social Security Agency N.O and Other v Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd32 
where the Supreme Court of Appeal intimated that once legislation echoing the 
constitutional demands of section 217(1) is put in place, the procurement process must 
take place within the constraints of such legislation. It is  incumbent on government not to 
award public tenders indiscriminately to black people without due consideration for the 
laws and policies that is implemented for this purpose, chiefly,  the PFMA,33 Treasury 
Regulations 2005,34 the Procurement Act and Regulations 2011 and the BBBEE Act and 
                                                          
32
(2011) 3 All SA 233 (SCA) para 15. 
33
Act 1 of 1999, as amended by Act 29 of 1999. 
34
GN R225 GG 27388 of 15 March 2005; as amended by GN R146 GG 29644 of 20 February 2007. 
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BEE Codes. How the legislation and its amendments influence preferential procurement 
needs to be explored to expose how it will affect the procurement environment. 
 
2.5.1  Legislation dominating preferential procurement 
 
 
Arrowsmith argues that success in public procurement can only be achieved if the legal 
rules are stabilised by an adequate procurement „environment‟.35  First there must be a 
well-designed legislative framework. Secondly, proper recruitment and training of 
procurement personnel is key in ensuring that discretion is exercised wisely36  against the 
backdrop of the framework legislation, when adjudicating tenders.  In both instances the 
procurement system in South Africa is lacking. First, this is evidenced by the Procurement 
Act (the framework act for preferential procurement) being misaligned with the BBBEE 
Act (framework act for BEE).37 Secondly, due to this disharmony procurement personnel 
cannot exercise their decisions on a rational basis since this is influenced by the dual 
definition given for target groups and the different methods of procuring preferential 
points. This incoherency has led to much confusion in the public procurement arena due 
to the tendency by public officials to ignore the BBBEE Act and apply the provisions of the 
Procurement Act in allocating preferential points.38  
 
2.5.2 The Public Finance Management Act of 1999 and Treasury Regulations 2005  
 
                                                          
35
Arrowsmith S, Linarelli J & Wallace D Jr Regulating Public Procurement: National and International 
Perspective (2000) 18. 
36
Arrowsmith S, Linarelli J & Wallace D Jr (2000) 19. See chapter four para 4.3 for discussion on skills. 
37
See para 2.5.3 for discussion on the disharmony. 
38
AGSA Report on Investigation into the Procurement of Various Contracts at the Gauteng Provincial 
Department of Roads and Transport (June 2011) (hereafter AGSA report June 2011); AGSA Report to 
Eastern Cape Provincial Legislature on Investigation at Department of Roads and Transport (July 2010). 
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Public procurement entails the use of public money and the PFMA also plays a central 
role in procurement procedures. The PFMA and Treasury Regulations39 regulate financial 
management in the national and provincial spheres of government while the Municipal 
Finance Management Act (MFMA) 40 similarly dictates sound financial management in the 
affairs of municipalities and other institutions in the local government sphere. Evidently 
the PFMA,41 Treasury Regulations42 (which also regulate  procurement of goods and 
services and SCM) 43  and MFMA44 resonates with section 217 (1) because it mirrors the 
same sentiment that procurement processes must be  „fair, equitable, transparent, 
competitive and cost-effective‟. The inclusion of constitutonal principles in the main 
legislation that governs public expendicture in the state, indicate that organs of state are 
bound by these principles.45  
 
Furthermore the Treasury Regulations46 include prescipts for SCM on the the acquisition 
of goods and services which provide that the SCM systems must consider the 
Procurement Act and the BBBEE Act when contracting for goods and services.47  It 
makes good financial sense that the PFMA applies to all government departments, 
                                                          
39
Government Gazette 27388 GN R225 of 15 March 2005; as amended by GN R146 GG 29644 of 20 
February 2007. 
40
Act 56 of 2003.    
41
Section. 38(1)(a)(iii) provides that the accounting officer for a department, trading entity, 
or constitutional institution must ensure the use and maintenance of “an appropriate procurement 
and provisioning system which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective” 
and section 51(1)(a)(iii) provides that an accounting authority for a public entity must ensure that 
that public entity does the same. 
42
Regulation 16A3.2(a) A supply chain management system referred to in paragraph 16A.3.1 must– be fair, 
equitable, transparent, competitive and cost effective. 
43
Regulation 16A6. See chapter four para 4.2.1 for discussion on SCM. 
44
Sections 111–12 provide that each municipality and municipal entity must have and implement a supply 
chain management policy that is “fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective” and complies 
with a prescribed regulatory framework that is “fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective.”   
45
CAE Construction CC v Petroleum Oil & Gas Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd & Others (2007) JOL 18912 (C) 
    para 27. 
46
Regulations 16A. 
47
Regulations 16A3.2 (b),(c). 
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parastatals, utilities and government-owned enterprises as designated by the act.48  
Needless to say a breach of section 217(1) principles during tender adjudication is a 
breach of constitutional principles and also a breach of the PFMA (or MFMA).  
 
The PFMA no doubt plays a pivotal role in the functioning of public contracting entities 
since it lays the ground rules for public financial transactions and obliges public bodies to 
maintain appropriate procurement systems.49  Despite this, recent findings by the  Auditor 
General of South Africa (AGSA) revealed that section 217 (1) is also contravened by 
officials not keeping proper centralised filing systems in maintaining SCM policies and 
processes and thereby failed to submit reports for auditing.50 This behaviour falls foul of 
the PFMA and leads to unlawful behaviour. In Steenkamp v Provincial Tender Board, 
Eastern Cape51 the Constitutional Court averred that „in our constitutional dispensation 
every failure of administrative justice amounts to a breach of a constitutional duty and is 
unlawful.‟  
 
Such unlawful behaviour was also displayed in the recent South African Police (SAPS) 
lease debacle. The Public Protector was tasked to investigate the non-compliance with 
tender procedures and thereby constitutional principles for the leasing of the SAPS 
headquarters in the amount of R500 million.52 The findings showed that this improper 
                                                          
48
Williams S „The use of exclusions for corruption in developing country procurement: The case of South 
Africa‟ (2007) 51 Journal of African Law 6. 
49
Williams S (2007) 6. 
50
AGSA Report (June 2011) para 1.2.2. 
51
(2007)(3) SA 121 (CC) para 137.   
52
Madonsela T „Public Protector, SAPS lease report‟ 22 February 2011. 
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behaviour occurred because the SAPS failed to implement proper controls in terms of 
SCM, as required by the PFMA and relevant procurement prescripts.53 
 
Moreover, the SAPS failed to comply „with the relevant provisions of the PFMA, Treasury 
Regulations and supply chain management rules and policies.‟54  There was also breach 
of fiduciary duty by the minister insofar as good governance in terms of the PFMA which 
led to maladministration and reckless dealing in public funds. 55   
 
2.5.3 The Procurement Act of 2000 and Regulations of 2011: Disharmony   between 
legislation creating a hindrance 
 
As noted the Procurement Act provides the framework within which organs of state 
should structure their preferential procurement policies. On the other hand the BBBEE Act 
provides for the framework for the broad-based application of BEE.  These Acts 
dominates the promotion of preferential procurement and therein lays the importance for 
its cogency.  
 
The congruency does not exist due to the fact that the Procurement Act56 provides for 
preferential points that must accrue to historically disadvantaged individuals (HDIs) by 
measuring specific goals and RDP goals.57  The BBBEE Act on the other hand accrues 
                                                          
53
Madonsela T „Public Protector: SAPS lease report‟ 22 February 2011.  
54
Madonsela T „Public Protector: SAPS lease report‟ 22 February 2011. 
55
Madonsela T „Public Protector: SAPS lease report‟ 22 February 2011. 
56
Section 2(1)(d)(i) the specific goals may include-  contracting with persons, or categories of persons, 
historically disadvantaged by unfair discrimination on the basis of race, gender or disability; DTI Policy 
Strategy (2003) para 3.22 refers to HDIs as collective reference to African, Coloured and Indian South 
African citizens unfairly discriminated against during the apartheid-era. 
57
Reconstruction and Development Program as published in GG 16085 dated 23 November 1994 provides 
for a description on these goals which is codified in the BEE Codes (2007) s8. 
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these preferential points to black people, by providing through the BEE Codes for a 
predetermined score card, detailing the points to be considered when calculating 
preferential points. The reason for this discord is the changed vision about the target 
groups promoted by the BEE legislation which advocates for more broad-based economic 
empowerment than the Procurement Act. 
 
This misalignment of the framework legislation has been a topic of discussion since 2003 
(when the BBBEE Bill was contemplated).58  In order to alleviate the discord the 
Procurement Regulations were redrafted. The Procurement Regulations were to define 
the target groups for BEE and provide for the accrual of preferential point in tandem with 
the BEE Codes. After eight years the Procurement Regulations 2011 were finally enacted 
and will be effective from 7 December 2011. Interestingly the finalised Procurement 
Regulations 2011 completely omitted any definition for the target group that should 
benefit from preferential procurement. This resulted in the Procurement Act continuing to 
cause distortions in this regard, and the Act needs amendment coherent to the BBBEE 
Act that defines the target group as black people. In addition the evaluation of preferential 
points as prescribed by the Procurement Act was not remedied by the Procurement 
Regulations 2011 which now prescribe the calculation of preference points as provided 
for in the BEE Codes. This is because subordinate legislation (Regulations) cannot 
remedy the framework Act (Procurement Act); it can only be remedied by amending the 
Act 
                                                          
58
Parliamentary Monitoring Group „National Treasury Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act: 
Hearings‟ 8 September 2003 (hereafter PMG Procurement Act hearings) available at 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20030907-preferential-procurement-policy-framework-act-hearings 
(accessed 30April 2011). 
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It is quite unfortunate that government has dragged its feet for eight years to fix the gap in 
the legislation and manages to come out with an end product that does not mend the two 
most important points namely, the identity of those who are to benefit and how the 
applicants should be viewed. Seemingly the Procurement Act will continue to create 
discontent and hindrance in the procurement environment.  For this reason this study will 
crystallise the time line preceding the implementation of the Procurement Regulations 
2011 to highlight the problems in the legislation that will continue to bedevil the 
procurement environment.   
 
2.5.3.1    Time line of disharmony 
 
As early as 2003 the parliamentary finance select committee59 held a hearing in 
parliament with regard to the problems that were proving troublesome when implementing 
the provisions of the Procurement Act. The contention at this hearing was that the 
Procurement Act‟s definition of HDIs which refers to the target groups is problematic and 
that it created loopholes. 60 An example of the unintended consequence of this definition 
is that a white, male owned business can transfer his business to his white spouse in 
order to obtain preferential points and thereby win public tenders without having to 
embrace any BEE ideologies.61 Furthermore the concerns were compounded by the 
following shortcomings in the Procurement Act: 
                                                          
59
PMG Procurement Act hearings 2003. 
60
PMG Procurement Act hearings 2003. 
61
PMG Procurement Act hearings 2003. 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
 „It provided no formulated means of applying policy (goals were set by officials 
without specific targets to be achieved); 
 it lacked mechanisms to monitor fronting („rent-a-black‟);  
 there was no uniformity in how different state organs applied the Act; 
 it was not aligned with the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) Act; 
 the RDP goals the Act aimed to achieve could not be measured; 
 the calculations required to award points were too many and too laborious.‟62   
The finance committee noted that the different definitions of beneficiaries in the Acts were 
untenable and urged that the Procurement Act be aligned with the BEE Bill.63  Despite 
this warning the BBBEE Act was implemented without amendment to the Procurement 
Act thereby causing the disagreement. In an attempt to remedy this, the Regulations 2001 
were to be redrafted in 200464 in anticipation of bringing the Procurement Act more in line 
with the BBBEE Act (of 2003).  
 
Notwithstanding this the National Treasury sent out a circular on 13 February 2007 to 
inform accounting officers of the latest development regarding the alignment of the 
Procurement Act, with the aims of the BBBEE Act and its related strategy.65 This circular 
related to the fact that the revised Procurement Act must be finalised and that the relevant 
                                                          
62
PMG Procurement Act hearings 2003. 
63
PMG Procurement Act hearings 2003. 
64
Draft Preferential Procurement Regulations, in GN 2174 GG 26863 of 4 October 2004.  
65
National Treasury „Supply Chain Management: Alignment of Preferential Procurement with the Aims of the 
BBBEE Act and its Related Strategy‟ para1, 18 April 2007 (hereafter National Treasury SCM  alignment 
of Preferential Procurement with the BBBEE Act)  available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/divisions/sf/sc/PPPFA/circular%20070419.pdf (accessed 30 April 2011) 
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Bill be submitted to parliament for consideration by June 2007.66 The revised legislation 
(Procurement Act) was intended to include:  
„broadening the basis of evaluation to beyond only equity ownership and the promotion of 
the non-quantifiable RDP goals; bidders will also be able to earn preferences for other 
elements such as the number of black people in management, transfer of skills, equity 
employment, indirect empowerment by procuring goods and services from black 
enterprises and socio-economic development initiatives.‟
 67
 
 
This was clearly an attempt to bring the Procurement Act in concert with the objectives of 
the BBBEE Act. However in the meantime the National Treasury urged accounting 
officers and accounting authorities to apply the current Procurement Act68 and the 
Procurement Regulation 2001. This status quo was to remain until such time that the 
revised Procurement Act was officially enacted and the revised regulations pertaining 
thereto were formally promulgated by the Minister of Finance.69 The revised Procurement 
Act had not seen the light of day when in 2009 this disjuncture in the legislation came 
under scrutiny again. This was when the National Treasury made presentations to the 
parliamentary briefing committee that the Procurement Act was not aligned with the 
broader goals of the BBBEE Act.70 
 
                                                          
66
National Treasury SCM  Alignment of Preferential Procurement with the BBBEE Act para 3.2.The National 
Treasury will convene various workshops and training initiatives to support accounting officers and 
accounting authorities in the implementation of the new preferential procurement policy as soon as the 
Act and its Regulations are amended para 4.2. 
67
National Treasury SCM Alignment of Preferential Procurement with the BBBEE Act para 3.4. 
68
Act 5 of 2000. 
69
National Treasury SCM alignment of Preferential Procurement with the BBBEE Act para 4.1. 
70
Parliamentary Monitoring Group „National Treasury Preferential Procurement Draft Regulations Briefing‟ 9 
September 2009 (hereafter PMG „Draft Regulations briefing 2009‟) available at 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20090909-draft-preferential-procurement-regulations (accessed 3 May 
2011). 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
It was again highlighted that the Procurement Act71 incorporated a preferential point 
system that used the promotion of specific and 13 RDP goals to determine preference 
points during public tendering.72 This is in contrast with the BBBEE Act that refers to black 
people as beneficiaries and a score table that predetermines preferential points, in the 
2007 BEE Codes.73  Furthermore, with the implementation of the BEE Codes, the 
Procurement Regulations of 2004 was updated in parallel with these Codes. This was 
done by a working group consisting of the National Treasury and the BEE unit of DTI, and 
the draft Procurement Regulations 2009 was the product of this labour, which was aimed 
at mending the rift in the legislation. The new draft Procurement Regulations 2009 
replaced the awarding of preferential points on the basis of HDI status and the promotion 
of RDP goals, with the BEE rating of a bidder as per the predetermined table74 (as 
provided for in the BEE Codes). Furthermore these draft Preferential Regulations 200975  
also defined black people as the generic term identical to the BBBEE Act.  
 
The National Treasury recommended that in the short term the amended draft 
Procurement Regulations 2009 be used.76 In contradiction the National Treasury 
recommended that „in the short-term the Procurement Act would be retained‟.77 
Cognisance should reflect that the National Treasury recommended that the draft 
Procurement Regulations of 2009, which were not effective and not law yet, be used. 
                                                          
71
Sections  2(1) (b) (i); (d) (i); (ii)   
72
PMG Draft Regulations briefing 2009. 
73
BEE Codes in GN 112 GG 29617 of 9 February 2007. Objectives: s1.2 specifies the application of the 
Codes and the basis for measurements under the Codes; s1.5 specifies the elements of the BBBEE 
measurable under the Generic Scorecard. 
74
PMG Draft Regulations briefing 2009. Draft Regulations 2009 reg 4(3); 5(3); 6(3). 
75
Regulation 1 (f)"Black people" is a generic term, which bears the same meaning assigned to this 
expression in the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act, 2003 and its Codes of Good Practice. 
76
PMG Draft Regulations briefing 2009. 
77
PMG Draft Regulations briefing 2009. 
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Furthermore, there was no further recommendation to update the Procurement Act; 
instead it was recommended that the Procurement Act be completely repealed in the long 
term. This contradicted the earlier circular in 2007 referring to the finalisation of the 
revised Procurement Act. This ultimately meant that the ambiguities in the definition of 
black people and the measurement of preference points remained in use. 
  
This perpetuated the situation as public officials may choose to apply the Procurement 
Act or the BBBEE Act, when measuring preferential points. The much awaited final 
Procurement Regulations 2011 failed to eliminate this choice and the much needed 
amended Procurement Act escaped the procurement domain. However the Procurement 
Regulations 2011 which is discussed next do offer some attention grabbing changes.  
 
 
2.5.3.2 The Procurement Regulations 2011 amendments and its impact on 
preferential procurement 
 
The Aids Law Project had raised concerns in its submissions to the regulations when it 
was still in draft form. It submitted that the Procurement Act and Regulations78 were in 
conflict in the criteria that should be considered when not awarding the bid to the highest 
scorer. 79 The Procurement Act provides for objective criteria80  to determine this, whereas 
the draft Procurement Regulations 2009 (and Regulations 2001), provided for reasonable 
and justifiable grounds to be determined when awarding to such a bidder.  This was 
                                                          
78
Draft Procurement Regulations (2009).  
79
Aids Law Project „Submission on Draft Preferential Procurement Regulations 2009‟ 6 available at 
http://www.tac.org.za/community/files/file/ALP%20submission%20on%20draft%20Preferential%20Procur
ement%20Regulations,%202009.pdf (accessed 22April 2011). 
80
See para 2.6.1 for discussion on objective criteria. 
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remedied by bringing the Procurement Regulations 201181  in line with section 2(1) (f) of 
the Procurement Act which provides for objective criteria to be observed when awarding 
to a bidder not scoring highest points.  
 
The court in Sizabonke Civils cc t/a Pilcon Projects v Zululand District Municipality and 
Others82  declared regulation 8 of Regulations 200183  invalid on the basis that it 
conflicted with the Procurement Act. The contention was that the regulation referred to 
functionality and price which gives the impression that the points allocated for price may 
be split between price and functionality. In contrast to this the Procurement Act84 provides 
for the allocation of points for price only. This ground of invalidity was remedied by the 
Procurement Regulations 201185 providing that points for functionality should be 
evaluated separately from points for price.  
 
Whether this solves the problem need to be answered in the light of the AGSA report into 
provincial procurement irregularities.86 It was found that the 90 points allocated for price is 
as practice split into 30 points for functionality and 60 points for price. Notably the AGSA 
do not lament this as a deviation from the Procurement Act, despite this report being 
completed after the court in Sizabonke87 declared the Procurement Regulations 2001, 
                                                          
81
Regulation 7 (1) A contract may be awarded to a tenderer that did not score the highest total number of 
points, only in accordance with s2 (1) (f) of the Act. 
82
(10878/2009) ZAKZPHC 21 (2010) para 30 (hereafter Sizabonke). 
83
Regulation 8 (1) an organ of state must, in the tender documents, indicates if, in respect of a particular 
tender invitation, tenders will be evaluated on functionality and price. Regulation 8(3) the total combined 
points allowed for functionality and price may, in respect of tenders with an estimated Rand value above 
R500, 000, not exceed 90 points. 
84
Section 2(1) (b) (i) provide for contracts with a Rand value above a prescribed amount a maximum of 10 
points may be allocated for specific goals as contemplated in paragraph (d) provided that the lowest 
acceptable tender scores 90 points for price. 
85
Regulation 4. 
86
AGSA report June 2011 para 10.2.1.7 (a). 
87
(10878/2009)  ZAKZPHC 21 (2010). 
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(providing for price and functionality), invalid. Interestingly the investigation revealed that 
the SCM officials chose to use the Procurement Act to calculate preferential points and 
the term HDIs were used to calculate equity ownership, in effect ignoring the BBBEE Act 
and BEE Codes.88 
 
The Procurement Regulations 2011 further reflect the following amendments: 
 For ease of reference the Procurement Regulations 201189  include a BBBEE 
status table which measures the BEE status of bidders on seven levels.90  This 
conforms to the BEE Codes which provides for a generic scorecard to this effect. 
What this means is that BEE is not only measured in terms of ownership, 
management and control of the business, but extends a more broad-based 
approach, which include inter alia enterprise development, rural development and 
points for new entrants.91  On the other hand the Procurement Act still provides for 
a different formula when measuring preference points which allows for discretion in 
applying specific goals (this cannot be remedied by the Procurement Regulations 
2011). It is also noted by the AGSA report that SCM officials elect to observe the 
Procurement Act during preferential procurement92 and thereby do not promote the 
broad-based economic empowerment as anticipated by the BBBEE Act and BEE 
Codes.  
                                                          
88
AGSA report June 2011 para10.2.1.7 (b). 
89
Regulation 5(2). 
90
These levels are discussed in para 2.7. 
91
See para 2.7 for a discussion on the BBBEE Act and BEE Codes. 
92
AGSA report June 2011 para10.2.1.7 (b). 
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 The Regulations 201193 are further extended to apply to all organs of state 
including, national and provincial departments, municipalities, parliament, 
provincial legislatures and schedule 3A and 3C public entities (as contemplated by 
the PFMA). This amendment resolves a major point of contention in the earlier 
code. An improvement brought about by the regulations is that organs of state 
must apply a preferential procurement system which is compliant with the 
Procurement Act and Regulations.94  These entities had a choice to deviate from 
the framework of the Procurement Act and Regulations under the Procurement 
Regulations 2001.95 
This creates uniformity as parastals like ESKOM, TELKOM and TRANSNET must 
observe the Procurement Act and Regulations when engaging in the procurement 
of goods and services. This inclusion was necessary bearing in mind the vast 
budgets96 these parastatals spend on procurement. 
 The threshold value for bids going out on tender has also increased depending on 
the point system used. 97 This gives SMMEs access to bigger contract with 
government, and if successful this will empower those enterprises to expand their 
employment base. 
                                                          
93
Regulation 2(1). 
94
Regulations (2011) 2((2) An organ of state contemplated in sub-regulation (1) must, unless the Minister of 
Finance has directed otherwise, only apply a preferential procurement system which is in accordance with 
the Act and these regulations. 
95
Regulation 2(3) an organ of state may deviate from the framework contemplated in section 2 of the Act in 
respect of a pre-determined tariff based professional appointments. 
96
Creamer T „Eskom recovers to R3,6bn profit, but culls R15bn worth of capex in the process‟ Polity 2 June 
2010 reports that ESKOM has a procurement budget of R9 billion available at 
http://www.polity.org.za/article/eskom-recovers-to-r36bn-profit-but-culls-r15bn-worth-of-capex-in-the-
process-2010-06-02-1 (accessed 10 October 2011). 
97
The 80/20 preference points system has been increased from R500 000 to R1 000 000.The 90/10 value 
has been increased to bids of more than R1 million rand. 
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Notwithstanding theses changes, the Procurement Regulations 2011 do not resolve the 
discord between the BBBEE Act and the Procurement Act. To remedy this, the 
Procurement Act has to be aligned to the way the BEE Codes measure preferential 
points, and the way the BBBEE Act defines the preferential points recipients, which 
means the Procurement Act should be amended. Failing to amend the Procurement Act 
will prolong the disharmony; that effect will be elaborated on next. 
 
2.5.3.3 The impact of what was not harmonised  
 
The economic empowerment of black people is undermined by the points system under 
the Procurement Act which enables white-owned companies to undercut prices and 
thereby benefit from tender awards without promoting BEE. For example a white-owned 
company with disabled white people and white women offering the best price will outscore 
a black-owned company with a higher price. This is as a result of the Procurement Act 
including white females98 and white disabled people as HDIs, meaning they can score 
preferential points through public tendering, lawfully, without having to subscribe to any 
policy to broaden BEE.  This situation is untenable in sustaining preferential procurement.  
 
The problem with the Procurement Regulations 2011 is that it was cross-referenced to the 
problems created by the Regulations 2001. That is why it was drafted on the back of the 
BEE Codes on how to measure preferential points, without due regard to the provisions of 
the Procurement Act. Instead the Procurement Act should have been amended as such 
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Notwithstanding that black women were discriminated by law, whilst white women bore disadvantage due 
to social preferences.  
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and the Procurement Regulations 2011 should have followed suit. The current 
Procurement Regulations created a new problem which now renders it incoherent with 
the Procurement Act. The evidenced by the fact  that the Procurement Regulations 2011 
provide for a table that predetermines the preferential points for BEE compliant bidders, 
whereas the Procurement Act measures preferential points through specific and RDP 
goals. 
 
This compounded the cogency problem in public procurement since the regulations may 
not be inconsistent with the Procurement Act, as this is against the principle of legality.99 
The fact is the impugned Procurement Act remains law together with the inconsistent 
Regulations 2011. This is unlawful and therefore cause for concern. This state of affairs 
will cause confusion in bid adjudication during which SCM officials100  must consider the 
evaluation and adjudication of public procurement in terms of the Procurement Act and 
BBBEE Act.  
 
This inconsistency aids fronting because black people can front for white companies 
since the Procurement Act does not employ the strict rules for measuring equity as the 
BEE Codes do. A case in point is the ground breaking Viking Pony Africa Pumps (Pty) Ltd 
t/a Tricom Africa v Hidro-Tech Systems (Pty) Ltd and Another101 where the director 
(black) had left the company, but they continued to use him as a statistic to score 
preferential points and thereby acquired several tender awards. If the BEE Codes are 
correctly applied this situation may be circumvented as the Codes dictate re-evaluation of 
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Sizabonke (10878/2009) ZAKZPHC 21 (2010) para 28. 
100
Treasury Regulations 16A3.2 (b); (c). 
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(2011) 1 SA 327 (CC). 
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the BEE verification certificate every two years, to ensure that the BEE status of a bidder 
is monitored. This is further supported by DTI establishing a central database containing 
the information underlying each verification certificate.102 
 
2.6 The Procurement Act: Possible disregard of the highest preferential points 
 
Bolton reasons that the most controversial procurement provision is section 2 (1) (f) of the 
Procurement Act103 which provides that: „the contract must be awarded to the tenderer 
who scores the highest points, unless objective criteria in addition to those contemplated 
in paragraphs (d) and (e) justify the award to another tenderer‟. This provision is unusual 
since public officials in public procurement are expected to guard against wasteful 
expenditure and observe value for money104 whereas this regulation necessarily 
promotes that a tender may be awarded to a bidder offering a higher price.  Moreover the 
Procurement Act expresses in peremptory terms that the contract must be awarded to the 
bidder scoring the highest points (which means the lowest price).  The court also 
confirmed in RHI Joint Venture v Minister of Roads and Public Works105  that the tender 
board has the special responsibility of ensuring that tenders awarded constitute the 
minimum costs to the government. This being said, the major and sole consideration is 
                                                          
102
BEE Codes s10.9. 
103
Bolton P „The Use of Government Procurement as an Instrument of Policy‟ (2004) 121(3) SALJ 627. Also 
see Regulations (2011) s7 a contract may be awarded to a tenderer that did not score the highest total 
number of points, only in accordance with section 2(1)(f) of the Act. 
104
Treasury Regulations 9.1 also see PFMA s38; 76 (2) (e). 
105
(2003) 5 BCLR 544 (CK) para 25 (hereafter RHI Joint Venture). 
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that points are allocated for price and empowerment; the combination of best price and 
BBBEE status are the determining factors.106  
 
The court in Grinaker 107 agreed with this approach and held that, the awarding of a 
tender to a bidder not tendering the lowest price, will conflict with, not only the 
Procurement Act but also the Constitution insofar as section 217(1) is concerned. This will 
result in a contract which is not competitive or cost-effective. The court emphasised the 
importance of the lowest price, by overturning the tender board‟s decision (which saw the 
tender awarded to the bidder with the highest price) and awarded the tender to the bidder 
offering the lowest price.108  
 
Nevertheless, although the bidder scoring the highest points must be selected, the 
highest points with the lowest price do not necessarily land a bidder the tender award.  
This is contemplated by the Procurement Act109 which provides for objective criteria to be 
considered in awarding the tender to a bidder not scoring the highest points.110 What this 
ultimately means, is that there must first be a determination of which bidder scored the 
highest points based on their BBBEE status level certificate. Secondly a determination of 
whether objective criteria (as in the Procurement Act) exist, in addition to those 
                                                          
106
Grinaker LTA Ltd and Another v Tender Board (Mpumalanga) and Others (2002) 3 All SA 336 (T) para 
66 (hereafter Grinaker). 
107
Grinaker (2002) 3 All SA 336 (T) para 70. 
108
Grinaker (2002) 3 All SA 336 (T) para 70. 
109
Procurement Act s 2(1)(f) the contract must be awarded to the tenderer who scores the highest points, 
unless objective criteria in addition to those contemplated in paragraphs (d) and (e) justify the award to 
another tenderer‟ (emphasis added). Paragraphs (d) and (e) set out specific goals for which preference 
points can be awarded and require that any goals for which preference points will be awarded be 
indicated in the conditions of tender. 
110
See para 6.3.1. 
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contemplated in the core elements of the BEE Codes, justifying the award of a tender to 
another bidder.111  
 
The legislature envisaged that, over and above the criteria noted in the Procurement 
Act,112 there must be other objective criteria justifying awarding the bid to another 
tenderer.113 It stands to reason that the legislature did not intend that the criteria 
contemplated in the BEE Codes should be taken into account twice.114  Cognisance 
should be taken that such other objective criteria only come into consideration when 
considering a tender other than the one scoring the highest points.115  
 
Despite the fact that a bidder with a higher price (subject to objective criteria) may be 
awarded the tender, value for money is seen as the primary goal of most procurement 
systems116 The National Treasury states: „In its most basic form, value for money is the 
reason for an institution to enter into a private-public partnership.‟117  „Value for money‟ is 
not a vague term but rather a term that is defined in monetary terms and will be subject to 
audit.118 This conforms to the principle that when organs of state contract for goods or 
                                                          
111
Grinaker (2002) 3 All SA 336 (T) paras 40-1. 
112
Road Mac Surfacing, Kgotsong Civils Joint Venture and Another v MEC for the Department of Transport 
and Roads, North West Province and Others (2005) JDR 1033 (HC) para 22. (hereafter Road Mac 
Surfacing).  
113
Grinaker (2002) 3 All SA 336 (T) para 60. 
114
Grinaker (2002) 3 All SA 336 (T) para 60. 
115
Grinaker (2002) 3 All SA 336 (T) para 62. 
116
Arrowsmith S, Linarelli J & Wallace D Jr (2000) 28, 29. 
117
National Treasury: Public Private Partnership Manual, Module 5: PPP Procurement 5 (hereafter National 
Treasury PPP Manual) available at www.nationaltreasury.gov.za  (accessed 10 November 2010). 
118
National Treasury PPP Manual 5. 
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services, the aim must be to get the best possible terms on goods or services which are 
suitable for the requirements.119  
 
Nevertheless, accepting the lowest price tender „can have negative repercussions with 
implications for the achievement of social objectives‟.120  When accepting a tender with a 
higher price such a decision must further the social objectives that underscores BEE. The 
aim should be that these social objectives should include creative ways of furthering the 
success of disadvantaged black bidders.  Obviously there is a need for caution where 
there is room for abuse in the decision not to award to the bidder with the highest score, 
particularly now that the Procurement Regulations 2011121  do not require notice to the 
National Treasury or Auditor–general of such a decision. What comes to mind is that 
public officials may collude with a potential bidder and manipulate what will be considered 
objective criteria, without the other bidders‟ knowledge. This is possible because there is 
no statutory requirement that states that objective criteria be stated in the tender 
documents.122 The reason for this is that the Procurement Act clearly specifies specific 
goals for which points may be awarded; in contrast objective criteria are not specified in 
                                                          
119
Arrowsmith S,  Linarelli J & Wallace D Jr  (2000) 29 notes „For example, an information technology 
system purchased to process information for the tax authorities must be capable of handling the volume 
of information required in a suitable form.‟  
120
Hawkins J & Wells J „Modifying Infrastructure Procurement to Enhance Social Development‟ (2008) 4 
(4)ATDF Journal 60 notes: „If the tender price is very low the successful bidder may be led to cut costs 
by cheating on materials and taking other shortcuts that can affect the quality of the product. The 
successful bidder may also cut back on labour costs by pushing down wages, hiring casual workers and 
failing to meet contractual requirements to ensure the health, safety and welfare of the workers.‟ 
121
Interestingly the draft Regulations 2009 reg 9(2) provided that „if a bid other than the one that scored the 
highest number of points is approved, the organ of state must, in writing, within ten (10) working days 
notify the Auditor-General and the relevant treasury of the reasons for not selecting the bidder that scored 
the highest number of points.‟  
122
In Road Mac Surfacing (Pty) Ltd v MEC for the Department of Transport and Roads, North-West 
Province and Others, Raubex (Pty) Ltd v MEC for the Department of Transport and Roads, North-West 
Province and Others (820/05, 821/05) (2006) 54 (ZANWHC) para 33 (hereafter Road Mac Surfacing). 
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the Act but will become apparent during the tender evaluation. 123 Moreover the 
advertised tender should stipulate that the Procurement Act will be considered in the 
adjudication of the tender. 
 
Furthermore the AGSA report124 revealed in a recent study that in the Free State Province 
four contracts were awarded to contractors that had not scored the highest points and no 
reasons for these decisions were documented. Two of the four contracts were cancelled 
due to insufficient progress and in the other two contracts projects were delayed or the 
workmanship was unsatisfactory.125 In addition one of the contractors was previously 
contacted to the same project and it was terminated due to lack of performance.126 This 
problem was aggravated in the Limpopo Province where the audit team found that 89 
percent of the 35 recommendable bids for a tender were incorrectly calculated, leading to 
contracts awarded to bidders that did not score the highest points.127 
 
The objective criteria which should be considered have lent further controversy to the 
procurement environment. There has been reported misuse of the term „objective criteria‟ 
which will be discussed next. 
 
2.6.1 ‘Objective criteria’ to disregard lowest price 
 
                                                          
123
Road Mac Surfacing (2006) 54 (ZANWHC) para 33.  Also see Procurement Act s 2(1) (d); (f). 
124
Report of the Auditor-General of South Africa to Parliament on a performance audit of the infrastructure 
delivery process at the provincial departments of Education and Health August 2011 para 2.1.5 (a) 
(hereafter AGSA report on Education and Health Departments) available at 
http://www.agsa.co.za/Reports%20Documents/performance%20audit%20of%20the%20infrastructure%2
0delivery%20process.pdf 
125
AGSA report on Education and Health Departments August 2011 para 2.1.5 (a). 
126
AGSA report on Education and Health Departments August 2011 para 2.1.5 (a). 
127
AGSA report on Education and Health Departments August 2011 para 2.1.5 (b). 
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The phrase „objective criteria‟ has been the reason for controversy, when deciding what to 
consider as such. In Cash Paymaster Services128  the court held that it is important to 
note, that as important as the use of procurement is as a policy tool, it does not trump the 
attainment of value for money. For this reason close observation of such „other‟ objective 
criteria is essential, as public officials have displayed a subjective attitude in its 
interpretation as exposed by the court in RHI Joint Venture.129 It was held that 
„expenditure on local labour and economy‟ is not considered as „other‟ objective criteria as 
it already ranked in the preference point system (generic scorecard).130 In the same vein, 
the fact that a bidding enterprise is owned by a woman does not qualify as an objective 
criterion, as this criterion is also assigned in the Procurement Act131  and the generic 
scorecard in the BEE Codes.  
 
What are required are criteria in addition to those already considered as specific goals.132 
Moreover the objective criteria should justify the granting of the tender to another bidder.  
That is, not only must there be a causal link between these criteria but, most importantly, 
the objective criteria landing the contract for the tenderer, other than the one with the 
highest points, must observe the principles of the section 217(1).133 
                                                          
128
(1999) 1 SA 324 (CkH) para 381. In this case the tender was awarded on the ground of RDP goals, to a 
tenderer that quoted R200 million more than other tenderers. The Court set aside the award and ordered 
the process to start de novo. 
129
(2003) 5 BCLR 544 (CK). 
130
RHI Joint Venture (2003) 5 BCLR 544 (CK) para 27. See BEE Codes (2007) code 500. 
131
Road Mac Surfacing (2006) 54 (ZANWHC) para 29. See also Procurement Act (2000) s2 (d). In Road 
Mac Surfacing (2005) JDR 1033 (HC) para 25 the court a quo held that „a women owned   company/firm 
is capable of objective assessment‟. In Road Mac Surfacing (2006) 54 (ZANWHC) para 29 the appeal 
court rejected this as an objective criterion and said points so awarded will be a duplication of preference 
points for specific goals.  Also see BEE Codes (2007) code series 500. 
132
RHI Joint Venture (2003) 5 BCLR 544 (CK) para 32. 
133
Pelatona Projects (Pty) Ltd v Phokwane Municipality and 14 others (unreported NCD691/04) para 31.  
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The Court eloquently explained in Road Mac Surfacing, 134   that objective criteria „can be 
ascertained objectively as its existence or worth is not an opinion of a person but rather 
that it bears some degree of rationality and relevance to the tender.‟ Such will be goals 
not specified and not contained in the Procurement Act and which will normally only 
become apparent when tenders are adjudicated.135  This „other‟ objective criteria the court 
in Road Mac Surfacing136   held, is where a bidder scoring the highest points, is already 
committed to work on a departmental project, this may be considered as an objective 
criterion to award the tender to a bidder not scoring the highest points (and who is not 
engaged in departmental projects).  
 
Of immediate relevance to this is that, should objective criteria be considered for 
preference points, such criteria must be measurable, quantifiable and monitored for 
compliance.137 The BEE Codes also point out that BEE must be measured and reported 
according to economic reality rather than legal form.138   
 
 
2.7  BBBEE Act and BEE Codes of good practice 
 
                                                          
134
Road Mac Surfacing (2006) 54 (ZANWHC) para 33. 
135
Road Mac Surfacing (2006) 54 (ZANWHC) para 33. 
136
Road Mac Surfacing (2005) JDR 1033 (HC) para 24 the court a quo, held that not disclosing the objective 
criteria in the tender documents warrants the tender being awarded to the bidder with the highest points. 
However in Road Mac Surfacing (2006) 54 (ZANWHC) para 36 the appeal court reject this approach 
insofar that the tender documents do not need to disclose that objective criteria will be considered, as 
the Procurement Act tends to this. 
137
Procurement Act s2 (2) any goals contemplated in subsection 1(e) must be measurable, quantifiable and 
monitored for compliance. 
138
BEE Codes (2007) key principles 2.1. 
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The drive for preferential procurement is only relevant insofar as its main aim is to 
economically advance disadvantaged black people. For this reason the BBBEE Act was 
introduced to affect a more comprehensive BEE strategy139 by drawing the various 
elements of government‟s transformation programmes together in a coherent and focused 
manner.140 This was necessary in order to direct advantages to as many disadvantaged 
and impoverished black people as possible in order to obviate the enrichment of only a 
small black minority.141 The emphasis was on a broad-based approach to spread the 
sunshine of economic development and prosperity to the majority of black people. This 
broad-based approach is not embraced by the Procurement Act resulting in discord in the 
transformation programme. 
 
However the BBBEE Act142 and BEE Codes143 have as its main objective the 
advancement of black people in a holistic way, this is apparent from its various prescripts 
promoting black people and black women in particular. Moreover the BEE Codes144 seek 
to curb fronting145  by providing a comprehensive list of key principles.146 In addition the 
                                                          
139
BBBEE Act (2003) s1 defines broad-based black economic empowerment as „the economic 
empowerment of all black people including women, workers, youth, people with disabilities and people 
living in rural areas through diverse but integrated socio-economic strategies that include … (e) 
preferential procurement.‟ 
140
Bolton P Law of Government Procurement in South Africa (2007) 261. 
141
Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd v Eastern Cape Province and Others (1999) 1 SA 324 (CkH) para 
385 (hereafter Cash Paymaster Services). 
142
Section 2 The objectives of this Act are to facilitate broad-based black economic empowerment by-  
    (a)promoting economic transformation in order to enable meaningful participation of black people in the    
economy;  
    (d)increasing the extent to which black women own and manage existing and new enterprises, and   
increasing their access to economic activities, infrastructure and skills training; 
    (e)promoting investment programmes that lead to broad-based and meaningful participation in the 
economy by black people in order to achieve sustainable development and general prosperity. 
143
Section 7 „The Elements of B-BBEE in terms of the Generic Scorecard.‟ 
144
Section 2 Ownership.  
145
Bolton P (2007) fn 225 explains „that “window dressing” or “fronting”  is also referred to as “tokenism”, ie 
a partnership or employment situation where colour or gender participation is not real or meaningful; the 
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BEE Codes also try and prevent ownership being claimed by a person that only lends his 
name to the business in order to gain preferential points for the enterprise. This is done 
by measuring the active involvement of black participants in the ownership of the 
enterprise. The idea is to measure and ensure a thorough check of BEE credentials147 
before accrediting preferential points to a bidder (a key aspect in which the Procurement 
Act differs by measuring preferential points through specific goals and RDP goals).148   
 
To give credence to this the BEE Codes149 measures seven core areas for broad-based 
BEE opportunities namely: ownership,  management control, employment, skills 
development, preferential procurement, enterprise development, and socio-economic 
development. Through these core measures the BEE Codes appear to provide clearer 
direction than the Procurement Act for broad-based BEE. To square this off the BEE 
Codes are aligned with key legislation such as the National Small Business Act,150 the 
Skills Development Act151 and the Employment Equity Act.152 This legislation is all aimed 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
disadvantaged person or entity is there simply as a convenient “token” concession to a rule or qualifying 
condition.‟  
146
Sections 2.1.1 exercisable voting rights in the hands of black people; 2.1.2 exercisable voting rights in the 
hands of black women. 2.2.2 Economic interest by black people and black women. 2.4 bonus points for 
involvement in ownership of the enterprise by black new entrants. Also see BEE Codes (2007) code 
series 100 s2.4. 
147
BEE Codes (2007) s3. 
148
BEE Codes (2007) s2 para 2.4.2. 
149
BEE Codes (2007) code series 100 measures ownership by black people;  
    code series  200 measures effective control of enterprises by black people;  
    code series  300 measures initiatives intended to achieve equity in the workplace; 
    code series  400 measures employers initiatives to develop competencies of black employees;  
    code series  500 measures the buying of goods and services; 
    code series 600 measures the extent to which enterprises carry out initiatives intended to assist and   
accelerate the development and sustainability of other enterprises; 
code series 700 measures the extent to which enterprises carry out initiatives that promote access to 
economic empowerment for black people. 
150
Act 102 of 1996. 
151
Act 97 of 1998. 
152
Act 55 of 1998. 
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at assisting SMMEs in skills development and creating employment opportunities for 
black people. 
 
In Bato Star Fishing153 the Constitutional Court also made it clear that transformation 
involves more than a simple change of ownership; there must be other aspects of 
transformation like the creation of employment. This stands to reason that government‟s 
strategy for broad-based BEE through the BEE Codes, reaches beyond the redress of 
past imbalances, by using BEE to broaden the country‟s economic base and thereby 
accelerate growth, job creation and poverty alleviation.154 This vision should be shared by 
the Procurement Act which should dovetail with the BBBEE Act and BEE Codes to 
ensure coherency.  
 
2.8     Conclusion  
 
This chapter explored the legislation that dominates public procurement in order to 
analyse how it impacts on the progress of preferential procurement. In this study the 
PFMA, MFMA, Procurement Act and Regulations, BBBEE Act and BEE Codes received 
attention. The objective of this chapter was to examine the frustrations caused by the 
disharmony in the framework legislation for preferential procurement, namely the 
Procurement Act and BBBEE Act.  
 
First the PFMA and MFMA are the overarching legislation governing financial 
management in public spending.  This legislation should be observed during the public 
                                                          
153
(2004) 4 SA 490 (CC); (2004) BCLR 687 (CC) paras 10, 62. 
154
DTI Transformation Strategy (2003) para 2.6.4. 
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procurement of goods or services. According to the AGSA reports155 large budgets are 
controlled by official in public tendering. For this reason public officials have a fiduciary 
duty in their oversight of these funds to ensure its optimal use. This will mean that those 
officials having oversight must observe the objectives of the PFMA and MFMA in the 
expenditure of state funds. Furthermore these officials are bound by the principles of 
fairness, equitably, transparency, competitiveness and cost-effectiveness which the 
PFMA and MFMA promotes. Their fiduciary duty also extends to being responsible for 
public procurement processes that subscribe to value for money and the furthering BEE 
ideologies. These ideologies are not served by by-passing procurement processes as in 
the lease debacle which points to breach of good financial governance as laid down by 
the PFMA (and MFMA). 156 
 
Secondly the regulatory framework of South Africa‟s preferential procurement seems to 
be in disorder rather than well-designed. The difficulty is that the Procurement Act and 
Regulations 2011 do not create the cogency which gives a common understanding of 
what is meant by broad-based BEE, who is to benefit and how. The Procurement Act 
continues to promote a narrower approach to BEE by measuring specific goals and not 
the broad-based goals provided for by the BEE Codes. This necessary cogency could not 
be ensured by the amended regulations. The reason being that although the Procurement 
Regulations 2011 is in tandem with the BEE Codes in that it does promote broad-based 
empowerment, it is now in conflict with the Procurement Act in this regard. This is 
untenable since subordinate legislation (regulations) should not conflict with the 
                                                          
155
AGSA report on Education and Health Departments of August 2011; AGSA report June 2011. 
156
Madonsela T „Public Protector, SAPS lease report‟ 22 February 2011. 
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framework Act. The result is that the status quo remain, the two principle Acts to the same 
group of beneficiaries do not have the same evaluation points. 
 
The reason for the discord is the fact that the BBBEE Act was enacted (2003) without due 
regard to the difference in interpretation of the target groups for BEE in the Procurement 
Act. This would have been remedied if the amendments to the Procurement Act were 
effected whilst the BBBEE Act was still a bill. This recommendation by the National 
Treasury was ignored and the subsequent implementation of the BEE Codes continued 
the distortion instead of bringing the necessary cogency that is still needed today. All 
those years of deliberation to bring about coherency to the promotion of BEE seems like 
an exercise in futility and a waste of public funds.  This clearly created an intolerable 
situation which left the preferential procurement environment in some disorder. The result 
is that the different interpretations as to who is to benefit, has left room for individuals that 
previously benefited from the pre-democracy indulgence, continue to benefit post-
democracy. This incoherency between the two frame work Acts (Procurement Act and 
BBBEE Act) are irreconcilably inconsistent and could be regarded as a case of implied 
repeal. 
 
Due to the fact that the Procurement Regulations 2011 do not remedy this discord, this 
disagreement in the measuring of preference points further weakens the procurement 
environment in that the Procurement Act affords public officials discretion in how to 
measure goals for transformation. In essence the disharmony between the legislation 
places limitations on legal regulations as tools which should vindicate the achievement of 
preferential procurement objectives. The tardiness in finalising the draft Procurement 
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Regulations of 2009 and then the subsequent end product still lacking, may be construed 
as lack of proper political oversight in preferential procurement.  This proves cause for 
concern as to the earnestness of government in economically empowering those 
previously deprived citizens.  
 
As a starting point the Procurement Act and BBBEE Act should be consistent with 
regards to the intended beneficiaries of BEE and in the evaluation of preferential points. 
The prompt remedy to this is amendment to the Procurement Act, to bring the framework 
into harmony with the BBBEE Act and BEE Codes. This should resolve some of the 
ambivalence in the preferential procurement environment.  
 
Notwithstanding this, the legislation is only a guide to promote the social deliverables of 
BEE; this must also be complemented by the political will to apply and enforce the laws 
pertaining to the promotion of disadvantaged black people; failure should meet with 
penalties for procurement irregularities.157 Diligent public officials should do the right thing 
and promote the broad-based focus that the BEE Codes prescribe instead of the narrow 
approach the Procurement Act presents. This action will serve to accelerate the success 
of preferential procurement as a policy tool. After all the reason for the implementation of 
the BBBEE Act is to promote broad-based BEE because the Procurement Act did not 
aspire to this wider objectives   
 
                                                          
157
See chapter four para 4.5 for a discussion on remedies for procurement irregularities. 
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Unfortunately, although BEE has been a focus point since 1994, there has been more 
disparity than cogency in the strategy for the development of broad-based BEE.158  
Although it seems that South Africa‟s procurement regime is sufficiently legislated, the 
discord in its legislation is fragmenting the procurement environment. Essentially, without 
aligning the key legislation (Procurement Act and BBBEE Act), government will not be in 
a position to maximise its impact on transformation through preferential procurement.  
Lest we forget that a well-designed regulatory framework is as important to the success of 
preferential procurement, as is the political will that enforces those regulatory provisions. 
 
                                                          
158
BEE Codes (2007) background BEE Strategy 2. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
COMMON PRACTICES FRUSTRATING THE EFFECTIVE USE OF PREFERENTIAL 
PROCUREMENT 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
The preferential procurement environment is well legislated (despite the cogency 
challenge). Nevertheless, public procurement is unduly stressed by certain practices. 
This chapter will elaborate on these practices in order to illustrate its negative impact on 
preferential procurement and to enquire as to why with so many laws in place these 
practices are not eliminated. Media headlines are constant reminders that these 
practices are allowed to flourish and negatively influence public procurement 
processes.1 In the main, these practices are threefold namely, fronting, 2  collusive 
tendering and tenderpreneurship. This chapter will explain how these practices are used 
in the public procurement terrain. 
 
There has been some effort by government to curb malfeasance by implementing both 
anti-corruption legislation and other measures. But despite these measures, it remains a 
                                                          
1
Hartley W ‗Tender investigation tops R20bn Business Day’ 31 March 2011 1 available at  
http://www.businessday.co.za/Articles/Content.aspx?id=138691 (accessed 6 April 2011).The article 
report that the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) is probing R20 billion worth of tender corruption, in 2011. 
Stapenhurst F ‗The Role of the Public Administration in Fighting Corruption‘ 10(5) International Journal 
of Public Sector Management (1997) 313 refers to corruption as: ‗involving behaviour on the part of 
officials in the public sector, whether politicians or civil servants, in which they improperly an unlawfully 
enrich themselves or those close to them by the misuse of the public power entrusted to them.‘  
2
Williams S ‗The  Use of Exclusions for Corruption in Developing Country Procurement: The case of 
South Africa‘ (2007) 51 Journal of African Law 27 describes fronting as fraudulent misrepresentation or 
use of fictitious or tokenistic person from groups targeted for BEE, when bidding for goods or services. 
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major thorn in the flesh of competitive bidding to the extent that it is costing the 
government billions of rand.3  This chapter will present an exposition of these anti-
corruption measures to clarify what effect it has on combating willful behaviour in public 
procurement. 
  
A major contributor to the success of willful practices is that politically connected 
individuals are offered economic prowess through public tenders without having to 
follow the tender process. This is so evident that it is even mentioned in blogs such as 
that of De Vos.4  This situation is unsustainable and this chapter will probe how it is 
possible to by-pass legislated procedures. This inquiry will include the court and the 
Competition Commission‘s5 interpretation to some of these challenges. In conclusion 
there will be recommendations on how best these challenges can be handled and 
minimised. 
 
3.2 The challenge of willful practices in preferential procurement 
 
Conventionally, practices that are defined as the abuse of public office for private gain 
can be termed as corruption,6  and there is hardly a country in the world that has 
                                                          
3
Hartley W ‗Tender investigation tops R20bn Business Day 31 March 2011 1. 
4
De Vos P ‗On corruption in South Africa‘ July 2010 Constitutionally Speaking 5 available at 
   http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/on-corruption-in-south-africa/ (accessed 12 March 2011). 
5
Competition Commission Act 89 of 1998 s19 provides for the formation of a Competition Commission to 
investigate collusive practices in business. 
6
Heliman J et al ‗Measuring Governance, Corruption and State Capture‘ How Firms and Bureaucrats  
Shape the Business Environment in Transition Economies (2000) 2312 World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 19 available at 
http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/04/24/000094946_0004070541
2171/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf   (accessed 12 March 2011) Westring G & Jadoun G Public 
Procurement Manual for Central and Eastern Europe SIGMA-ILO Project (1996) para E I. 
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escaped the scourge of corruption in public procurement.7  Corruption even extends to 
those countries on the high end of the honesty index such as the Scandinavian 
countries, Singapore and New Zealand.8  The seriousness of corruption is recognised in 
the preamble of the Corruption Act which mentions the political, economic, legal, social 
and moral threat it poses.9 One of the reasons for the allure of public sector corruption 
is due to the large sums of money involved and the presence of unsupervised 
discretion.10 
 
The extent of corruption is shown by South Africa being placed at 55 out of 180 
countries on Transparency International‘s 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index, down one 
place from 2008.11 The scourge of corruption in public procurement leads to collusion in 
purchasing goods or services from the best briber instead of the best price-quality.12 
Rose-Ackerman raises concern, and Westring agrees, over the tendency of senior 
public officials only being concerned with extending their personal gain, as this may lead 
to inefficiencies in the public contract.13  An example of this could be where a firm 
                                                          
7
Westring, G & Jadoun G Public Procurement Manual for Central and Eastern Europe SIGMA-ILO Project 
(1996) para E I. 
8
Rose-Ackerman S Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform (1999) 30. 
9
Corruption Act 12 of 2004 Preamble inter alia states: ‗ Whereas corruption and related corrupt activities 
undermine, endanger the stability and security of societies, undermine the institutions and values of 
democracy and ethical values and morality, jeopardize sustainable development, the rule of law and the 
credibility of governments, and provide a breeding ground for organised crime; Whereas the illicit 
acquisition of personal wealth can be particularly damaging to democratic institutions, national 
economies, ethical values and the rule of law; Whereas as comprehensive, integrated and multi-
disciplinary approach is required to prevent and combat corruption and related corrupt activities 
efficiently and effectively…‘ 
10
Williams S & Quinot G ‗Public Procurement and Corruption: The South African Response‘ (2007) 124 
SALJ 341.  
11
Available at http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010 (accessed 14 April  
2011) 
12
Søreide T ‗Corruption in Public Procurement: Causes, Consequences and Cures‘ (2002) Chr. Michelsen 
Institute 1 available at http://bora.cmi.no/dspace/bitstream/10202/185/1/R%202002-1.pdf  (accessed 30 
October 2011) 
13
 Rose-Ackerman S (1999) 30; Westring G & Jadoun G (1996) para E.I. 
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winning the contract, benefit from inflated prices but skimping on quality.14 This tie in 
with the view that corruption in government is necessarily as a result of weak 
governance since it creates an environment where states are too weak to control their 
own bureaucrats.15 Consequently corruption studies focus on the degree of 
discretionary powers state policies allows its officials.16 Needless to say, eradicating 
corruption from public procurement means the awarding of contracts to the most 
competitive bidder, instead of those preferred for ulterior motives.17  
 
In essence corruption can take place on the part of the bidder18 and/or public officials. 
As such the Corruption Act19 bears on both such participants whether the corruption 
amounts to prospective or retrospective gratification. It is important to note that, in most 
countries corruption by contractors to government attracts the application of criminal 
law, subject to sanctions such as a fine or imprisonment.20 In compliance with this 
approach, the Corruption Act21 provides for imprisonment of between three years and 
life, of any tender defaulter who offers or accepts gratifications and the names of such 
defaulters may be endorsed in a public register. Penalties include a fine equal to five 
times the value of the gratification involved in the offence.22  In addition endorsement of 
                                                          
14
Rose-Ackerman S (1999) 28. 
15
Heliman J (2000) 3 
16
Heliman J (2000) 3. 
17
Williams S & Quinot G (2007) 124 SALJ 339. 
18
Green Paper on Public Sector Procurement Reform in South Africa in GG17928 of 14 April 1997 para 
4.11 (I) refers to corrupt actions by bidders as ‗collusion; influencing the choice of procurement method 
and technical standards; inciting breaks of confidentiality; influencing the work of evaluators; offering of 
bribes; over or under invoicing; "fast pay‖ action; inaccurate disclosures.‘ 
19
 Act 12 of 2004. 
20
Arrowsmith S, Linarelli J & Wallace D Jr Regulating Public Procurement: National and International 
Perspective (2000) 49. 
21
Section 28.  
22
Section 26 (3). 
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tender defaulters in the public register can last as long as ten years during which period 
no tender offer by such defaulters may be entertained by government.23  
 
Notwithstanding these measures the Public Service Commission (PSC) reported that 
corrupt practices in public procurement ranks in the top four categories of most common 
allegations24  in the mismanagement of public administration.25 This is evident from the 
fact that corrupt practices in public procurement continue to empower historically 
advantaged conglomerates and the new black-elite.26  This situation undermines the 
Constitution27 as well as the legislation (BBBEE Act) which promotes broad-based 
economic prosperity to black people generally, rather than to the small minority feigning 
disadvantaged credentials.  
 
Noteworthy are the many cases of procurement corruption that have been handed over 
for investigation to the National Prosecuting Agency (NPA) by the Special Investigations 
Unit (SlU).28 In addition to this, as many as 20 employees of the SABC have been 
exposed of being involved in corruption (in tenders) to the tune of R3.4 million. The 
investigation by the SIU with the Brixton commercial crimes unit resulted in eight 
                                                          
23
Corruption Act (2004) s28(3)(a)(ii) the National Treasury must determine the period (which period may 
not be less than five years or more than 10 years) for which the particulars of the convicted person or 
the enterprise referred to in subsection 1(a),(b),(c) or (d) must remain in the Register and during such 
period no offer in respect of any agreement from a person or enterprise referred to in that subsection 
maybe considered by the National Treasury. 
24
Public Service Commission  Report ‗Profiling and Analysis of the most Common Manifestations of 
Corruption and its Related Risks in the Public Service‘ (April 2011) (hereafter PSC Report April 2011) 
para 2.4 describes ‗bribery, abuse of Government-owned vehicles, procurement and appointment 
irregularities, as most common‘ available at http://www.psc.gov.za/documents/reports.asp (accessed 3 
May 2011) 
25
PSC Report (April 2011) para 6. 
26
See para 3.2.3 for a discussion on  tenderpreneurs. 
27
Plasket C ‗Tendering for Government Contracts: Public Procurement and Judicial Review‘ in Glover G 
(ed) Essays in Honour of AJ Kerr (2006)160. 
28
De Lange D ‗Corruption Bombshell‘ Cape Times 31 March 2011 1. 
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criminal cases, of which five has been referred to the NPA; there have been no 
prosecutions as yet.29   
 
Quinot argues that the media reporting on the uncovering of corruption in public tenders 
means that the state tender system is working.30 The exposure of these practices that 
derail state tenders are welcome and should be enhanced by the political will to enforce 
the comprehensive sanctions in the Corruption Act. 31  However despite the media 
reporting on tender corruption by public officials, the Register for Tender Defaulters has 
two names of bidders but remains devoid of any corrupt public officials in public 
tendering.32  
 
A demonstration of the strong political commitment needed by government in 
addressing corruption in public procurement33  was displayed in the case of South 
Africa‘s neighbouring country, Lesotho, through the Lesotho Highland Water Project. In 
this matter, a senior government executive found guilty of taking bribes to distort the 
tender process34 was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment35  and the briber (the 
                                                          
29
De Lange D ‗Corruption Bombshell‘ Cape Times 31 March 2011 1. 
30
Quinot G ‗Even the bad news reflects a positive side to public contracting in SA‘ Cape Argus 28 Oct 
2010 23. 
31
Section 13. 
32
The tender register currently contains two names of bidders convicted by court available at 
    http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/other/Register%20for%20Tender%20Defaulters.pdf    
(accessed 7 April 2011)  
33
Darroch F (2003) para 1.2. 
34
Information Portal on Corruption and Governance in Africa ‗Lesotho Highlands Water Project‘ (1997) 
para 4.2 this project came into being by a treaty signed between Lesotho and South Africa in October 
1986. The law in Lesotho is in general similar to the laws of the Republic of South Africa. 
available at 
http://www.ipocafrica.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=71&Itemid=66#strip 
(accessed 16 Feb 2011). 
35
Darroch F ‗The Lesotho Corruption Trials – A case study‘ Prepared for Transparency International   
(2003). ‗Through an extensive, international network of bank accounts and ‗agents‘, bribes were paid to 
Mr Sole, who was able to materially influence the tendering procedure and outcome through his 
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company) was also convicted and suspended for three years from doing business with 
government, thus both parties in the scam convicted.36  This is exemplary of the good 
governance that is needed by the South African government; they need to enforce strict 
sanctions on recalcitrant public officials found tampering with tenders intended to 
empower the poor.  
 
3.2.1  The practice of fronting  
 
 
The practice of BEE fronting takes place where black people are used to pose as 
owners or in the management of a business, but in reality they do not reap the financial 
benefits befitting such a position. Fronting can also be done by white women and 
disabled white women and men due to these groups being included in the reference to 
HDIs in Procurement Act.37 The minister of Trade and Industry acknowledged that the 
act of ‗BEE fronting‘,38  which result in non-empowered companies winning government 
contracts, by feigning BEE credentials, is ‗pretty rife‘.39 A further difficulty is that the 
verification agencies intended to verify proper BEE credentials are often the culprits 
advising companies, how to front effectively.40 This practice is most probably aided by 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
unchecked power as LHDA Chief Executive.  Sole was accused of accepting more than $6 million in 
bribes from multinationals. Sole has been convicted and sentenced to 15 years in prison.‘ 
http://www.ipocafrica.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=71&Itemid=66 (accessed 21 
April 2011) 
36
Darroch F (2003) para 1.2. 
37
See chapter two para 2.5.3.1 a discussion on this. 
38
Williams S (2007) 27 describes that fronting ‗occurs where there is fraudulent misrepresentation or use 
of fictitious or tokenistic persons from groups targeted for BEE, when bidding for goods or services.‘ 
39
Government  Communication and Information System  ‗Accountants, agencies to be targeted for 
fronting‘ BUA News online 11 November 2010 (hereafter GCIS ‗Accountants, agencies to be targeted 
for fronting‘) available at  http://www.buanews.gov.za/news/10/10111118151001 (accessed 19 Feb 
2011)  
40
GCIS ‗Accountants, agencies to be targeted for fronting‘ 11 November 2010. 
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the fact that the Procurement Act does not prescribe BEE verification like the BEE 
Codes do; the newly passed Regulations 2011 do not remedy this.  
 
In Hidro-Tech Systems (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 41 declared fronting an 
offence in terms of misrepresentation and fraud. The court explained that fronting 
results in the benefit of preferential procurement favouring those not intended to prosper 
by it. The Constitutional Court‘s finding is an object lesson on how this problem should 
be dealt with. In this case the applicant (Viking Pony) and the first respondent (Hidro-
Tech) competed for tenders to supply and install equipment for water and sewerage 
treatment works for the City of Cape Town (the City). Viking Pony was awarded more 
tenders than Hidro-Tech. Hidro-Tech discovered that this was attuned to the fact that 
black people held 70% of Viking Pony's shares. They (Hidro-Tech) lodged a complaint 
with the City, that the black majority shareholder in Viking Pony was a mere token and 
urged the City to investigate the allegation of fronting. In evidence they alleged that the 
(white) director was paid R23 500 per month, while the (black) shareholder who was 
paid only R5 600 per month, exercised no control or influence over the company and 
neither actively participated in its management.  They also alleged that the profits of 
Viking Pony were routed to its white-owned sister company. The database managing 
company assigned to investigate the allegations of fronting simply confirmed that the 
shareholding reflected in Viking Pony‘s tender documents was correct and the 
allegation of fronting was not further investigated. 
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(2010) 1 SA 483 (C) para 75 (hereafter Hidro-Tech Systems). 
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The government was castigated by the court because they (the government) neglected 
their duty by not properly investigating the allegations of fronting.42 These allegations 
point to action that is contrary to the spirit, purport and objectives of the Constitution, the 
Procurement Act and Regulations.43   The High Court urged that the government should 
investigate the fronting allegations properly, by acting against the supplier in 
accordance with regulation 15(1).44 The Supreme Court of Appeal45  confirmed this 
finding but still the government persisted in not investigating, the fronting allegations. 
The Constitutional Court was eventually approached to compel the government to 
conduct an investigation into these allegations.  The Constitutional Court lamented the 
government‘s complacency regarding its legal obligations in cases of alleged fronting.46 
To this end the High Court47  agreed that the black directors on the board of Viking Pony 
were a sham intended only to enhance the BEE status for the purpose of scoring 
preferential points in public tendering. Moreover the government not only displayed 
reluctance to investigate the fronting allegations, it was also undeterred by the repeated 
court challenges48 and the resultant costs to the fiscus.  
 
                                                          
42
Viking Pony (2011) 1 SA 327 (CC) paras 57- 8. The court ordered cost against the government. 
43
Viking Pony (2011) 1 SA 327 (CC) paras 57- 8. 
44
Hidro-Tech Systems (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others (2010) 1 SA 483 (C) para 66 (hereafter 
Hidro-Tech Systems). The court gave the City two months to complete the investigation. 
45
 Viking Pony (2010) 3 SA 365 (SCA ) para 32. 
46
Viking Pony (2011) 1 SA 327 (CC) para 57. In this case an unfair preference was obtained through the 
bidder‘s BEE status, which was technically non-existent as the black shareholders were merely fronting, 
insofar that they did not derive the same benefits as the white share holders. Even after they resigned 
and left the company, Viking made fraudulent misrepresentations in its tender documents about its BEE 
profile, in order to secure a preference. 
47
Hidro-Tech Systems (2010) 1 SA 483 (C) para 21. 
48
Hidro-Tech Systems (2010) 1 SA 483 (C); Viking Pony Africa Pumps v Hidro-Tech Systems (2010) 3 SA 
365 (SCA) (hereafter Viking Pony); Viking Pony Africa Pumps (Pty) Ltd t/a Tricom Africa v Hidro-Tech 
Systems (Pty) Ltd and Another (2011) 1 SA 327 (CC) para 57 (hereafter Viking Pony). 
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The tenacity with which Viking Pony continued to challenge the allegation of fronting; 
knowing that its BEE credentials were not a true reflection of the company is particularly 
disturbing. This shows the extent to which companies will go to continue to keep 
economic power amongst a few advantaged businesses.49 This behaviour will not 
promote the development and economic growth of black people in the spirit of the seven 
core elements of the BEE Codes.50 This case provides confirmation that there is a 
constitutional and statutory obligation to take appropriate action against fronting.51 The 
Constitutional Court concurred with the Supreme Court of Appeal that an organ of state 
is obliged to take steps when confronted with the mere awareness of information 
regarding fraudulent misrepresentation and not conclusive evidence; by applying 
regulation 15 the City should have investigated the allegations of fronting.52  This means 
that where information is obtained that raises reasonable suspicion that preferential 
points has been fraudulently obtained, this information has to be acted upon by 
investigation. 53 
 
In addition, should ‗fronting‘ be confirmed upon investigation, a state organ has the 
discretion to cancel such a contract and debar the business from contracting with the 
state for a period of up to 10 years.54 The Constitutional Court stated that the purpose of 
the legislative measures put in place for preferential procurement is ultimately to 
                                                          
49
Viking Pony (2011) 1 SA 327 (CC) para 46 states that ‗At the heart of this case is the complaint by 
Hidro-Tech that historically disadvantaged individuals were neither remunerated nor allowed to 
participate in the management of Viking to the degree commensurate with their shareholding and their 
positions as directors.‘ 
50
See chapter two para 2.7 for discussion on the BEE Codes. 
51
Viking Pony (2011) 1 SA 327 (CC) paras 18, 57. 
52
Viking Pony (2011) 1 SA 327 (CC) para 31; Viking Pony (2010) 3 SA 365 (SCA) para 32.  
53
Viking Pony (2011) 1 SA 327 (CC) para 34. 
54
Procurement Regulations (2011) reg 13 (2) (d). 
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embrace the constitutional imperative of seeking to empower HDI‘s.55  The effect of 
doing so will root out schemes designed to fraudulently divert economic benefits from 
black people, historically disadvantaged, and to historically empowered individuals.56 
Lastly because the City‘s generally lackadaisical attitude toward the court challenge and 
fronting allegations, it was ordered to pay the costs of Hidro-Tech and Viking Pony. 
 
It should be noted that if the City used the BEE Codes57 which prescribe verification of 
BEE through verification agencies, the fronting by Viking may have been detected.58 
The verification process would have been conducted through a verification agent or 
auditor, who would be familiar with the score card measurements for ownership and 
management in the BEE Codes. 59 The use of the City‘s database management to 
confirm ownership or BEE credentials simply do not measure up to the BEE Codes 
prescripts. In addition, if contract maintenance60 is observed, a change in shareholders 
like in Viking would in any case have been identified. Therefore, to observe the BBBEE 
Act makes for a stricter procurement environment. Notwithstanding this, the 
Procurement Act is still the framework act for preferential procurement and it does not 
prescribe a BEE status verification certificate to enter into a bid for public tendering. 
                                                          
55
Viking Pony (2011) 1 SA 327 (CC) para 27.   
56
Viking Pony (2011) 1 SA 327 (CC) para 27. 
57
BEE Codes (2007) s10.1. 
58
BEE Codes (2007) s2 Key Principles: S 2.3 the basis for measuring BBBEE initiatives under the Codes 
is the BBBEE compliance of the measured entities at the time of measurement; s 2.4 any 
misrepresentation or attempt to misrepresent any enterprise‘s true BBBEE status may lead to the 
disqualification of the entire scorecard of that enterprise. 
59
BEE Codes (2007) s7 Elements of BBBEE: S7.1 The Ownership Element, as set out in the Code series 
100, measures the effective ownership of enterprises by black people; s7.2 The Management Control 
Element, as set out in Code series 200, measures the effective control of enterprises by black people.  
Also see chapter two para 2.7 for a discussion on the BEE Codes. 
60
See chapter 4 para 4.3.4 for a discussion on contract maintenance. 
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This oversight must be remedied to bring the procurement system closer in achieving 
broad-based BEE proliferation. 
 
3.2.2 Collusive tendering  
 
Williams and Quinot argues that the second type of corruption found in public 
procurement is private corruption which comes in the form of collusion, price-fixing, 
maintenance of cartels or other uncompetitive practices engaged in by suppliers which 
derails the preferential procurement aims.61 Collusion occurs when bidders tendering for 
a government contract, collude and agree on the price to offer for the bid.62 They form a 
cartel whereby the one bidder in the cartel offers a certain price, and all the others in the 
cartel offer a higher price as covering bids, to create the impression of competition. If 
successful the bidders in the cartel share monopolistic profits as pre-determined 
amongst themselves. Although the Competitions Act 63 prohibits, collusive tendering in 
South Africa, a significant increase in bid rigging (tender rigging) cases have been 
exposed, most notably, in the construction industry.64 In January 2010 the Competition 
Commission65 considered 66 applications for corporate leniency, of which 59 were 
                                                          
61
Williams S & Quinot G (2007) 342. 
62
Bolton P The Law of Government Procurement in South Africa (2007) 138. 
63
Act 89 of 1998 provides in its preamble that ‗restrain of particular trade practices which undermine a 
competitive economy.‘ Section 4(1) (b) (iii) prohibits all forms of collusive tendering, it states that: ‗An 
agreement between or concerted practice by firms or a decision by an association of firms is prohibited 
if it is between parties in a horizontal relationship and if it involves... collusive tendering.‘ 
64
Global Forum on Competition ‗Collusion and Corruption in Public Procurement‘ Contribution from South 
Africa 18-19Feb 2010 para 3. (hereafter OECD ‗Collusion and Corruption in Public Procurement‘) 
available at  http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/51/44558091.pdf (accessed 14 Feb 2011) 
65
Competitions Act s19 provides for the formation of a Competition Commission to investigate collusive 
practices in business. 
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involved in collusive tendering.66 Most of these cases were exposed due to companies 
seeking corporate leniency, which means after they engaged in this practice and having 
profited thereby, they confessed to having unduly profited, paid a fine and thereby 
escaped any criminal liability.  
 
The following cases paint a picture of this anti-competitive behaviour of collusive 
tendering: 
 
 in the Competition Commission v Cobra Concrete (Pty) Ltd67 where collusion on 
price-fixing68 in the pricing of precast concrete products was found in the period 
of 1987 and 2007; through this collusive practice the companies prevented and 
limited price competition amongst them.69 As a matter of fact for over thirty years 
in the construction industry, the bosses regarded themselves as ‗one big 
organisation,‘ a family, rather than competitors.70 The thirty year tendency of 
collusion continues, as recently collusive bid rigging arose in the tendering of 
World Cup stadiums and the Gautrain.71  This is despite many companies having 
been exposed through the Competition Commission. 
                                                          
66
OECD ‗Collusion and Corruption in Public Procurement‘ (2010) para 4. The report states that ‗A further 
122 marker applications, the majority in construction, had been received. Three cases involving bid-
rigging are currently being ‗prosecuted‘ before the Competition Tribunal‘ para 4. 
67
Case no 3595 ZACT 25 (31 March 2010) (hereafter Competition Commission v Cobro Concrete) para 
2.3.1.1 ‗During the period 1986 until September 2007, Rocia, Infraset, Cobro ("competitors") and during 
the period 1999 until November 2007, Cobro, Conrite Walls and DND Concrete ["DND"] ("competitors"), 
competitors in the business of manufacture and sale of precast manholes and pipes in South Africa, 
acting through their respective representatives in meetings colluded in price-fixing.‘  
68
Price fixing - Agreeing with competitors to keep prices at a specific level. 
69
Competition Commission v Cobro Concrete (2010) para 2.3.1.3. 
70
Naidoo P:‘ Concrete Raiders‘ Financial Mail 17 February 2011 available at 
http://www.fm.co.za/Article.aspx?id=134615  (accessed 17 Feb 2011). ‗There are 65 bid-rigging cases, 
involving over 70 public and private projects valued at R29bn, before the commission. Companies 
implicated and facing possible penalties include Group Five, Murray & Roberts, Aveng, WBHO, Basil 
Read, Stefanutti Stocks, Grinaker,‘  
71
Naidoo P ‘ Concrete Raiders‘ Financial Mail 17 February 2011 the stadia are ‗Cape Town‘s Green Point 
and Moses Mabhida  stadia in Durban‘. 
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 Another big enterprise in the medical supplies, Adcock Ingram Critical Care 
(AICC), admitted to collusive tendering, in the supply of large volume medical 
products, to public hospitals across South Africa.72 In this case, before submitting 
their respective tenders, the competitors collaborated and agreed on prices. The 
Commission settled; this cartel paid admission of guilt fines totaling R55 million.73 
The admission of guilt forestalled further prosecutions, thus these companies 
may continue to do business with government and in fact AICC is in the running 
for another R5 billion contract for health services to government.74  
 
 The tide of collusive tendering also followed in the auctioning of coaches, 
wagons and tankers by the state-owned rail transport, Transnet.75 In this instance 
the competitors had a general understanding amongst each other, not to push up 
the prices or bid against each other at Transnet auctions. This corruption was 
remedied by a penalty of R146 million (6 percent of turnover).  
                                                          
72
The Competition Commission vs Adcock Ingram Critical Care (AICC), Tiger Food, Fresenius Kabi South 
Africa (FKSA), Thusanong Health Care (Thusanong) and Dismed (Criticare) (2005Jan1404 and 
(2007Nov3376) para 7. (hereafter Competition Commission v Adcock Ingram) 
73
Competition Commission v Adcock Ingram (2007) para 8. 
74
SAPA ‗Black Sash condemns collusive tendering‘ IOL 13 May 2008. This comes after the Department of 
Health had said that AICC remained in the running for a R5-billion contract for anti-retrovirals and is to 
be considered for future purchases available at http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/black-sash-
condemn-collusive-tendering-1.400335 (accessed 16 Feb 2011). 
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The Competition Commission vs The New Reclamation Group (Reclam), Aberddac Group, 
Amalgamated Metals Recycling, Ben Jacobs Metals, Power Metals, SA Metal and Universal Recycling 
(2007 Aug 3121) para 12. 
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 In addition to this collusive tendering and price-fixing in the supply of plastic pipes 
for water and sanitation to municipalities was also exposed and again the 
Commission considered corporate leniency.76  
 
 
This practice of collusive behaviour in competitive bidding makes it difficult for SMMEs 
to compete against the prices of a cartel. This detracts from the aims of preferential 
procurement, that is, to economically empower SMMEs by giving them access to 
government contracts. Instead collusive behaviour created monopolies which sully not 
only competitiveness, but also BEE. 
 
 
To further remedy the plight of collusive behaviour the Competition Act was amended in 
2000,77  in order to make it possible to impose imprisonment of 10 years and/or a fine of 
R500 thousand, on directors of a firm engaging in prohibited practices like collusive 
tendering. South Africa joined the global trend in criminalising cartel behaviour, in tender 
collusion and price-fixing.78 However, the amendment brought no relief to date, because 
                                                          
76
The Competition Commission vs DPI Plastics, Petzetakis Africa, Marley Pipes System, Swan Plastics, 
Amitech South Africa, Flo-Tek Pipes & Irrigation, Macneil Agencies, Andrag and Gazelle Plastics  (2008 
Mar 3596) para 14. 
77
Competition Amendment Act 1 of 2000 s13 published GG 32533 of 28 August 2009 section 74 of the  
principal Act is hereby amended— 
(a) by the deletion of ‗‗(1)‘‘ from the beginning of the section; and 
(b) by the substitution for paragraph (a) of the following paragraph: 
‗‗(a) in the case of a contravention of section 73(1), or section 73A, to a fine not exceeding R500 000-00 
or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10 years, or to both a fine and such imprisonment;‘ 
Insertion of section 73A in Act 89 of 1998 s12  
The following section is hereby inserted in the principal Act after section 73: 
‗Causing or permitting firm to engage in prohibited practice.‘ 
73A. (1) A person commits an offence if, while being a director of a firm or while engaged or purporting 
to be engaged by a firm in a position having management authority within the firm, such person— 
(a)caused the firm to engage in a prohibited practice in terms of section 4(1) (b); or 
(b) knowingly acquiesced in the firm engaging in a prohibited practice in terms of section 4(1) (b).’ 
78
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prosecutions have yet to be visited on those suppliers engaging in monopolistic 
tendencies. It is argued that the amendment seriously frustrates the Competition 
Commission‘s work, because the companies engaging in collusive bid rigging will not 
expose such practices, if they face personal criminal liability.79  The Competitions 
Commission maintains that offering corporate leniency has proven successful in 
exposing these cartels and the inclusion of personal liability will prevent cartels coming 
forward, fearing self-incrimination.80 
 
Thus, regardless of the amended legislation, there seems to be reluctance on the part 
of the Competition Commission to impose criminal sanctions on these companies guilty 
of collusion. Simply put, criminal prosecution escapes those involved in collusion. Thus, 
although going through the trouble of amending the Competition Act to include criminal 
liability, the legislation has yet to be tested in court. This is regrettable, whilst doing 
good work exposing white-collar crime; the Competitions Commission is really a watch 
dog without teeth. What is the purpose of a fine to companies that have been well 
served by capitalism and therefore can afford to pay millions as if it is small change? 
One simply cannot see why that will act as a deterrent for suppliers engaging in a 
practice that typically became a habit for 30 years.  
 
The recent exposure on bid-rigging of the world cup stadia necessarily illustrates how 
white-collar crime has no conscience and the consideration of BEE is really not on their 
agenda; at least not to the extent that they will make space for SMMEs to grow into real 
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Naidoo P ‗Good act but is it right?‘ Financial Mail 17 February 2011 available at 
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time competitors. Instead they keep black competitors on the perimeter to feast on the 
crumbs after they rigged the lucrative tenders. The importance of economic growth in 
South Africa is universally accepted. It will thus serve the aspirations of preferential 
procurement as a policy tool, if the Competition Commission helps to root out corruption 
in business in appropriating the necessary criminal sanction provided for by the 
amendment Act; thereby create a level playing field for new entrants to business. More 
importantly, it will serve it (the Competition Commission) well to develop the expertise to 
uncover collusive tendering instead of waiting for a whistleblower with a vested interest 
and an inflated bank account. 
  
3.2.3  The new cartels: tenderpreneurs  
 
 
The practice of tenderpreneurship is a modern day cartel practice which takes place 
where a public official colludes with a bidder (known to him) to control prices of the bid 
and manipulates the tender process. These culprits are in pursuit of government 
contracts and conspire with public officials to undermine principles of competitive 
bidding.81 These bidders undermine value for money by overpricing, non delivery or 
poor workmanship; thereby violating the principles of cost-effectiveness and 
competitiveness in section 217 (1). The process unfolds by; validating the favourite 
tenderpreneur in return for kick-backs; sharing of confidential information to enable the 
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tenderpreneur to win the bid or by influencing the bidding process to benefit the 
tenderpreneur.82 
 
This is in essence the transfer of wealth from the financially strong to the financially 
weak,83 without them having to initiate or finance a new enterprise. These bidders do 
not have to compete equally with other bidders because  their political connections are 
what favour them as recipients of tender awards84  This practice of tenderpreneurship 
has become known as BEE in South Africa which ‗is in reality an attempt to siphon 
savings from private-sector operators.‘85 
 
Emerging out of this is a new, elite class of black millionaires, who acquired their wealth 
as beneficiaries of black empowerment without conforming to the strict procurement 
regulations. This has earned them the term ‗tenderpreneurs‘.86  The problem with this 
practice is that the seven core elements of the BEE Codes87 are not observed. The 
reason for this is that the business does not need to be measured in terms of skills 
development or enterprise development. The consequence of which has given rise to ‗a 
black-elite that continues to be perpetual junior support players to white-controlled 
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Mac Gregor K ‗Tenderpreneurs and cartels: The devil is in the detail…De Rebus July 2010 16. 
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Mbeki M Architects of Poverty: Why African Capitalism Needs Changing (2009) (2009) 69. 
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SAPA ‗ANC MEC in tender fraud arrest‘ Times live 5 November 2010 available at 
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Mbeki M (2009) 65. 
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Laurence P ‗Malema and the tenderpreneurs‘ Politicsweb 25 February 2010 available at 
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corporations.‘88 This situation exists because these elite black groups shy away from 
being producers, therefore they do not engage in entrepreneurship.89  It should be 
observed that the BEE Codes seek to encourage entrepreneurship through the 
contracting of SMMEs with government for good or services. This is government‘s 
vision of growing the economy by encouraging entrepreneurship, in particularly because 
private entrepreneurship is the driver of modern economies.90 The concern is that 
tenderpreneurship has replaced entrepreneurship as the economic liberation of the 
black-elite.91 This is so because financing new commercial enterprises is not the driving 
ideology behind this black-elite, but rather the joining of existing enterprises(previously 
advantaged) by them (black-elite) in the quest to gather riches92  and not to start as 
emerging new businesses with the view to develop skills and economic power. 
 
Tenderpreneurship is a reflection of unfair wealth accumulation leading to narrow 
empowerment, which means BBBEE is not proliferating to the majority of black people. 
This narrow empowerment that discourages entrepreneurship points to a crisis in 
BBBEE.93   This is so because tenderpreneurship imposes a cost on state services and 
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Naidu B ‗How Malema made his millions- Malema the "Tenderpreneur" 
Sunday Times 21 Feb 2010 1. In Malema's case the Sunday Times, ‗citing official tender and 
government documents, reported that Malema's companies were awarded more than 20 contracts, 
each worth between R500,000 and R39 million between 2007 and 2008. A number of these were in 
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construction to bulk water supply and upgrading cemeteries with documentation confirming that while 
some of the projects were completed on schedule, the majority of them were not, available at 
http://www.timeslive.co.za/sundaytimes/article318330.ece (accessed 21 Feb 2011). 
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confers no benefit; as a result it is branded as ‗economic terrorism.‘94  They also provide 
shoddy services to communities at the expense of genuine entrepreneurs with proper 
skills and services,95  as required by the BEE Codes. This way the public resources are 
being used superficially, instead of developing the majority of black people.  
 
It rather benefits the black-elite in private accumulation of wealth in the name of 
preferential public procurement. This practice compromises the preferential 
procurement process, by not following the fair process prescribed by the procurement 
system. This prescribes that a competitive bidding process must be followed to allow for 
competition at large, thereby observing the principles of preferential procurement, in the 
Constitution.  They do not need to pass the scrutiny of the BEE Codes scorecard grid, 
because proper tender procedures are not followed. This means that the performance 
of the tenderpreneur in term of social deliverables was not evaluated, since promotion 
of skills, rural and enterprise development, as the BEE Codes envisage, is not a priority. 
The difficulty with rooting out this behaviour is that those tasked to bring about 
economic change to the population at large are seemingly feathering their own nests by 
joining in this cartel. 
 
3.3  Remedies for procurement transgressions  
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The Procurement Act96 makes provision for the cancellation of any tenderer found 
tendering  false information. In addition the Procurement  Regulations97  provides for 
penalties which are to be meted out to those found transgressing procurement 
procedures and laws. But, despite accounting authorities being empowered by these 
provisions they are found lacking in its application. Moreover, in the wake of the willful  
behaviour of public official and suppliers that this study suggests, it causes concern why 
so few are falling prey to the penalties that apply in public procurement.  
 
A very useful mechanism to apply to those that manipulate tender processes is 
debarment from doing business with the state. The European Community and the USA 
use exclusions as well-known legal mechanism.98 In South Africa the Procurement 
Regulations 201199 provides for a non-judicial process through which exclusions can be 
implemented by all three spheres of government and organs of state. This process 
provides that those engaging in corrupt practices may be excluded from doing business 
with government, for up to 10 years.100 If the situation warrants it, an accounting officer 
is empowered to impose penalties by debarring the enterprise and in addition laying 
criminal charges against any bidder or public official.101 Should an accounting officer fail 
to act, the National Treasury may direct an institution to lay criminal charges against 
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Procurement Act s2- 
   1(g) Any contract awarded on account of false information furnished by the tenderer in order to 
secure preference in terms of this Act, may be cancelled at the sole discretion of the organ of 
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(2011) reg 13. 
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such a person.102  Furthermore, debarring a bidder using the empowering provisions of 
the Procurement Regulations can result in such names being listed in the National 
Treasury Database of Restricted Suppliers.103 Contrary to the Register of Tender 
Defaulters (which works through the Corruption Act) this list does have a number of 
suppliers restricted for up to 10 years.  
 
It is the responsibility of the organ of state to verify if a preferred bidder is black listed on 
the National Treasury Database of Restricted Suppliers104 and Register for Tender 
Defaulters. In the case of De Sols Trading CC and Anitha Dubaram Singh v the 
Government of South Africa and Others 105 a tender was awarded to the applicant which 
was blacklisted on the restricted suppliers database. After the contract was concluded 
the respondent discovered that the applicant was on the data base and after due 
process cancelled the contract. Upon the threat of cancellation of the contract the 
applicant approached the court but to no avail because she was listed. Valuable time 
and money could have been spared if the respondent did the right thing in the first place 
and verified the status of the preferred bidder. Setting aside the contract means that a 
new supplier needs to be sourced which could entail a new tender process.106  
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It is recommended that these internal remedies should be used in a more aggressive 
way in order to make inroads on those that wilfully undermine preferential procurement 
laws. In particular where fronting is alleged, due process should ensue by invoking the 
provisions of the Procurement Regulations.  In Hidro - Tech Systems (Pty) Ltd v City of 
Cape Town and Others107 the application of section 15 of the Regulations 2001108 came 
under scrutiny in an allegation of fronting. The court was approached to explain the 
nature and extent of the duty of an organ of state, when presented with allegations of 
fraudulent manipulation of the preferential procurement system in order to secure a 
preference in terms of a bidder‘s black economic empowerment profile. The court was 
asked for an order directing the City to act upon the allegation in accordance with 
Regulation 15109 or that the City is ordered to initiate an investigation into the allegation 
of fronting. The court challenge came in the wake of allegations of fronting, leveled 
against one of the City‘s service providers (Viking), which the City refused to thoroughly 
investigate. The court held that bidders caught tendering false information to secure 
preference points face unilateral termination of their contract by organs of state.110  
Viking was found guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation and the City was ordered to 
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(2010) 1 SA 483 (C). (hereafter Hidro-Tech Systems). Also see para 3.2 1 for a discussion on this case 
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engage the appropriate steps in terms of regulation 15.111 The court said these steps 
should be taken as soon as possible and there is no need to wait until after final 
conclusion of the investigation.112 It must be noted that should the City wait for 
conclusive investigation the fronting continues and contracts are tendered for with these 
bogus credentials as happened in this case. 
 
 
In the subsequent Supreme Court of Appeal113  challenge against the High Court114 
decision, the court held that no organ of state should remain passive in the face of 
evidence of fraudulent preferment, but is obliged to employ the appropriate steps to 
remedy the situation. The Supreme Court of Appeal concurred with the approach of the 
High Court but found the City of Cape Town to be in breach of its duty to investigate the 
allegations of fronting.115  This court did not make any recommendations compelling an 
investigation. 
 
This dispute was put to bed by the Constitutional Court setting aside the Supreme Court 
of Appeal‘s order and replacing it with an order compelling the City to investigate the 
allegations (fronting) leveled against Viking.116 It is unfortunate that the City was not 
vigilant in the face of allegations of fronting, which could easily have been established 
by calling in the shareholders and directors with recent proof of shareholding. It seems 
that government lacks the appétit to impose exclusions on corrupt suppliers. As it 
stands there are only five suppliers listed for fronting on the Database for Restricted 
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Suppliers.117 These suppliers are debarred from 2010 to 2015; regrettably they were not 
debarred for the maximum of 10 years. 
 
 
Of importance is that the power of the public official is limited to debarring a bidder for 
tender irregularities or corrupt practices, but only the court may impose conviction for 
those practices. Furthermore the Corruption Act118  also makes provision for debarment 
of contractors found criminally liable. Williams prefers this approach in that courts have 
better investigative powers and expertise to deal with exclusions for corruption and in 
this regard can provide a central source for dissemination of information.119  
Consequently the court is the preferred authority to deal with corruption where criminal 
sanction may be imposed.120   
 
This was also the view in Viking Pony, where the court held that the proper way to deal 
with an allegation of fraud is to report it to the police or the NPA.121   As such, should 
charges of corruption in public tendering be laid, this should be done through the 
Corruption Act. Therefore the Corruption Act provides that a court may convict a person 
for corrupt activities in relation to procuring and withdrawal of tenders and in addition, 
may order that the particulars of the convicted person, the conviction and the sentence 
be endorsed in the Register for Tender Defaulters for a period between five and 10 
years.122 In the case where an ‗enterprise‘ is convicted, the court may order 
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These suppliers are all debarred from 2010 to 2015 see National Treasury Database of Restricted 
Suppliers. 
118
Sections 12; 13; 28 (1) (a). 
119
Williams S (2007) 20. 
120
Williams S (2007) 12. 
121
Viking Pony (2011) 1 SA327 (CC) para 48. 
122
Corruption Act (2004) s28 (3) (a) (ii). 
 
 
 
 
83 
 
endorsement on the register of the particulars of that enterprise; the particulars of any 
partner, manager or director.123 However the Corruption Act provides that an 
endorsement on the register should only commence after an appeal against the 
conviction or sentence is finalised by the court.124  
 
Criticism has been raised against the debarment procedures in the Corruption Act in 
that it creates uncertainty as to its rationale and proper place in public procurement 
regulation.125 The contention is that whilst the court deals with the issue of conviction for 
corruption, the National Treasury has to carry out the order of debarment. Thus the time 
of debarment is controlled by the Treasury and not the court.   This means the Treasury 
has the discretion of choosing the date of endorsing the convicted supplier;126  the court 
order do not provide the date when endorsement should start. However, once debarred, 
there is no derogation from the orders attached to debarment, which means these 
suppliers cannot do business with the government and public officials have no 
discretion in this regard.127 This is in contrast with the internal debarment under the 
Regulations 2011, which operates under the discretion of the procurement entity. 128  
 
Williams and Quinot suggest that the alternative (internal) debarment measures should 
trump court process.129 Furthermore government should use exclusions as an 
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administrative remedy130 with the view to conserve the integrity of the procurement 
system which is better suited than judicial intervention, for debarment. 131 As it is the 
Corruption Act provides for debarment with the view of punishment of corrupt activities 
and as a deterrent for corruption in general and not to preserve the integrity public 
procurement.132 Consequently protecting the integrity of the procurement system should 
be the preferred view for a flexible and effective procurement system.133 
 
This study cautions that, should the court should not be used to police corruption in 
government procurement it will mean discretion to debar is left to public officials who 
may have the potential to act arbitrarily. On the other hand the court order does not lend 
room for any arbitrary discretion, because the order must be followed. However, using 
the Procurement Regulations for debarment could prove to be less sluggish than court 
process. It must also be born in mind that the primary reason for debarment is to protect 
the organ of state against risk and thereby lend protection to the fiscus.134  
 
Furthermore Bolton argues that debarment of contractors‘ shrinks the pool of 
competitors in the procurement process and thereby defeats the principles of 
competitiveness and cost-effectiveness.135 Thus the decision by public officials to debar 
(using the Procurement Regulations) should not be capricious but rather follow due 
process. This will be served by giving affected contractors the opportunity to be heard 
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before debarment takes place.136 This will maintain procedural fairness as provided by 
the PAJA which provides the audi alteram partem rule that gives affected bidders an 
opportunity to defend themselves when faced with debarment.  
 
Despite the fact that government is protected against ruthless contractors by the 
debarment mechanisms,137 none of those companies found guilty of collusive behaviour 
have been debarred from doing business with government. (admission of guilt fines put 
the matter to rest for them).  The purpose of including debarment in the procurement 
legislation accounts for the fact that it was deemed necessary to guard against the 
practice of corruption which works against reputable economic reform. This thesis 
suggests a more aggressive approach in debarring those found guilty of corrupt 
behaviour in order to secure a tender award. Vacillation in debarring of those bidders 
found to be willful will not serve preferential but rather frustrate its success in economic 
empowerment. 
 
3.4 Other Anti-corruption measures implemented by the state 
 
Although the end to malfeasance is not nigh, it does seem that government is taking the 
issue of corrupt practices very seriously. The battle against the scourge is also evident 
in the other anti-corruption efforts implement by government.  
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First there is the recently established, National Anti-Corruption Forum,138 created  by the  
Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) to help stamp out 
corruption.139 One of the major concerns relates to irregular expenditure in SCM.140  
This is attributed to the fact that the public service is lacking in record-keeping and 
compliance with statutes.141 Through this forum the DPSA is adopting a ‗zero tolerance 
of corruption‘ approach.142  
 
Secondly, and probably the most notable of these anti corruption agencies is the SIU 
which was appointed in March 1997 to probe corruption and maladministration in 
government.143 The SIU had been mandated by the president to investigate non-
compliance with procurement procedures and procurement-related fraud, in various 
government departments.144 The president mandated the SIU in 2010145 through 
various proclamations to investigate certain government departments, inter alia the 
SAPS146 and DPW.147  The proclamations mandated the SIU to conduct investigations 
into the procurement of goods, work or services including lease accommodation by the 
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SAPS. The investigation focuses on the fact that procurement procedures were not fair, 
equitable, transparent, competitive and or cost-effective; and or contrary to applicable 
legislation manuals, guidelines, practice notes and instructions issued by the national 
treasury.148 
 
Thirdly, a working group on SCM was established to improve management of the SCM 
system as a whole.149 This working group comprises of representatives of the National 
Treasury, the South African Revenue Services, the Financial Intelligence Centre, the 
Auditor-General and the Special Investigation Unit.150 This group will identify high-risk 
clusters of tenders in order to integrate investigations, to enforce actions, which include 
criminal investigations.151  
 
Fourthly, the national treasury has also recently established a specialised audit service 
unit that focuses on developing fraud detection guidelines for supply chain management 
processes and provides fraud awareness and investigative capacity in government 
departments.152 The reason for this unit is the National Treasury‘s commitment to 
properly manage the 57 transversal contracts153 (tenders) that costs R16 billion 
annually, and in doing so ensuring proper observance of the rules of public 
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procurement.154 This will include measures employed by the national treasury to boost 
public awareness of those found guilty of transgressions in public procurement.155  
 
These are all the additional endeavors the government has made in its quest to combat 
corruption, mismanagement and maladministration in all spheres of government.156 
There is not much information recorded on the success of these establishments. The 
SIU has been the most vigilant in investigating corruption in public procurement. This is 
substantiated by its report on rampant tender corruption in the SAPS.157   However it 
must be stressed that prosecutions are not succeeding at the same rate that corruption 
is being uncovered.  
 
The PSC158 report of 2010 provides some ‗achievements‘ but laments how the 
incoherency of the different forums hinders the fight against corruption in the public 
service. The PSC reports that further structures had been established to help fully 
integrate and coordinate the fight against corruption.159 The National Anti-Corruption 
Forum was established in 2001 to contribute towards a national consensus for 
strategies against corruption.160 This was complemented by cabinet approving in 2002 
the establishment of an Anti-Corruption Coordinating Committee to achieve a 
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coordinated approach towards anti-corruption in government.161 This committee was 
mandated to ensure the fight against corruption is fully coordinated and integrated 
between all spheres of government. 
 
However the effectiveness of this collaboration is frustrated by the lack of both funds 
and political commitment; public officials have constantly missed meetings, and as a 
result the Committee has withered into inactivity.162  The PSC urged the executive of 
government to commit to delegate representatives to these forums for it to remain 
active.163 This uncoordinated approach adopted between government departments 
handicaps the struggle against corrupt practices. A major problem is a lack of 
information sharing between government departments;164  this can be seen from the 
fact that officials being investigated for financial misconduct resign and join other 
departments in government.   
 
The PSC also manages the National Anti-Corruption Hotline, through which it refers 
cases of corruption to government departments to investigate. The feed back rate of all 
cases of corruption referred to departments since 2004 is 36 percent.165 The lack of 
capacity to investigate and follow up cases is cited as the impediment to success. The 
most recent effort by government to coordinate the anti-corruption forums is the 
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establishment of an Anti-Corruption Inter-Ministerial Committee in 2009. This committee 
considers the corruption recommendations that the PSC and other bodies issue.166  
 
The PSC reports in 2011 that corrupt practices in procurement ranks in the top four 
categories of most common167 allegations in public administration.168 Amongst its key 
findings is that 60 percent169 of the government departments have either no anti-
corruption policies or very basic policies of poor quality.170 In addition to this, these 
departments have no basic investigative capacity, no forensic investigative plans and 
protocol documents for investigating cases of corruption.171 Moreover those 
departments with infrastructure for anti-corruption are mainly focused on the 
investigation of particular matters instead off a holistic approach of investigation, 
detection and prevention. 172 
 
Furthermore feedback on disciplinary action against those public officials found guilty of 
corruption and fraud, show that departments are often very lenient. 173 The common 
sanctions against disciplinary action in this regard, are written or final written 
warnings.174 This situation exists, despite the requirement that departments should 
report offences relating to fraud and corruption involving an amount of R100 000 or 
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more, to the SAPS section 34(1) of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities 
Act, 2004. 
 
There is clearly no shortage on agencies or forums that deal with corruption. The 
concern is that, despite this, corruption nevertheless seems to swamp the procurement 
environment. This is evidenced by the many media reports and more importantly from 
the SIU and the PSC reports. The political will to enforce the Corruption Act and other 
legislative measures enacted to deal with corruption, seems like a good starting point to 
deal with the scourge. However this will entail political commitment to report those found 
engaging in corruption to the authorities, in order for the court to deal with their fate.    
 
3.5 Conclusion   
 
Those that drink from the cup of corruption should face the might of the comprehensive 
provisions of the Procurement Regulations or the Corruption Act against any wilful 
action that deliberately hinders economic empowerment. Aggressive action is warranted 
in  light of the fact that the  SIU can only investigate the top 20 cases of corruption in the 
police force, which already amounts to R2 billion.175  Moreover the PSC report confirms 
that ‗corruption transcends institutional boundaries, and it is, therefore, beneficial for 
different departments and sectors of society to collaborate to fight it.‘176 This means in 
attempting to put a restraint on corruption, an organ of state should promptly investigate 
allegations of corruption and if necessary, apply Regulation 13. This will enable 
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corruption to be caught at an early stage and remedied by excluding the bidder from 
public tendering.  This will entail that government enforce the regulations in order to 
promote their own policies in the infrastructure for procurement.177  
 
In addition the exposure of collusive tendering over the past 30 years has shown the 
unabated tenacity of ‗big business‘ to corrupt the procurement environment. To break 
the chain of collusive tendering, bidders should have the Competition Amendment 
Act178 brought to bear on them. Thereby South Africa will join the global trend which 
entails imprisonment and naming such corruptors in the tender register. In addition 
those found guilty should be excluded from contracting with government. It makes no 
sense to impose a fine on a contractor for corruption, which is easily paid from ill-gotten 
gains, and then they continue to be eligible to contract with government.  
 
To exclude corrupt suppliers from tendering for government contracts is immediately 
detrimental to the reputation of such supplier, as it will affect its ability to obtain business 
from other sectors.  This is precisely why the publication of the names of suppliers, is 
such an attractive anti-corruption tool.179 Excluding corrupt suppliers brings credibility to 
the preferential procurement process and this tie in with international best practice that 
recommends the automatic exclusion of those involved in collusive tendering, or those 
providing false information to secure a tender.180 Regrettably it is possible that the 
exclusion of a company will not prevent a sister company from bidding for government 
                                                          
177
Hawkins J (2008) 60 states that the government fails to enforce their own regulations and policies. 
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Act 1 of 2000. 
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Williams S (2007) 11. 
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Arrowsmith S, Linarelli J & Wallace D Jr (2000) 41. 
 
 
 
 
93 
 
tenders.181 This means that corrupt firms still have access to government contracts, 
which raises questions about the efficacy of the exclusion provisions.182 This seems like 
an oversight and legislation in this regard is necessary which should see the suspension 
those related companies for a limited period from contracting with government. 
 
The monetary fines paid to the fiscus by bid-riggers, is not a deterrent in itself as those 
individuals responsible for crooking the procurement system are not brought to book in 
this way. The business enterprise takes the rap and bears the financial burden. The real 
perpetrators remain faceless and nameless behind the name of the enterprise. In order 
to bring those perpetrators to book, they should face prosecution in terms of the 
Competitions Amendment Act. 
 
Corporate leniency should be afforded to the enterprise ‗first through the door‘ in 
exposing collusion, resulting in immunity to that enterprise in exchange for full 
disclosure of the cartel.  The rest of the cartel should meet with the might of the 
Competition Amendment Act.183  This should have them pay a fine and be prosecuted 
for their ill gotten gains.  Moreover, because of the secretive nature of collusion, one is 
unable to tell whether these businesses will abstain from collusive behaviour in the 
future. Therefore, corporate leniency should not be on offer for the same transgression 
by the same enterprise.   
                                                          
181
Williams S (2007) 17. 
182
Williams S (2007) 17. ‗For instance, empirical evidence from the US has shown that even when firms 
have been excluded from government contracts, they are still often able to secure contracts through a 
complex network of subsidiaries, affiliates and related companies owned by the same proprietors of 
the excluded firm.‘ 
183
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The most prominent bid-riggers, the cartels in the construction industry amount to four 
percent of the GDP.184 The fact that they wield such economic power is all the more 
reason to break this monopoly in order to extend prosperity to those justified. If not, 
these same companies, that manipulated tender processes during apartheid, will 
continue to prosper, almost two decades into democratic rule. This displays such a 
blatant disregard for South Africa‘s economic growth and development policies that the 
government should stamp out this practice as a matter of national interest.  
 
It is also rather distressing that the DTI refers at least three to four fronting complaints 
per week to the SIU for further investigation.185 Thus fronting is pervasive and those 
found guilty should be named and shamed in the tender default register. Furthermore 
an effective way to deal with fronting is that it should be detected and investigated at an 
early stage and in debarring the bidder, government may nip the practice in the bud, 
without a lengthy court trial. The starting point to insulate the procurement environment 
against fronting is to apply only the BEE Codes186 verification method, which provide for 
verification biennially.  
 
This will be best served if every bidder passes scrutiny of their BEE credentials by being 
issued with a BEE status level certificate, which is updated biennially. Adhering to this 
practice may alert procurement entities of any change in shareholding or the active 
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employment of directors. Therefore post-award monitoring of tender performance is a 
necessary process to try and combat fronting. This vigilance of checking up on the 
social deliverables attached to the tender award should restrain bidders from using out 
dated BEE credentials as was the case in Viking. Moreover, if Viking Pony is found 
guilty of exploiting the practice of fronting, both Viking and the sister company (Bunker) 
should be endorsed on the register.  
 
Nevertheless the complacency to investigate fronting, displayed by the government in 
Viking Pony is cause for concern. The failure to enforce punitive measures available in 
the procurement process is to condone fronting and thereby negate proper 
transformation 
 
Furthermore the practice of tenderpreneurship, distorts the tender process by selling the 
tender to the highest bidder, without following proper tender proceedings, thereby 
bringing a credible economic empowerment program, like BEE into disrepute.187  This 
means that public resources are not optimally used for development and growth but 
rather to simply transfer wealth to a new elite- black oligarchy. As noted, the problem 
with this development in preferential procurement is that it does not promote 
entrepreneurship which is what the BEE Codes encourage. The way to deal with this 
scourge is to extend the Competitions Commission Act to include this practice. As it is 
there has to be collusion between the procurement entity and the tenderpreneur in order 
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for this practice to succeed. This type of collusion defeats fair competition and as such 
should fall under the jurisdiction of the Act.  
 
Lastly, there are too many agencies with overlapping duties on investigating corruption 
in public procurement and not enough application of preventative measures. Despite all 
these forums, this year started with reports of accounting officers of SAPS and DPW by-
passing tender procedures, unlawfully. Fortunately the government has finally re-acted 
to these reports by suspending the Police Commissioner and removing the responsible 
cabinet minister. The efficiency of preferential procurement will be better served by 
focusing on measures for early detection of corruption and thereby preventing its full 
blown operation. This should prove more valuable than trying to investigate corruption 
already at an advanced stage, where the tender contract is in progress and monies 
received. Thus the focus should be on preventative rather than reactive measures. This 
means that corrupt suppliers should be detected before they start to work on a contract 
instead of trying to recover monies irregularly paid to such bidders. This situation proves 
untenable because only insignificant amounts of moneys are recovered.188  
 
In any case, by preventing corruption from flourishing in public procurement, South 
Africa will prevent negative growth in BEE, and non-meritorious bidders will not be 
awarded tenders. The government should let the legislation guide it in the quest to 
combat willful practices. 
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PMG ‗PSA Anti-Corruption Initiatives‘ (2010). The report states that: ‗Of the 1204 financial misconduct 
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  CHAPTER 4 
 
 
THE PROBLEMS EVIDENT IN COMPETITIVE BIDDING 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapters1 enquired into the challenges that the legislation and willful 
practices pose to the preferential procurement domain. The lens of this chapter will 
extend the enquiry into the challenges experienced in the execution phase of preferential 
procurement. The objectives set out in the legislation are to be realised through this 
phase, competitive bidding (tendering) and it is important to analyse whether the 
objectives of preferential procurement are supported through the execution phase. A 
bone of contention is that the competitive bidding terrain is more often than not 
challenged by bad management. The Auditor General of South Africa (AGSA) reports 
that the tender committees neglect to properly consider the prescribed procurement 
legislation and regulations when evaluating, scoring and awarding bids.2 
 
This is cause for inquiry because it is during this phase that those broad-based BEE 
ideals of the BEE Codes are tested, because when a potential bidder wants to contract 
                                                          
1
See chapter 2 for discussion on the legislative regime for procurement and chapter 3 for discussion on 
malpractices. 
2
AGSA report  to Parliament on a performance audit of the infrastructure delivery process at the provincial 
departments of Education and Health (August 2011) para 2.1.4 (a) (hereafter AGSA report on Education 
and Health Departments) available at 
http://www.agsa.co.za/Reports%20Documents/performance%20audit%20of%20the%20infrastructure%20
delivery%20process.pdf (accessed 20 October 2011). AGSA Report on Investigation into the 
Procurement of Various Contracts at the Gauteng Provincial   Department of Roads and Transport (June 
2011) para 1.2.2(c) also decry the same non-compliance. (hereafter AGSA Report June 2011) also 
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with government for goods or services, this must be done by participating in a 
competitive bidding process.3 Those potential bidders wishing to benefit from preferential 
procurement should become compliant to the specifications required in order to submit 
an acceptable tender. The objective of the exercise of competitive bidding is to provide 
access to black people as potential bidders to preferential procurement. If accepted the 
tender will have been adjudicated through a competitive bidding process that determines 
the prescribed credentials of bidders at certain stages. This makes competitive bidding 
undeniably part of preferential procurement. 
 
This study will commence with explaining the concept of competitive bidding insofar as 
the procurement of goods or services in the South African setting. Furthermore 
competitive bidding is adjudicated by a committee system4 and this chapter will elaborate 
on the constitution of the committees and how they dispose of their tasks under the 
auspices of the legislation. 
 
 
In addition competitive bidding is also laboured by other nefarious practices displayed by 
public officials. This conduct sees the processes of competitive bidding often ignored 
which can be seen as disregard of the procurement and BEE laws. This study will look 
into the repercussions of this behaviour on the competitive bidding process. Lastly, the 
recourse for aggrieved bidders affected by tender decision will receive attention together 
with the judicial review for procurement transgressions.  
                                                          
3
This depends on the value of the tender as not all tenders need to follow a formal competitive bidding 
process only from R500 000. 
4
See Treasury Regulations reg16A in GN R225 GG 27388 of 15 March 2005; as amended by GN R146 
GG 29644 of 20 February 2007 SCM  
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4.2  Competitive bidding- the procurement of goods or services 
 
The South African Government refers to a tender as an offer to do work or supply goods 
at a fixed price.5 Securing goods or services from a bidder is also referred to as 
‘procurement’. Furthermore procurement procedures are usually referred to as 
‘tendering, ‘competitive tendering/bidding’, or ‘a call for tenders’.6 When government 
‘puts out a tender’ or ‘invites bids’ it means the public is asked for price offers to do work 
or supply goods to the state.7 This postulates a process where government assesses 
who to choose based on preferential points, price and various technical aspects.  
 
 
Plasket draws attention  to the fact that a polycentric decision is needed when evaluating 
tenders which boils down to the fact that price, although most important, is not the 
decisive factor.8 In Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd v Eastern Cape Province and 
Others9  the court noted that, annually government contracts notionally run into billions of 
rands. The court therefore lamented the fact the government’s budget is undermined 
where public officers fail to recognise that their primary task is to ensure that competitive 
bidding ensues at the least possible cost to the state, and to be mindful of BEE 
demands.10  Their task will be fulfilled if tenders are awarded to the most advantageous 
                                                          
5
Cape gateway ‘What is a tender’ 17 August 2010 available at 
http://www.capegateway.gov.za/eng/tenders/#20 (Accessed 5 September 2010). 
6
Bolton P Law of Government Procurement in South Africa (2007) 134. 
7
Cape gateway ‘What is a tender’ 17 August 2010. 
8
Plasket C ‘Administrative Law’ 2006 Annual Survey of South African Law 179. 
9
(1999) 1 SA 324 (CkH) 393(hereafter Cash Paymaster Services). 
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Cash Paymaster Services (1999) 1 SA 324 (CkH) 393. 
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offer,11  which is based on a balance between the tendered price and the tendered 
deliverables in respect of targeted groups.12 Obviously, if value for money is determined 
by price alone, this will hamper the envisaged socio-economic objectives for targeted 
groups.  
 
Competitive bidding processes or the lack thereof is not given the optimal attention 
needed in the context of the importance attributed to preferential procurement. To this 
extent the disregard of procurement policies and procedures is treated with flippancy as 
demonstrated by the investigation into the lack of procurement procedures by a 
government agency entrusted with R106 million.13  A forensic investigation confirmed 
that no proper bookkeeping was followed and procurement lacked proper tendering in 
that most suppliers failed to provide tax clearance certificates as required.  The 
procurement entity felt it was sufficient to justify how the money was spent (without 
regard for formal tendering). 
 
Importance should also be shed on a fair and transparent tender process, which must 
give rise to a competitive public procurement system. Therefore government contracts 
                                                          
11
Green Paper on Public Sector Procurement Reform in South Africa. Government  Gazette no 17928,14 
April 1997 para 3.4.4 (hereafter Green Paper ) states: ‘The successful tenderer would, normally, be the 
one who is awarded the most points, subject to technical factors, previous contractual performance, 
financial references, unit rates and prices, alternative offers, qualifications etc., being acceptable. The 
premium, if any, which an organ of the State is prepared to pay to meet certain specific socio-economic / 
development objectives is defined in the formulation of the development objective / price mechanism 
which could be standardised throughout South Africa.’ 
12
Watermeyer R ‘The Use of Targeted Procurement as an Instrument of Poverty Alleviation and Job 
Creation in Infrastructure Projects’ (2000) 9 Public Procurement Law Review 230. 
13
Pauw J ‘Grootskaalse bedrog en diefstal kenmerk jeugfees’ Die Burger 9 October 2011 available at 
http://www.dieburger.com/Suid-Afrika/Nuus/Grootskaalse-bedrog-en-diefstal-kenmerk-jeugfees-
20111009 (accessed 30 October 2011). 
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should only be awarded after an adequate number of suppliers were able to compete.14 
The attraction of the biggest pool of competitors ensures optimal competition which 
underscores value for money,15  the ultimate aim for public procurement. Furthermore 
the court describes the very essence of tender procedures as a procedure that ensures 
proper evaluation is done of ‘what is available, at what price and whether or not that 
which is produced serves the purposes for which it is intended’.16 Furthermore the 
principle of transparency dictates that public procurement procedures cannot be held 
behind closed doors and generally tenders must be opened in public.17 Moreover, after 
conclusion of a tender the parties may not vary the terms of the contract.18 This makes 
the publication of tender information of the utmost importance. 
 
As it is, competitive bidding  gives rise to four entitlements for bidders namely; sufficient 
access to tender competitions; timeous notification of the closing date for submission of 
tenders; information on evaluation and selection criteria; and the right to expect and 
require the organ of state calling for tenders, to abide by the tender criteria.19  As a result 
public procurement decisions are fertile grounds for review of rationality; therefore the 
necessary legal controls over the adjudication of tenders must be in place to ensure that 
public interest is furthered when drawing from the public purse.20 In addition, should 
                                                          
14
Bolton P (2007)131. 
15
Bolton P (2007) 131. 
16
Cash Paymaster Services (1999) 1 SA 324 (CkH) para 385. 
17
Bolton P (2007) 131. 
18
Bolton P ‘Scope for Negotiating and/or Varying the Terms of Government Contracts Awarded by Way of 
a Tender Process’ (2006) 2 Stell LR 270. 
19
Bolton P (2006) 272. In Grinaker LTA Ltd and Another v Tender Board (Mpumalanga) and Others (2002) 
3 All SA 336 (T) para 54-5 (hereafter Grinaker) the court set aside the tender board’s decision and 
awarded the tender in accordance with the advertised tender conditions which the tender board deviated 
from. 
20
Plasket C (2006) 179. 
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public officials act capriciously, unsuccessful or aggrieved bidders have locus standi in 
court to review such action.   
 
Nevertheless upon acceptance of a tender by government, a binding contract ensues 
and the bidder awarded the tender has to provide the goods or services agreed to and 
government must pay the agreed price at the agreed time. Public officials manage 
competitive bidding within a SCM system which is explores next to determine how well 
officials dispose of this task. 
 
4.2.1 Supply Chain Management (SCM)  
 
Supply chain management can be described as: ‘[a] function that ensures that goods 
and services are delivered to the right place, in the right quantity, with the right quality, at 
the right cost and at the right time.’21 A policy shift has seen procurement powers being 
vested in procurement entities of each government department or organ of state. This 
resulted in a SCM system22  entrusted to each procurement entity23 instead of a 
centralised tender board which also extend to local government where competitive 
bidding is tied into SCM regulations24 providing for a committee system. Consequently 
this evolved in a more hands-on approach in competitive bidding, which creates 
                                                          
21
Malinga M ‘Zero Tolerance Against Fraud and Corruption Conference’ National Treasury: Supply Chain   
Management 25 – 26 September (2007) 11. (hereafter Malinga M ‘Fraud and Corruption Conference). 
22
Treasury Regulations 16A3.2 (b); (c); 16A6.2 (a); (b). 
23
Plasket C (2006) 163. 
24
Municipal Supply Chain Management Regulations in GN 868 GG 27636 of 30 May 2005 reg 2(3); 26.
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uniformity in the process,25  thereby giving effect to the provisions of the Constitution, the 
PFMA,26 Procurement Act27 and BBBEE Act.28 This serves to combat inconsistency in 
policy application, fragmented bid procedures and insufficient training of staff, as was the 
situation with tender boards.29   
 
Ordinarily a SCM policy must provide for procedures for each of the stages of the 
competitive bidding process, that is: the compilation of bid documentation; the public 
invitation of bids; site meetings or briefing sessions where necessary; the handling of 
bids after submission; the evaluation of bids; the award of contracts, and the 
administration of contracts and proper record keeping.30 Evidently, preferential 
procurement is not discretionary but strictly rule-bound; therefore a public tender is the 
preferable means of engaging in competitive bidding. 31   
 
4.2.2 SCM Committees  
 
The Treasury Regulations32 require the establishment of a committee system that 
comprises of at least three committees; namely, a bid specification committee (BSC), a 
bid evaluation committee (BEC) and a bid adjudication committee (BAC).  It is common 
knowledge that these committees should oversee the adjudication of tenders. The 
                                                          
25
Malinga M ‘Fraud and Corruption Conference’ (2007) 11. 
26
Act 1 of 1999. 
27
Act 5 of 2000. 
28
Act 53 of  2003 
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Malinga M ‘Fraud and Corruption Conference’ (2007) background. 
30
Bolton P 'The Committee System for Competitive Bids in Local Government' (2009) 2 Potchefstroom 
Electronic Law Journal 90. 
31
Bolton P The Legal Regulation of Government Procurement in South Africa the Legal Regulation of 
Government Procurement in South Africa (published LLD thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2005) 
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importance of the constitution of these committees was highlighted in Actaris South 
Africa (Pty) Ltd v Sol Platjie Municipality and Another 33  where the court pointed out the 
importance of properly constituted SCM committees. The court reviewed and set aside 
three awarded tenders, because the SCM evaluation and adjudication committees were 
not properly constituted and their procedures were questionable. In setting aside the 
tender awards, the court afforded peremptory status to the different provisions of SCM, 
which serves to enhance the integrity of bid procedures thereby promoting public 
confidence.34  
 
In order to achieve positive results in preferential procurement, the SCM committees 
should be constituted from the most honourable, incorruptible and objective people that 
government can find for that purpose and they must also hail from the department calling 
for the goods or services.35   Furthermore, in satisfying a bidder’s legitimate expectation 
of fair tendering, the SCM officials must dispense of their discretion in a fair, responsible 
and honest way.36  Competitiveness and fairness in public tendering is undermined by 
accounting officers found ‘tampering’ with tenders.  These were the findings of the AGSA 
in reporting to parliament that two unsuccessful bidders in a state tender complained 
they were not given the same information and that the successful bidder was given 
confidential business information not given to the other bidders.37 Despite the 
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2008) 4 All SA 168 (NC) para 58 (hereafter Actaris SA). 
34
Bolton P (2009) 90. 
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Cash Paymaster Services (1999) 1 SA 324 (CkH) para 385; Actaris SA (2008) 4 All SA 168 (NC) para 
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Aquafund (Pty) Limited v Premier of the Western Cape 
 
(1997) 2 All SA 608 (C) 617. 
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SAPA ‘CIPRO in tender trouble’ Times live 18 May 2010 available at 
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confirmation of the minister that fraud and corruption had taken place in this tender, the 
successful bidder was neither suspended nor debarred.38 This position prevailed despite 
the power of accounting officers to restrict suppliers from doing business with 
government, should irregularities occur during tender procedures.39 
 
4.3 Competitive bidding:  The effect of skills deficiency on the different stages 
of procurement  
 
The promotion of skills development in public procurement, which dates back to the 1997 
Green Paper on public sector procurement reform, makes specific reference to the sort 
of training needed; this includes basic procurement training, the development of 
management and advanced specialist procurement skills.40  Notwithstanding this, the 
National Treasury stated in a policy document in 200341  that public procurement 
practitioners are not adequately trained in the application of the Procurement Act and its 
associated Regulations.  
 
In Millennium Waste Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson of the Tender Board: Limpopo 
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SAPA ‘CIPRO in tender trouble’ Times live 18 May 2010 the minister confirmed that R1 million had 
already been paid to the supplier. 
39
Supply Chain Management Practice Note Number 5 of 2006 issued on 09 October 2006. 
40
Green Paper (1997) para 2.2.2 states: ‘Collectively, procurement personnel in organs of State possess a 
great deal of knowledge and experience. Ensuring that this is fully shared within and between organs of 
state will be of major benefit to all. As few procurement problems are unique, solutions developed in 
isolation will, at best, involve duplication and, at worst, mean failure to secure the best available 
solution.’ 
41
National Treasury Policy Strategy to Guide Uniformity in Procurement Reform Processes in Government 
(2003) 3 (hereafter National Treasury Policy Strategy) available at http://www.treasury.gov.za/ (accessed 
3 February 2011).
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Province & Others42  the court pointed out that this situation is still prevalent, leading to 
the principles of fairness, equitability, transparency, competitiveness and cost-
effectiveness being compromised by gross incompetence in SCM. This is due to the lack 
of understanding of the procurement laws which leads to unnecessary court challenges 
by aggrieved bidders.43 The Supreme Court of Appeal held that ‘the tender committee 
lacked not only the necessary skills to adjudicate the tender, but also an understanding 
of legislative principles.’ These inadequacies have seen meritorious bidders being 
disqualified. 44 
 
Watermeyer makes it clear that a good starting point for the successful use of 
preferential procurement is that those public officials evaluating tenders should be 
conversant with and competent in, implementing procurement laws and policies.45   
 
4.3.1 Planning stage  
 
Arrowsmith points out that the most transparent of all procurement methods is the single 
stage formal tendering.46  This process entails planning which includes identification, 
                                                          
42
(2008) 2 SA 481 (SCA) para 33 (hereafter Millennium Waste Management). Aso see Intertrade Two (Pty) 
Ltd v Mec for Road and Public Works (2008) 1 All SA 142 (CK) (hereafter Intertrade Two). 
43
Millennium Waste Management (2008) 2 SA 481 (SCA) para 33. 
44
Millennium Waste Management (2008) 2 SA 481 (SCA).In this case incompetence led to the applicant’s 
tender being wrongly disqualified. The appellant had tendered to provide the needed service at a cost of 
R444 244, 43 per month whereas the winner had quoted and was awarded the tender at the amount of 
R3 642 257, 28 per month. 
45
Watermeyer R (2000) 228. 
46
Arrowsmith S, Linarelli J & Wallace D Jr Regulating Public Procurement: National and International 
Perspective (2000) 460. 
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design, finance and procurement strategy, tender selection and contract agreement.47 
Essentially a well planned procurement process is the start of a successful procurement 
environment. This route should pursue adequately prepared documentation with 
thoughtful drafting and specifications which promotes value for money.48 The degree of 
competition is determined by well-drafted specifications, documentation, and scope of 
the work and evaluation criteria.49 It is furthermore incumbent on the BSC to ensure that 
bid documentation include evaluation and adjudication criteria, which must include 
criteria prescribed by the Procurement Act and the BBBEE Act.50 
 
 
Supply chain management policies must make provision for a tendering process for 
contracts above R30 000 and long-term contracts.51 However to promote maximum 
competition and value for money52 procurement from R500 00053 must pursue a formal 
public tendering process, which is compliant with the legal prescripts pertaining to 
preferential procurement. The BSC is tasked with the duty to plan for the invitation of 
tenders as prescribed by the Procurement Regulations.54 Should poor planning occur, 
this may result in waste, inefficiency and disputes with bidders over vague specifications, 
                                                          
47
Hawkins J, & Wells J ‘Modifying Infrastructure Procurement to Enhance Social Development’ (2008) 4 (4) 
ATDF Journal (2008) 56. 
48
Arrowsmith S, Linarelli J &Wallace D Jr (2000) 355. The author defines specifications as: ‘the technical 
requirements which define, in an objective manner, the characteristics of the goods, works or services to 
be purchased. There are three types of specifications namely design, performance and functional’ 407. 
49
Arrowsmith S Linarelli J & Wallace D Jr (2000) 355. 
50
Bolton P (2006) 273; Treasury Regulations16A6.3 (c). 
51
Bolton P (2007) 152. 
52
Bolton P (2007) 143. 
53
Procurement Regulations (2011) reg 5 (1) (a) prescribes that a tender has to be arranged for bids from 
R30 000. However tenders under R500 000, do not need to go out on public tender but can be sourced 
from a supplier data base).  
54
Section 3 provides that ‘An organ of state must, prior to making an invitation for tenders- 
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terms and conditions.55 For this reason BSC must be convened as required by the 
Treasury Regulations, 56 to compile detailed bid specifications in anticipation of a call for 
tenders. The failure to establish a BSC compromises the process of tendering; 
consequently it is disconcerting that the AGSA57 found that a BSC was not always 
established for each occasion when bid specifications were compiled. The importance of 
drawing up properly expressed bid documents is pivotal because vague tender 
documents does not only frustrate administrative fairness but may also lead to the 
process having to start afresh.58 
 
 
To stave off this practice tender documents should be distinct and inform tenderers with 
reasonable and sufficient certainty of the requirements for a valid and acceptable 
tender.59 In addition to this the BSC must ensure that the bid documents and general 
conditions of contract (GCC)60 are in accordance with the National Treasury 
instructions.61  
 
 
Bolton warns that organs of state should be mindful not to draft vague and ambiguous 
provisions for tendering.62 In Aurobindo Pharma (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson, State Tender 
                                                          
55
Arrowsmith S, Linarelli J & Wallace D Jr (2000) 355. 
56
Regulation 16A6.2 (b). 
57
AGSA Report on Investigation into the Procurement of Various Contracts at the Gauteng Provincial   
Department of Roads and Transport (June 2011) para 1.2.2(c) (hereafter AGSA Report June 2011). 
58
Minister of Social Development v Phoenix Cash & Carry (2007) 3 All SA 115 (SCA) (2007) 3 All SA 115 
(SCA) para 9 (hereafter Phoenix Cash & Carry). In this case the Court found that the tender documents 
did not clearly state whether financial statements were required or not and thus ruled the specifications 
to be vague and that the process should start de novo. 
59
Phoenix Cash & Carry (2007) 3 All SA 115 (SCA) para 7. 
60
National Treasury General Conditions of Contract (Practice Note Number SCM 1 of 2003) para 2.1 
(hereafter National Treasury GCC). 
61
Treasury Regulations 16A6.3 (a). 
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Board and Others63  an unsuccessful tenderer in the supply of antiretroviral drugs 
attacked the tender process after the BAC regarded the bid as non-compliant and thus 
unresponsive thereby rendering it invalid. The court agreed (with the applicant) that the 
terms which excluded the bidder were ambiguous and therefore misleading.64  This 
bidder would have scored the tender due to its significantly lower price which would have 
saved the tax payer a considerable amount of money.65 The BAC should have sought 
clarity from the bidder instead of disqualifying the bid as unresponsive.66 Due to the fact 
that the contract had run its course the setting aside of the award was moot. The court 
was obliged to dismiss the application but ordered the government to pay costs.67  
 
In response to this the Aids Law Project writes that there is an urgent need for the best 
available prices for anti-retroviral drugs (ARV) and this requires the fair application of fair 
tender rules by appropriately constituted bid committees.68 This needs to translate into 
more skillful committees because the lack of astute adjudication could have seen the 
tender for supplying important life prolonging drugs, set aside and this could have had 
dire results. Concern was expressed that the National Treasury should guard against 
similarly flawed tender procedures in future. 
 
                                                          
63
(59309/2008) (2010) ZAGPPHC 51 (27 May 2010) para 21 (hereafter Aurobindo).  
64
Aurobindo (59309/2008) (2010) ZAGPPHC 51 (27 May 2010) para 37. 
65
Aurobindo product was to be delivered to the state at R142.50 for 30 days’ supply – some 52% lower 
than MSD’s 2008 price (R297.22) for the same product. 
66
Aurobindo (59309/2008) (2010) ZAGPPHC 51 (27 May 2010) para39. 
67
Aurobindo (59309/2008) (2010) ZAGPPHC 51 (27 May 2010) para 60. 
68
Section 27 incorporating the Aids Law Project ‘Transparency and fairness must be enforced in 2010 
ARV tender process’ 1 July 2010 available at http://www.section27.org.za/2010/07/01/transparency-
and-fairness-must-be-enforced-in-2010-arv-tender-process/ (accessed on 1 November 2011). 
 
 
 
 
110 
 
Furthermore, in Casalinga Investments CC t/a Waste Rite v Buffalo City Municipality 69 
the respondent (the government) admitted that particulars of the services to be rendered 
were vaguely expressed in the advertised bid and the bidders would not have known the 
criteria or full details of the work required.70 Adding to the woes was that no technical 
specifications were adequately detailed.71 After the tender award a forensic audit found 
that procurement elements and values had been transgressed by the public officials 
adjudicating the tender and this rendered the award unlawful.  
 
 
The unlawful conduct of the public officials was aggravated by the person signing the 
agreement not being clothed with the authority to do so.72 Further transgressions include 
the opening, registering and recording of bids in the presence of interested persons.73 
This evolved from non-compliance with the legal and regulatory framework, SCM policies 
and other prescripts which rendered the agreement void ab initio.74   
 
 
It must be pointed out that uncertain criteria in a tender process run the risk of excluding 
meritorious tenders, thus negating competitiveness.75 The importance of including the 
envisaged criteria was accentuated by the court in RHI Joint Venture v Minister of Roads 
and Public Works76  where the tender board failed to inform prospective bidders that 
                                                          
69
(2009) JOL 23397 (ECG) paras 16 - 7 (hereafter Casalinga Investments ). 
70
Casalinga Investments (2009) JOL 23397 (ECG) para 14. 
71
Casalinga Investments (2009) JOL 23397 (ECG) para 14. 
72
Casalinga Investments (2009) JOL 23397 (ECG) para 10. 
73
Casalinga Investments (2009) JOL 23397 (ECG) para 20. 
74
Casalinga Investments (2009) JOL 23397 (ECG) para 3. 
75
Phoenix Cash & Carry (2007) 3 All SA 115 (SCA) para 2. 
76
(2003) 5 BCLR 544 (CK) para 37 the court held that ‘every tenderer was entitled to know, prior to 
tendering for the contract that preference would be given to tenderers who had not been awarded a 
contract previously. From a practical and financial point of view the necessity for this to have been 
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preference will be afforded to contractors who had never been awarded a contract. The 
court set aside the award and relegated the matter to the tender board for re-
adjudication.  
 
Nonetheless, government should ensure that tender specifications are not  too restrictive 
as this will limit the number of tenders received, which  in turn thwarts competition as the 
biggest pool of competitors are not engaged.77  Although the Treasury Regulations 
provide that tender specifications should be drawn up in an unbiased manner, it does not 
veto restrictive specifications.78 Bolton affirms that restrictive specifications discourage 
emerging enterprises in particular from tendering.79 In this regard organs of state are 
prohibited from mentioning, for instance, trademarks, trade names or particular 
processes of manufacturing.80  International guidelines recognise that, precise and clear 
specifications in tender documents are a prerequisite to realise economic objectives, 
efficiency and fairness in procurement.81  Moreover in planning for preferential 
procurement BSC should always be aware of attracting BEE compliant businesses. 
Therefore preferential points and any ‘specific goals’ as provided for in the Procurement 
Act82 must be clearly stated as this will alert  potential bidders that only tenders with an 
empowerment component will enjoy preference. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
disclosed is obvious. Those contractors who had previously been successful would then have been able 
to decide whether or not the expense of preparing and submitting a tender was warranted.’ 
77
Bolton P (2007) 144. 
78
Bolton P (2007) 144. 
79
Bolton P (2007) 144. 
80
Bolton P (2007) 144. 
81
World Bank Standard Bidding Document Procurement of Works (1995) available at www.worldbank.com 
(accessed 12 December 2010). 
82
Sections 2 (1) (a); s1 (b) (i) (ii). See Chapter two para 2.5.3 for discussion on the discord of the 
procurement legislation. 
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4.3.1.1   The advertising of bids  
 
The call for tenders gives rise to four entitlements for bidders, namely: adequate access 
to tender competitions; timeous notification of the closing date for submission of tenders; 
information on evaluation and selection criteria. Furthermore the competitive bidding 
process should kick off by calling for tenders and in this adequate notice must be given 
of the bid’s nature and purpose. In pursuit of spreading economic splendor the 
advertising of bids should reach as many black bidders as possible. 83 
 
The quest for competitiveness makes the advertising of bids crucial in the run-up to a 
competitive bidding process. In order to reach the maximum amount of bidders formal 
procurement procedures require public advertisement for the calling of tenders, through 
which the general public should be approached.84   
 
A good point of departure is to follow the Treasury Regulations85   which provide that a 
call for tenders must be advertised at least 21 days before closure of the bid, in at least 
the Government Tender Bulletin. Dereliction from this time frame has been disclosed in 
the AGSA report in that some provinces impaired the principles in section 217(1) by not 
advertising bids or not adhering to the minimum of 21 days, resulting in a small number 
                                                          
83
World Trade Organisation (WTO) Agreement on Government Procurement article XVII (1) available at 
www.wto.org (accessed 13 December 201) confirms the timeous advertising of bids. 
84
Regulation 16A6.3(c). 
85
Regulation 16A6.3 (c). Longer time may be necessary for more complex tenders. Regulation 16A6.3 (d) 
provides that the result of the tender process should be published in the Government Tender Bulletin 
and the same other media by which the bids were advertised. Also see the tender bulletin available at 
www.treasury.gov.za. MFMA Regulations (2005) reg 22(1) (b) (i) provide that closure date for 
submission of bids may not be less than 30 days for transactions over R10 million and 14 days for any 
other case from date which advertisement is placed. 
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of prospective bidders.86 In some instances those time frames ranged between seven 
and 52 days.87 This was evidenced by the award of a contract worth R3.1 million for a 
tender that was only advertised for seven days.88 This inappropriate conduct did not 
serve competitiveness because the most eligible bidder was not elected, resulting in the 
award to a bidder lacking capacity. The element of cost-effectiveness was compromised 
by the bidder not honouring timeframes for delivery; the project took 13 months to 
complete instead of the promised period of three months.89  
 
A further difficulty is that tender committees have a propensity for deviating from the 
specifications of advertised bids. In Moseme Road Construction CC and others v King 
Civil Engineering Contractors (Pty)90 the appellant and respondent both submitted tender 
applications for which the latter did not qualify whereas the former did. The problem was 
that the advertised bid specifications applied only to bidders with a certain classification. 
The respondent did not conform to this classification, but at a site meeting the public 
official informed the bidder that it qualifies to tender, despite its lower classification. 91  
The bidder, whom offered the lowest price, was subsequently disqualified because the 
advertised bid did not make provision for bidders with a lower classification. 92 
 
                                                          
86
AGSA report on Education and Health Departments (August 2011) para 2.1.4 (a). AGSA report June 
2011 para 1.2.2(b) also decry the same non-compliance. 
87
AGSA report on Education and Health Departments (August 2011) para 2.1.4 (a). AGSA Report June 
2011 para 1.2.2(b). 
88
AGSA report on Education and Health Departments (August 2011) para 2.1.4 (a). 
89
AGSA report on Education and Health Departments (August 2011) para 2.1.4 (a). 
90
(2010) (4) SA 359 (SCA) para 21 (hereafter Moseme Road Construction). 
91
Moseme Road Construction (2010) 4 SA 359 (SCA) para 4. 
92
Also see Grinaker (2002) 3 All SA 336 (T) para 54-5. Coolcat Restaurante BK h/a Die Kafeteria UOVS v 
Vrystaatse Regering(1999) 2 SA 635 (O) para 644I-J (hereafter Coolcat Restaurante). Mamlambo 
Construction CC v Port St John’s Municipality & Others (2010) JOL 26063 (ECM) para 6. 
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Poor planning on advertised bid specification has also seen tender committees having to 
ask the court to entertain condonation to deviate from the advertised bid. This was the 
case in South African Container Stevedores (Pty) Ltd v Transnet Port Terminals and 
Others.93  The applicant tendered for port container procurement on a port by port basis 
as was advertised, whereas the organ of state awarded the tender on a national basis in 
support of cost-effectiveness. The court was tasked to pronounce on whether an 
administrative error in deviating from an advertised tender may be condoned. In this 
instance the court viewed the reason for the deviation as fair. The reason for this 
conclusion is that the organ of state is legally and constitutionally obliged and entitled to 
some ‘commercial arm twisting’ in getting the fairest price when procuring goods or 
services through a competitive bidding process.94 This is especially important as it 
echoes the purpose of section 217 which dictates that subject to affirmative action, the 
government should still maintain the best price and value for money.95 
 
4.3.2 The bidding stage 
 
 
The BEC must ensure that ‘acceptable tenders’ are evaluated as provided for in the 
Procurement Act;96 this means that tenders must be judged against the principles 
fairness, equity, transparency, competitiveness and cost-effectiveness.97 Therefore 
miscalculation in the points for certain criteria during bid evaluations should not be 
                                                          
93
(2011) 22 (ZAKZDHC) para 88 (hereafter Stevendores). 
94
Stevendores (2011) 22 (ZAKZDHC) para 100. 
95
Stevendores (2011) 22 (ZAKZDHC) para 104. 
96
Section 1 (i). 
97
Chairperson: Standing Tender Committee and Others v JFE Sapela Electronics (Pty) Ltd and Others 
(2005) 4 All SA 487 (SCA) para 14 (hereafter Chairperson: Standing Tender Committee). 
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tolerated.98  As it also conflicts with the BEE Codes which prescribe how criteria should 
be evaluated. It stands to reason that tender procedures are intended to ensure that 
proper evaluation is done where all bidders are treated fairly to ensure that the tender 
that suits the requirements best, wins the award.99 This will entail that the tender should 
in all aspects comply with the bid specification and conditions as advertised and as set 
out in the contract documents,100 in compliance with the Procurement and BBBEE 
legislation.  
 
Further difficulty is created in competitive bidding reports which reveal that laws were 
contravened in about 47 percent of projects audited.101  There is repeated breach of 
Procurement Regulations102 insofar as the submission of tax clearance certificates by 
potential bidders. This important regulation ensures that only bidders, whose tax affairs 
with the South African Revenue Services are sound, qualify to tender. It is evidently 
necessary to submit this certificate together with the tender application, and if omitted, 
the subsequent submission of such tax clearance certificate will be considered a fatal 
error and acceptance of such a bid application is invalid.103 The acceptance of such a 
tender will be indicative of the process being unfair, non-transparent and non-
competitive104 and thus, be contrary to the principles in section 217 (1) of the 
Constitution.  
                                                          
98
AGSA report on Education and Health Departments (August 2011) para 2.1.5. 
99
Cash Paymaster Services (1999) 1 SA 324 (CkH) para 350. Also see Menzies Aviation South Africa (Pty) 
Limited v South African Airways and Others (2009) 08/22988 (ZAGPJHC) 65 para 36. 
100
Chairperson: Standing Tender Committee (2005) 4 All SA 487 (SCA) para14. Also see Metro Projects 
CC and Another v Klerksdorp Local Municipality and Others 2004 (1) SA 16 (SCA) para15. 
101
AGSA report on Education and Health Departments (August 2011) para 2.1.1. 
102
Procurement Regulations (2011) reg 14. 
103
Imvusa Trading 134CC and Another v Dr. Ruth Mompati District Municipality and Others (2008) 46 
ZANWHC  para 1 (hereafter Imvusa Trading) 
104
Imvusa Trading (2008) 46 (NW) para 3. 
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Notwithstanding this, in Casalinga Investments105 where the bid advertisement provided 
that standard procurement conditions will apply, the BEC did not ensure that the 
applicant was tax compliant and on close scrutiny the applicant’s tax clearance certificate 
did not have VAT registration, taxation of PAYE or UIF.  This contravened the 
Procurement Regulations106 and the Municipal Systems Act missing the attributes 
required by section 217 (1).107 Moreover the bidding process was fraught with non-
compliance in that the applicant had access to information on the bid specifications to 
which the other bidders were not privy; this led to the exclusion of other potential 
bidders,108 thereby diminishing competitiveness. The court deemed the agreement as 
unconstitutional and therefore invalid. 
 
This practice of overlooking the importance of tax clearances was again challenged in 
Mpumalanga Steam & Boiler Works CC v Minister of Public Works & Others109 where the 
tender committee awarded a tender to a bidder that submitted an invalid tax clearance 
certificate. The committee was of the opinion that they do not have to verify a tax 
certificate, but the court held that the legislation puts such a duty on the committee.110  
This display of ignorance by the tender committee resulted in a punitive cost order 
against the state which unfortunately does not bond with cost-effectiveness.  
 
Although state entities are obliged to implement a preferential procurement policy and 
                                                          
105
(2009) JOL 23397 (ECG) para 20. 
106
Regulation 14. 
107
Casalinga Investments (2009) JOL 23397 (ECG) para 22. Also see MFMA s111; s112. 
108
Casalinga Investments (2009) JOL 23397 (ECG) para 40. 
109
(2011) JOL 27018 (GNP) (hereafter Mpumalanga Steam). 
110
Mpumalanga Steam (2011) JOL 27018 (GNP) para 16. 
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then apply the BEE Codes during procurement processes111  these legislative prescripts 
are in some instances ignored. This was also suggested in the AGSA report where SCM 
was using the Procurement Act to calculate preferential points thereby ignoring the BEE 
Codes.112 In some instances the BEC miscalculated the points for certain criteria during 
bid evaluations.113 This conduct conflicts with the BEE Codes which prescribe how 
criteria should be evaluated.  
 
Further propensity of contravening legislative prescripts was disclosed in Sekgobela v 
State Information Technology Agency (Pty) Ltd 114(SITA) where the court emphasised 
the importance of following the proper procurement procedures and policies. The 
applicant was dismissed after making a protected disclosure115 in that formal 
procurement processes should have been followed in terms of the respondent's 
procurement policy and procedures. The applicant (the programme manager project) 
maintained that a request for quotations went out on 16 October 2003, days before the 
motivation for this project was finally approved on 24 October 2003.116 This resulted in 
quotations submitted on 20 October 2003, four days before the final approval.117 
According to the SITA procurement policy a request for quotations can only be made if 
                                                          
111
BEE Codes (2007) background. 
112
See AGSA Report (2011)  
113
AGSA report on Education and Health Departments (August 2011) para 2.1.5. 
114
(2009) JOL 23676 (LC) para 19 (hereafter Sekgobela). Note Sekgobela is discussed again in para 4.4   
dealing with ethical behaviour of public officials. 
115
 Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000  s1 'disclosure' means any disclosure of information regarding 
any conduct of an employer, or an employee of that employer, made by any employee who has reason 
to believe that the information concerned shows or tends to show one or more of the following:(a)that a 
criminal offence has been committed, is being committed or is likely to be committed; (b) that a person 
has failed is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which that person is subject" 
(own emphasis). 
116
Sekgobela (2009) JOL 23676 (LC) para 20. 
117
 Sekgobela (2009) JOL 23676 (LC) para 20. 
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the procurement price is less that R100 000.118 This procurement was for R9 million and 
according to the SITA policy it should have followed formal competitive bidding 
procedures and not a request for quotations  The respondent (SITA) argued that there 
was no legal obligation for it to follow a specific procurement policy or procedure since it 
had discretionary power to deviate from these processes in cases deemed internal.119 
The court rejected this argument that a state entity has no duty to have procurement and 
provisioning system.120 The court stated unequivocally that SITA is an organ of state and 
therefore bound by the PFMA121 which imposes a ‘legal duty or obligation upon an organ 
of state to maintain a procurement and provisioning system’. 122  
 
Furthermore the SITA accused the applicant of laying criminal charges on corruption 
against SITA employees without first raising the alleged conduct with senior 
management and without having authority to lay such a complaint.123 This will mean if a 
public official who has knowledge of maladministration want to criminally report this, he 
should first check with his superiors. If this is so it is not clear what purpose the 
Protection Act serves. The court held that an employee of the state should not face 
employment detriment should he dare to question the procurement operations of his 
employer, especially where the employer is an organ of state.124 
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Sekgobela (2009) JOL 23676 (LC) para 22 
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Sekgobela (2009) JOL 23676 (LC) para 7. 
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There is however occasions where government can dispense with procurement 
obligations, where two organs of state wish to enter into a procurement arrangement in 
support of cost-effectiveness. In CEO of the South African Social Security Agency N.O 
and Other v Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd 125 the court a quo upheld an application 
in setting aside an agreement between two organs of state, the Social Security Agency 
(SASSA) and the South African Post Office Ltd (SAPO) because they failed to follow a 
procurement process compliant with section 217 of the Constitution, the PFMA and the 
Treasury Regulations. The Supreme Court of Appeal differed with this and held that the 
Treasury Regulations do allow an accounting officer or accounting authority to deviate 
from inviting competitive bids.126 The agreement was reinstated as it was deemed to be 
cost-effective to the fiscus. Of interest is that the AGSA report127 found that when 
deviating from the competitive bidding process, reasons for the deviation are not 
recorded as prescribed by Treasury Regulations128 and departmental SCM policies.  
 
Instances of skills deficiency during competitive bidding were also displayed in 
Millennium Waste Management129  where the tender committee disqualified the bidder 
for not signing a duly completed declaration of interest. The court lamented the fact that 
the tender committee did not know it was clothed with the power to condone this 
peremptory requirement;130 the omission of the signature was not fatal because the 
bidder had already completed the declaration of interest in full. The lack of signature was 
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(2011) 3 All SA 233 (SCA). (hereafter CEO of SASSA). 
126
CEO of SASSA (2011) 3 All SA 233 (SCA) para 21 (SASSA and the SAPO are both organs of state). 
Treasury Regulations 16A6.4. 
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AGSA Report June 2011 para 1.2.2 (e). 
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Regulation 16A6.4.  
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Millennium Waste Management (2008) 2 SA 481 (SCA) para 35.  
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an honest omission. This ignorance led to the applicant’s tender being wrongly 
disqualified. Nevertheless a tender which is invalid in terms of the tender conditions 
should not even be considered by the bid committees.131 
 
 
 4.3.3   The contract maintenance stage 
 
The main reason why contract maintenance is important is to provide information on how 
successful preferential procurement has been, in order to make an assessment of how 
long the current preferential procurement policies should remain in force.132 Despite 
legislation and regulations substantiating contract maintenance in public procurement, 
there is a paucity of statistics on black people that have been successfully empowered 
through preferential procurement. This situation prevails despite reference to contract 
maintenance in several of the procurement legislation pertaining to national, provincial 
and local government level.  
 
The requirement of contract maintenance is mentioned in the following acts: first the 
Procurement Act133 provides that goals (deliverables) for preferential points must be 
monitored. This section necessarily promotes contract maintenance in that those goals 
or performance should be monitored after the award of the tender.  The importance 
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Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board of the Eastern Cape (2007) 3 SA 121 (CC); (2007) 3 BCLR 
300 (CC) para 54 (hereafter Steenkamp). 
132
Manchidi  T ‘Targeted Procurement in the Republic of South Africa- An independent assessment by 
International Labour Organisation, Development Bank of SA, Department of Public Works’(2002) 122 
(hereafter Manchidi T ‘Targeted Procurement in RSA) available at 
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placed on BEE for economic development dictates that the procurement process should 
include contract maintenance in order to monitor the success of transformation as a 
service provider‘s bad performance may be detected through contract maintenance. 
Therefore the service provider must be notified of its bad performance, as failure to do so 
will result in the organ of state not being able to rely on ‘bad track record’ to exclude or 
debar the supplier.134 The importance of contract maintenance should perhaps be more 
clearly addressed in the framework legislation because the provincial and municipal 
SCM legislation in particular elicit the importance of post tender- award monitoring in no 
uncertain terms.  
 
Secondly the MFMA Regulations135 provide for performance of contract management to 
determine whether SCM processes are followed in order to monitor whether desired 
objectives are met. Thirdly the City of Cape Town SCM Policy136 also provides that the 
contract manager should ensure that contractors fulfill their obligations and monitor 
continued performance against contract obligations.  
 
Contract maintenance needs a two-pronged approach as it is as important to monitor 
contract performance by the successful bidder, as it is to monitor government’s 
performance, particularly with regards to payment for goods and services to such 
                                                          
134
Renaissance Security and Cleaning Services CC v Rustenburg Local Municipality and Others (2008) 29 
(ZANWHC) para 10 (hereafter Renaissance Security) See Chapter four par 4.5 for a discussion on 
exclusions.  
135
Regulation 43. 
136
 27 March (2008) regs 332; 336.4. 
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bidders. Delay in payments for goods and services may impact negatively on the cash 
flow of SMMEs and thereby affect service delivery. Noted is that the National Treasury 
has made provision through the Treasury Regulations137   that payments due to creditors 
must be settled within 30 days from receipt of invoices. 
. 
The Treasury Regulations138  also stipulates that accounting officers must establish 
procedures for quarterly reporting on tender contract performance, as this will be 
facilitate effective performance monitoring, evaluation and corrective action (should a 
breach ensue). This tie in with the goals of economic empowerment that should see 
SMME’s progressively nurtured and trained by organs of state to progress to 
professional business people of the future.139 Therefore contractual obligations must be 
monitored and enforced through incentives and/or sanctions.  This should necessitate 
monitoring that the bidder delivers the promised goods or services synonymous to the 
contractual agreement and any default, or poor performance on the contract which 
affects value for money should attract sanctions against the bidder concerned. 
 
In the call for tenders, resource specifications are used to define social deliverables and 
the acceptance criteria thereto.140 This will enable the administrators to the contract, to 
audit whether the promised social deliverables were in fact delivered, in the performance 
of the contract, by the successful bidder.141 As such targeted procurement and targeted 
labour should be tracked in performance of the contract, this way the social deliverables 
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Treasury Regulations 8.2.3. 
138
Regulation 5.3.1.  
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of BEE is encouraged and employment equity is being addressed.142  The BEE Codes 
promotes the core social deliverables. This encompasses inter alia ownership of capital, 
which include enterprise development, employment equity and skills development.143 
Contract maintenance will detect any inadequate performance on these social 
deliverables, early enough to remedy the situation144 and therefore this practice should 
be encouraged. 
 
4.4 Conflict of Interest in SCM erodes ethical standards 
 
 
The court in Grinaker 145 affirmed that the submission of tenders by bidders entitles them 
to fair administrative action which leads to a legitimate expectation that their tenders will 
be evaluated ‘fairly, properly, justly and without bias’. Fairness and equity should 
ultimately dictate that the bidder, who best can meet the socio-economic goals and 
obligations of the services in question, will be awarded the tender.146  What will 
demonstrate fairness is that SCM officials should not be entitled to bid for government 
contracts whilst employed by government.  
 
Generally the Treasury Regulations147 dictate compliance with ethical standards as part 
of the conduct expected of public officials and as such public officials must disclose their 
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Watermeyer R (2000) 234. 
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BEE Codes (2007) code series 100 to 600. 
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Watermeyer R (2000) 250. 
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(2002) 3 All SA 336 (T) para 32.  
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University of the Western Cape, 2005) 262. 
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personal interest in where competitive bidding is concerned. This requirement is also 
extended to the Municipal Supply Chain Management Regulations (Municipal SCM 
Regulations).148 Furthermore the Western Cape Procurement (Business Interest of 
Employees) Act149 provides for a data base of all business interests disclosed by 
employees (and relatives) doing business with the provincial government. Ethical 
behaviour is viewed as a main ingredient to fortify preferential procurement, therefore the 
Corruption Act150 proscribes ‘a private interest in any contract, agreement or investment 
emanating from or connected with the public body in which he or she is employed or 
which is made on account of that public body.  
 
Essentially the principles of fairness and equity will be undermined and section 217 will 
be contravened where a decision-maker fails to avoid a conflict of interest or the bidding 
process is tainted by actual bias151 or reasonable suspicion of bias.152 Such disclosure 
ensures compliance with the principles of fairness, impartiality and transparency. This 
approach ties in with the requirement of procedural fairness (as in the PAJA) which 
validates the rule against bias.153 The Supreme Court of Appeal has held that, where a 
tenderer is able to reduce its price due to inside information about work not needed for 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Regulation 16A8.4 If a supply chain management official or other role player, or any close family 
member, partner or associate of such official or other role player, has any private or business interest in 
any contract to be awarded, that official or other role player must – 
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Municipal SCM Regulations reg 44 in  GN 868  GG 27636 of 30 May 2005;  
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Regulations 46 (2) (e); 45. 
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the tender, this would not only be procedurally unfair to other bidders, but also offend 
against section 217(1) insofar as fairness and equitability is concerned.154  
 
Another thorny issue in preferential procurement is that the expectation of ethical 
compliance is dashed by perpetual non-compliance with legislated prescripts. This is 
evidenced by those public officials responsible for SCM neglecting to declare their 
financial interest in bids. The result of this auto-corruption leads to public officials unjustly 
securing privileges which belong to the public, for themselves.155 This behaviour is 
reflected in them by-passing or manipulating those compulsory procedures to earn those 
privileges.156 This effect of this leads to the lowest prices not being considered; no 
quotations being received from winning bidders and payments to suppliers exceeding the 
budgeted costs.157 Effectively this often amounts to the awarding of contracts to 
unsuitable firms or payment of higher prices.158  An example of such conflict is where an 
official favours the company in which he has an interest.159 The consequences  of not 
declaring interest, is that an  unfair advantage over technical knowledge and pricing of 
the bid, may see an accounting officer setting up companies to suit the bid specifications, 
thereby winning the tender award, 160  or simply by- passing certain tender procedures.  
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This behaviour was depicted in Minister of Finance and Another v Gore NO161 where the 
Cape Provincial Administration (CPA) called for tenders in the quest to privatise the 
pension payments of South Africa. But this pilot project was ruined because the tender 
process was tainted with fraudulent behaviour by a deputy director and senior official 
who served on the BEC during the tender adjudication.162 
 
Their underhand tactics during the tender process led to them giving a glowing report on 
a bidder163 in which they had a vested interest. As fate had it, the bidder proved 
incapable of performing the required functions and one year into the five-year contract 
the ‘successful bidder’ started showing cracks in its capacity to deliver. After an 
investigation into the tender the contract was cancelled due to incapacity and thender 
irregularities.164 
 
 
The waywardness of the two state officials exposed that they had put the tender together 
ten day before the closing date using the CPA office and computer.165 Moreover they 
manipulated the tender process with lies and distortions to secure the award in favour of 
this bidder.166 Their fraud and manipulation paid off in that they secured jobs for 
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themselves with the bidder even before the tender was awarded.167 The court held the 
government vicariously liable for the fraudulent conduct of its employees.168 In an 
attempt to stunt this practice the Western Cape provincial government implemented the 
Western Cape Procurement Act169 whereby employees of CPA must disclose their 
business interests before the province enters into any contract. 
 
The Gauteng province was also urged to set up legislation that stops officials doing 
business with the provincial government. 170  This came in the wake of  findings which 
exposed public servant not declaring interest in companies that had won tenders to the 
tune of R26 million.171 The affected departments are education, health and social 
development with education trumping the list by 57 officials found conducting business 
with their own department, signing quotations and invoices personally.172  
 
The frequency of this inappropriate practice is shown by the latest SIU report to 
Parliament: this report revealed evidence of collusion between senior managers in the 
Department of Public Works and a contractor. Noted also were the acts of 
maladministration, financial misconduct and corruption by several managers in the 
department.173  The SIU also confirmed that the close relationship between an 
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accounting officer and a bidder had undermined the procurement process thereby 
exposing the Department of Correctional Services (DCS) to civil claims by unsuccessful 
bidders.174 This matter was referred to the National Procecuting Authority (NPA) for a 
decision on criminal prosecutions and the DCS for disciplinary action.175 Despite the 
NPA investigation being underway, this supplier 176  is currently in the running for a 
tender to render security services to the NPA.177  
 
Ethical behaviour is not totally alien to public officials as shown in Sekgobela v State 
Information Technology Agency (Pty) Ltd.178 In this matter a state official demonstrated 
moral behaviour  by reporting the public entity for not complying with its legal obligations 
and responsibilities provided for by the procurement laws. He was dismissed as a result. 
The court held that the dismissal was automatically unfair in that he made a protected 
disclosure when he reported the non–compliance.179  It is unfortunate that an employee 
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reporting on a breach in procurement laws was ostracised. Public officials should 
generally feel comfortable to report such derogation of duty without fear or favour.   
 
In addition, in a rare act of censure, parliament's ethics committee has disciplined a 
senior official in provincial government who failed to disclose her personal interests and 
lied about its value.180 This was a senior accounting officer who lied under oath and 
submitted false and misleading evidence with regards to her personal interests in a 
company benefiting from contracts she had signed. As Head of the department and 
accounting officer for the Northern Cape Department of Social and Population 
Development, she signed R98 million in lease agreements without adhering to tender 
procedures.181 This official could not explain why she did not recuse herself from the 
process, knowing that she and her family members were unduly receiving benefits from 
the company. The ethics committee found her guilty and fined her one month’s salary. In 
addition they referred the matter to the Public Protector for investigation into her tenure 
as state employee and also to the SAPS for criminal investigation. Unfortunately the 
report was returned to the ethics committee to re-table and if this is not done before the 
end of November 2011 the case could be buried.182 
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This rare act of self censure and especially the referral to the SAPS is commendable and 
investigation should be swift so as not to lose momentum of the seriousness of the 
transgression of this state official, who remains employed by the state. The problem of 
conflict of interest is exacerbated  by the absence of post-employment restrictions in the 
anti-corruption framework, which leaves public servants free to join a company to which 
they beforehand irregularly awarded a public tender contract.183 184 
 
The state machinery was also at work in that  a senior government executive was 
arrested in the latest corruption  in tender fraud 185  The tender fraud allegations against 
him relates to the purchase of water purification equipment for a state hospital at 
allegedly inflated prices (R112 million) and without following proper tender procedures.   
 
Due to the unfair advantage those in SCM have on bid specifications, as against the 
general public participating in the bid, it is incumbent on accounting officers to enforce a 
code of conduct. However, generally SCM officials were not compelled to sign relevant 
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code of conduct.186 Besides this, it is generally understood that a declaration of interest 
is only necessary when the public official is an employee of the procurement entity.187 
This has recently been remedied by the National Treasury issuing a practice note.188 
This practice note prescribes that accounting officers and accounting authorities must 
ensure that officials in SCM adhere to formally signing the relevant code of conduct and 
thereby observe its requirements.189    
 
4.5 Remedies 
 
When public officials exercise public power such as in competitive bidding, the law at 
minimum requires them to do so authorized by an empowering provision, in the language 
of the PAJA.190  Thus tender documents should always inform a tenderer of his right to 
request reasons for procurement decisions.191 This relates to the fact that an 
unsuccessful bidder be furnished with reasons for the award or non-award of a tender.192 
Thereby fairness is promoted in that bidders have the right to be heard193 Thus no 
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dissatisfied bidder should be condemned unheard.194  If this is not forthcoming there will 
be grounds for judicial review.195  
 
4.5.1  Judicial review of public procurement decisions.  
 
Judicial review may be used to address unlawful administrative action and to limit the 
scope of unscrupulous practices in the public procurement domain.196 The usual grounds 
of review for public procurement processes are the lack of lawfulness, procedural 
fairness or reasonableness.197  
 
However Nugent JA expressed concern over the frequency of public tenders seeking 
judicial review.198 In addition in Moseme construction199 it has been held that tender 
processes do not necessarily have to be perfect, and that not every slip in the 
administration of tenders has necessarily to be visited by judicial sanction. 
Notwithstanding this, in reviewing the exercise of discretionary powers of an 
administrative authority with regards to a tender award, a court will not readily substitute 
its own opinion for that of such an authority.200 In fact the courts are cautioned, when 
considering the validity of administrative action, not to intrude without justification on 
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terrain reserved for the administrative branch of government.201  Such restraints on the 
powers of the courts are universal in democratic societies like South Africa.202 
 
This synchronises with the fact that the Constitution does not give courts the power to 
perform administrative function themselves.203 The courts are rather the final instruments 
ensuring the accountability of the exercise of public power.204 The idea is to adhere to 
the tender requirements and observe constitutional imperatives in order to avoid the 
court’s interference with such decisions taken.205 
 
This will entail that during tender adjudication the administrative authority must exercise 
discretion without delegation; not be subjected to the unauthorised advice of another; 
follow the correct prescribed procedures and applies its mind to the matter.206 In applying 
its mind the administrative authority must comply with tender requirements for a valid 
administrative act, for example it should not entertain wholly irrelevant or improper 
considerations.207 As it stands the court will not entertain overturning a decision taken by 
an administrative authority who acted lawfully and honestly. Effectively this means, that 
there are limits on the power of the courts insofar as repairing damage that has been 
caused by a breakdown in the administrative process of competitive bidding.208  Should a 
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bidder be by the means to litigate, the following remedies may arise from applications for 
review. 
 
4.5.2      Re - awarding the tender (contract) 
 
In Eskom Holdings Ltd & Another v The New Reclamation Group 209 the Supreme Court 
of Appeal noted that an irregularity in the award of a tender is reviewable by the 
unsuccessful bidder who can call for the award to be set aside. Therefore, should 
exceptional circumstances warrant it, the court may set aside a tender and re-award it to 
the unsuccessful bidder.210 This was the circumstances in Grinaker211 where the tender 
board displayed such naked preference and gross incompetence, that fairness 
demanded the matter not to be referred back to them, but rather that the courts 
substitute their decision and award the tender to the unsuccessful bidder. 
 
In Shearwater Construction v City Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality & Others212 the 
tender was awarded subject to the applicant forming a joint-venture with BEE bidders in 
order to promote SMMEs. The court ironically set aside and re-awarded the tender, 
despite the applicant being disqualified for refusing to embrace any specific goals in 
empowering black people. It was found that these requirements were not spelt out in the 
bid specifications during the bid adjudication and the deserving bidder scored the highest 
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points although zero points was scored for special goals. The court re-awarded the 
tender because it appeared that the outcome was a foregone conclusion, in that the 
contract should have been granted to the applicant.213  
 
Lest we forget, not every mishap in public administration will be met with negative 
sanction; it will always depend on the circumstances of each case.  
 
4.5.3 Invalidity  
 
The court is also clear that failing to adhere to constitutional principles and legislative 
measures during the process of public procurement will lead to invalidity and setting 
aside of such decisions.214 However there is always the difficulty whether new tenders 
should be called or whether the existing bidders should be reconsidered.215  Moreover it 
must be borne in mind that the court may refuse to set aside the invalid award of a 
tender, in that work had been performed and that it was impractical to re-start the tender 
process for the remaining work.216   The court in Tecmed (Pty) Ltd v Eastern Cape 
Provincial Tender Board and Others 217   referred the decision back to the relevant body 
for reconsideration of the existing tenders, this remains the preferred course.  In contrast 
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the court in Cash Paymaster Services218  ordered that new tenders be called where 
circumstances had changed since original submission of the tenders.  
  
4.5.4 Interdict and damages  
 
Should a defective procurement process ensue, an unsuccessful or aggrieved tenderer 
may, by way of an interdict, freeze the award of the impugned tender.219 In  Darson 
Construction (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town,220 it was pointed out that where a bidder 
becomes aware of a ‘successful’ tenderer beginning work on an impugned tender, 
pending appeal, it is advisable to have such tenderer interdicted to suspend work. The 
advantage in this regard is that an interdict could anticipate and eliminate loss to the 
complainant. However, approaching the court after performance by the ‘successful’ 
tenderer, for loss suffered, has proven to be difficult. 221 Notwithstanding this, public 
bodies may be held delictually liable if they are derelicting their duty to perform their 
functions properly.222  
 
This may have the result of an unsuccessful bidder having a delictual claim for damages 
suffered, due to an unlawful tender procedure by a public body.223 It is difficult to obtain 
damages for pure economic loss for administrative errors during tender adjudication; 
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success is underpinned by whether the administrative action was tainted with dishonesty 
or fraud. In Steenkamp 224 a tender for automated cash payments for social welfare 
grants was granted to the lowest bidder (Balraz). After performing on the contract and 
incurring expenses, the award was set aside by the court at the behest of the 
unsuccessful bidder.225 This resulted in the liquidation of Balraz. The liquidators applied 
to court to recover damages comprising of out-of-pocket expenses.226  
 
The stance of the court was that the law is conservative regarding where the boundaries 
of delictual liability lay, particularly in cases dealing with pure economic loss.227  
Therefore the breach of administrative justice do not give  rise to a delict, which simply 
means that administrative law duties do not translate into private law duties in raising 
delictual liability.228 If not there will be a duplication of the same payment by the state in 
that the successful bidder will be paid for the goods or services delivered on the contract 
and the aggrieved bidder gets delictual compensation for the same tender contract. 229  It 
follows that immunity to a damages claim will only be upheld if the administrative error 
was negligent but an honest decision. 230  
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The court maintained that the evaluation and awarding of tenders are in the domain of 
administrative law231 and as such a public law remedy should pre-empt, correct or 
reverse an irregular administrative act.232 This is to afford the aggrieved party 
administrative justice for effective and efficient public administration.233 Thus a negligent 
administrative error in statutory obligations which leads to loss is not enough to invoke a 
delictual claim. 234 The court held that it cannot discriminate between unsuccessful and 
successful bidders because this approach will allot different legal rights to parties to the 
same tender process.235  
 
The minority judgment in Steenkamp 236 draws a comparison between a successful 
bidder losing the contract post employing contractual obligations and an unsuccessful 
bidder not winning the tender claiming for loss of profit, for not winning. The minority 
judgement reasoned that in the first instance, the successful bidder should be able to 
claim back out-of-pocket expenses as this will be more modest and less exposure to the 
fiscus, whereas the latter claim is untenable.237 Where out-of-pocket expenses are not 
being recoverable it could very well place small and less financially viable bidder at risk 
of liquidation.238 This may not be the intention but those vulnerable SMMEs, the 
government wishes to promote through BEE may fall prey as an unintended 
consequence. 
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Quinot favours the minority judgment in Steenkamp239 because the majority judgment 
places the risk of government contract that are administratively unjust and therefore set 
aside, on the successful bidder. This creates a risk unique to South Africa in that 
contracting with government carries an administrative injustice risk.240  Such 
administrative injustice may pose potential obstacles to new black entrants desirous of 
doing business with government.241 This will limit access to government business and 
restrict it to a small number of established and financially stronger black businesses. 242 
This will surely go against the aims of preferential procurement which plays a key role in 
the development of black economic empowerment.243 This approach will deflect from the 
broad based nature of BEE in that  potential black  bidders may be discourage to tender 
under such risk which limits their success of a damages claim. 
 
Roos and De la Harpe support this argument that a successful bidder is placed 
differently than an unsuccessful bidder.244 The variant between the two is that a 
successful bidder must incur expenses to perform on the tender award whereas an 
unsuccessful bidder does not have this obligation.245  Tenders in private and public 
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sector differ in that the latter has to subscribe to constitutional principles and the former 
not.246 
 
In any case should tenderers be allowed to negotiate a contract which includes a 
damages claim as the Constitutional court suggested, this will bear on the fiscus in the 
same manner should a claim for damages succeed.247 Moreover the possibility for a 
damages claim in Steenkamp may have been possible if the claim had been based on 
applicable statutes. But the PAJA was not in existence at the start of the Steenkamp 
case.248 In any case now that the PAJA249 is relied upon for administrative justice the 
courts are empowered to make a finding that is just and equitable which may therefore 
include a damages claim. Besides under the PAJA the litigation time and costs are 
reduced because the claim is limited to causation and quantum. 250  
 
In Moniel Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Premier of Limpopo Province and Others 251  in the wake 
of an unsuccessful bidder claiming for loss of profit due to not being awarded the 
contract, the court remained steadfast in the approach of  Steenkamp.252 In this instance 
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the bidder was disqualified for non–compliance253 and as a result was unsuccessful in 
the tender award. The argument that a delictual claim on the ground of pure economic 
loss was bad in law and cannot be entertained was accepted by the court.254 
 
Furthermore in South African Post Office v De Lacy and Another255 the court awarded 
damages due to the misconception that dishonesty and fraud had occurred during the 
tender deliberations. The Supreme Court of Appeal,256 using Steenkamp, held that due 
to the lack of dishonesty or fraud a damages claim could not be entertained. 
 
Along similar lines to this is Gore257 where the dishonest and fraudulent behaviour of the 
state officials during tender adjudication led to the Province having to accept vicarious 
liability for damages. In this case the public officials colluded with the bidder (a newly 
purchased shelf company) and tailored the tender offer on the Cape Provincial 
Administration’s (CPA) computer at the premises of the CPA.  Although not well versed 
in the services offered the bidder landed the award thanks to the cunning manipulation of 
the public officials. The court granted a claim for damages against the officials for which 
the employer (provincial government) was vicariously liable. In the subsequent quantum 
trial damages was ordered in the amount of R215 517 500, 00.258  
 
                                                          
253
Moniel Holdings (2007) 3 All SA 410 (T) the bider failed to submit a copy of a public indemnity insurance 
policy which was compulsory. 
254
Moniel Holdings (2007) 3 All SA 410 (T) para 9. 
255
(2009) 3 All SA 437 (SCA) (hereafter SAPO v De Lacy). 
256
SAPO v De Lacy (2009) 3 All SA 437 (SCA) para 439. 
257
(2007) 1 All SA 309 (SCA). See discussion of this case in para 4.4 in conflict of interest. 
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Gore NO v Minister of Finance and Others (11190/99) (2008) ZAGPHC 338 para 246. Also see 
Transnet Ltd v Sechaba Photoscan (Pty) Ltd 2005 1 SA 299 (SCA) where the tender was  fraudulently 
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Thus it should not be misconstrued that organs of state and administrators have delictual 
immunity but  rather that the intention of  judicial review of administrative decisions is not 
for compensation but to ensure the law is upheld and there is effective decision-making 
processes.259 Key to this is a procurement system managed by public officials that 
display a keen willingness to meticulously enforce the procurement laws and policies. 
 
4.6      Conclusion  
 
In this chapter the challenges experienced during competitive bidding was discussed. 
The findings are that the management of preferential procurement by public officials are 
not of the standard expected, to maximise the success of this policy tool. The objectives 
of the legislation are lost in the myriad of defective conduct displayed by public officials. 
This has the result of worthy bidders losing out on tenders and thereby economic 
transformation is deferred. Such eligible bidders often end up in court having to 
challenge a flaw bidding process.  
 
The study found that incompetence in the state machinery exists despite the Constitution 
demanding that, good human resources management and career development be 
cultivated in the public administration in order to maximise human potential.260 Evidently 
skills and ethical standards are so necessary for the success of preferential 
procurement. It could be said that without these attributes the successful implementation 
of preferential procurement may be deferred. Essentially there should be a pursuit for 
standard bidding documents as issued by National Treasury, and changes, if any, should 
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be minimal.261  This must be supplemented by skilful tender committees that are 
thoroughly conversant with the legislative prescripts. 
 
Schooner argues that ‘the tension between social policies and commercial purchasing 
has seen government buyers disregarding social policies in place of greater customer 
satisfaction.’262  This means that for government buyers customer service comes first 
and legislatively-mandated procurement policies are of lesser importance during 
procurement negotiations.263 This highlights the importance of ensuring bidders that are 
the most compliant is chosen which should result in greater customer satisfaction. 
However it still requires that government departments concerned with tender procedures, 
to be thoroughly acquainted with the requirements for their respective departments. 
Regrettably the SCM system seems fragmented by the many unlawful practices 
employed by the SCM officials. This is apparent when looking at the AGSA reports;264 it 
seems that there are different interpretations lent to the laws that are meant to guide 
competitive bidding in a coherent way. This practice prevails because SCM officials 
seem to be chosen without regard whether they can master the all important task of 
tender adjudication. The pace at which preferential procurement succeeds is 
compromised by this attitude of non-compliance with legislative prescripts. 
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This difficulty is compounded by the fact that contract maintenance is not receiving the 
attention required. BEE will remain unchecked, whilst it is not compulsory for public 
entities engaging in preferential procurement, to monitor the achievements of social 
performance post - award stage. This will not only prolong BEE initiatives but also defer 
economic development of South Africa as a whole. Contract maintenance post – award 
stage should be employed vigorously, as such social performance audits should be 
conducted with the same rigour as financial audits.265 For this reason there is a need for 
legislation that compels contract maintenance insofar as measuring the performance of 
the core elements the bidder have to deliver on in terms of the BEE Codes.  
 
This should keep government abreast of the goals reached in the empowering of, 
SMME’s and black people, particularly insofar as capital ownership, employment 
opportunities and skills development. Thus the main reason why contract maintenance 
should be observed is to provide information on how successful preferential procurement 
has been, in order to make an assessment of how long the current preferential 
procurement policies should remain in force. The government should ensure there is a 
viable method available for tracking the procurement legislation deliverables, particularly 
insofar as, the socio-economic and empowerment deliverables flowing from the RDP.266 
Contract monitoring and inspection also safeguard the attainment of value for money and 
cost-effectiveness.267  
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What should follow on the heels of this should be a display of optimal ethical standards 
in the procurement domain by public officials. This will not be served where competitive 
bidding is compromised by lack of proper oversight by accounting officers and the willful 
practice of self-interest in SCM.  It is rather unfortunate that declaration of interests and 
the prevailing code of conduct are simply disobeyed. Regrettably it does not seem that 
the National Treasury practice note compelling adherence to relevant code of conduct 
has the desired effect because regardless of its implementation, habitual non-
compliance in declaring interests continues to create disparity in public procurement. 
Various incidents of public officials behaving unethically in the procuring of goods and 
services have been uncovered. Moreover, in the face of any conflict of interest, officials 
should not participate in the procurement process in any way.268 Most importantly, ideally 
sanctions should be imposed on officials for non-disclosure and breach of conflict of 
interest rules. Williams and Quinot recommends the rotation of staff in combating conflict 
of interest.269  Worrisome though is that this approach may be undermined by the supply 
of staff that is adequately schooled in the procurement processes and laws.  
 
Another point of concern is, despite the myriad of legislative regulations that control 
preferential procurement; the courts are continuously approached to review tender 
irregularities. Whilst judicial review of procurement procedures is invaluable, when 
needed, it is regrettable that competitive bidding faces so many court challenges, which 
no doubt bears heavily on the public purse because cost orders are often made against 
the state. Moreover, although the constitutional right to administrative justice is a reality, 
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accessing the right to review administrative action may be a pipe dream for some due to 
the length of time afforded to government to furnish reasons. 270   
 
A preferred approach should be that SCM officials engage procurement rules without 
fear or favour. Where breach of procurement processes is present those officials willing 
to expose such breach should enjoy protection and as such they should not be 
intimidated by the fear of losing their livelihood.   This will give bidders a sense that their 
bids are fairly measured and public officials care about following the rules. In any case, 
the whole system of competitive bidding should observe the principles equity, fairness, 
transparency, cost-effectiveness and competitiveness.  Observing these prescripts 
should be the starting point to combat the ills in public procurement because where 
compliance and honesty in SCM is found, therein lays the success of economic 
empowerment for the citizens at large.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
As outlined in chapter one the object of this thesis is to examine and assess the efficacy 
of preferential procurement as a policy tool, to promote BEE.  In doing so, this thesis 
seeks to analyse the practices that hinder the effective use of preferential procurement 
as instrument that encourage black owned enterprises to contract with government. 
Indications such as the report of the Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA)1 and the 
Special Investigations Unit (SIU)2 have shown that the procurement industry is rife with 
practices that beleaguer rather than advance the success of preferential procurement.  
 
5.2 The challenges  
 
5.2.1 Disharmony of legislation  
Chapter two analyses the legal regime that dominates preferential procurement and its 
effect on the success of preferential procurement processes. The PFMA that oversees 
financial management in government provides clear guidelines for public procurement, 
but this is not enough for the success of preferential procurement. It is the Procurement 
                                                          
1
See chapter four. 
2
See chapter three. 
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Act3 and Regulations4 and the BBBEE Act5 and BEE Codes6  that is central to the 
success of this policy tool. This legislation determines how the process of public 
tendering should take place and who should be the target groups it should benefit. The 
implementation of these laws was necessary in order for the government to mend some 
of the economic disparities created during the apartheid era. These laws encourage 
preferential treatment of black people for the purpose of public tendering in goods and 
services, due to the fact that previously their economic participation in the economy was 
restricted. This is an indication of how essential these laws are in the transformation of 
the economy.  
 
The Procurement legislation7 provides the framework for the procurement policies that 
state entities and organs of state need to implement, together with a preferential points 
system. Preferential points of 10 or 20 are to be allocated to target groups for BEE by 
measuring specific and RDP goals. These preferential points are to accrue to HDIs. To 
complement this legislation, the BBBEE laws8 were enacted to identify more broad-
based BEE than the specific and RDP goals contemplated by the Procurement Act. This 
broad-based approach was defined in the BEE Codes and has a wider reach to BEE 
which includes but is not limited to ownership, management, skills development and 
enterprise development. In addition the BEE Codes provide a score card that 
predetermines how goals for preferential points are calculated. The other fundamental 
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provision is that the BBBEE Act provides that the recipients of these preferential points 
should be black people.   
 
The Procurement Act has been under scrutiny since before the ascension of the BBBEE 
Act in that the former needed amendments to be cogent with the latter. This cogency 
was to be brought about by the new Procurement Regulations of 2011.9  The 
Regulations have effected some positive changes in that the Procurement Act now 
extends to all those entities under the PFMA. This was a welcome change because now 
all three spheres of government, that is national, provincial and local, are obliged to 
consider policies in line with the framework Act and no deviation is allowed  as was 
previously the case. 
 
However the cogency10 between the Procurement Act and BBBEE Act and Codes are 
still lacking despite the new Regulations. A major bone of contention is that the two Acts 
still differ in the definition of who is to benefit, with the Procurement Act still referring to 
HDIs as the target group for BEE and the BBBEE Act referring to black people as the 
target group for BEE. In addition the Procurement Act measures preferential points by 
specific goals and RDP goals, but the BEE Codes measures BBBEE through a generic 
scorecard. This study suggests that this discord promotes confusion rather than 
coherent legislation for the empowerment of black people.  
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Furthermore, following the BEE Codes and applying the scorecard to evaluate BEE 
status places more constraints on supply chain management (SCM),11 in the allocation 
of preference points. This means that public officials cannot exercise their discretion 
with regards to the calculation of preferential point, because the BEE Codes tend to this. 
Therefore the BEE Codes make provision for the verification of BEE credentials through 
acquisition of a verification certificate (by potential bidders) which predetermines the 
preferential points of a BEE compliant bidder. This is in contrast to the Procurement Act 
that leaves the measuring of RDP goals open to the discretion of SCM. In this regard 
the Procurement Act is permissive rather than prescriptive in what to consider as 
specific goals.12  Since other goals could also be identified, this leads to disputes by 
aggrieved or unsuccessful bidders. Although the Procurement Regulations 2011 award 
preference points on the basis of the BEE Codes this does not remedy the way the 
Procurement Act measures points. 
 
 The implementation of the Regulations 2011 in December 2011 can be met with muted 
enthusiasm because the main thrust behind the amendment, that is to bring cogency to 
the framework Acts is not achieved. This tension between the frame work legislation 
should be remedied by amending section 2 (1) (d) of the Procurement Act to refer to the 
consideration of the BEE Codes when calculating preferential points.  In addition section 
1 definitions should be amended to include the term ‘black’ as the target group for 
broad-based empowerment. It will also serve the preferential procurement vision (BEE) 
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to remove the term HDI13 from the Procurement Act. As noted in chapter two this term 
has led to confusion in the recipients of preferential procurement in that those 
economically discriminated are sidelined in favour of those that suffered societal 
discrimination. Government needs to arrange for amendment of the Procurement Act, if 
not the preferential procurement processes will not serve the people it intended. 
 
Further care should be taken in awarding a tender to a bidder which did not score the 
highest points14 as provided for by the Procurement act and Regulations 2011. The 
thrust behind this provision is that price is not the most important element to score the 
tender. Should there be other objective criteria that a makes a bidder more eligible then 
this will be considered above the lowest priced tender.  This  ‘other’ objective criteria15  
is what may be problematic in that this is left to the discretion of  SCM officials and 
could prove a challenge for fairness, as has been illustrated by this study. A fairer 
evaluation is to provide a description of such criteria in the bid specifications to 
encourage bidders to go beyond the legal prescripts for BEE, and to be creative in how 
to add more value to advance black people. Nevertheless coherency in public 
procurement can only be achieved in applying one set of cogent rules. 
 
 
5.2.2 Willful practices  
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The Public Service Commission (PSC)16 notes that ‘the global discourse on good 
governance expects that the government should be proactive in fighting the spread of 
corruption and promoting an integrity-driven form of administration.’17 This thesis 
suggests that despite the number of policies and laws that support the public 
administration of government procurement, the procurement environment is tainted with 
a number of unsavory practices.18 The main reason for this is that the public 
administration lacks the capacities to not only investigate but also to prevent corruption 
as evidenced by the SIU report. The SIU is straining under the pressure in that they can 
only investigate the top scale of corruption in the police.  
 
This is aggravated by the fact that departments do not refer cases where corruption is 
confirmed to the South African Police Service (SAPS) for criminal prosecution. This is 
despite the Corruption Act19 prescribing that fraud over R100 000 must be criminally 
charged. There should be a clear commitment by government to discipline those public 
officials found acting with malice in preferential procurement. Such disciplining should 
take place speedily and those found guilty of corruption in excess of R100 000 should 
be criminally charged. Anything short of this approach will leave preferential 
procurement vulnerable to corruption by those meant to promote it.  
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See chapter three. 
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Public Service Commission report: ‘Profiling and Analysis of the most Common Manifestations of 
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Moreover most of the corrupt practices are either displayed by collusion between 
bidders (collusive tendering)20 or collusion between public officials and bidders 
(tenderpreneurship)21 and fronting.22 These practices have established cartel behaviour 
in the procurement environment. This collusive behaviour of public officials have not 
only been uncovered by the SIU but also reported on by the PSC. Hence the starting 
point for rooting out corruption in public procurement is to remove those public officials 
that are colluding in taking bribes or setting up tenders to financially benefit themselves 
from public procurement.   
 
The PSC23 recommends that clearer policy guidelines and review of disciplinary codes 
and procedures will mitigate the scourge of corruption.24  Cognisance should be taken 
that all the rules already in place have not sufficiently combated procurement corruption. 
 
5.2.3 Skills deficiency and ethics in SCM 
 
The economic transformation of South Africa is far too important for the public service to 
display the lack of skills as suggested in this thesis.25 To embrace international 
standards and practices, SCM officials must be skilled in the laws and procedures for 
public tendering.  Skills deficiencies can and should be remedied by government, by 
properly screening academic and other practical qualifications of those in SCM. Without 
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the adequate skills to interpret laws and policies, SCM officials are subjective in  their 
discretion, as happened in the case of Millennium Waste Management26 where the 
public officials did not know they may condone the oversight (by a bidder) of signing a 
duly completed  declaration of interest.27 Another negative impact on procurement is 
that those officials engaged in SCM are not declaring their interest, despite a practice 
note28 compelling obedience to this. It is not enough to just declare your interest in the 
tender and then recuse yourself from the process. Public officials will always be 
advantaged by the ‘inside’ information and thus will always have an unfair advantage 
over any other bidder not connected to such official.  The short answer to this is that 
public officials should not be allowed be active in private business whilst working for the 
government as required by the Western Cape Procurement (Business Interest of 
Employees) Act.29 
 
5.3 Remedies and anti-corruption measures for procurement transgressions 
 
There is certainly not a lack of anti-corruption measures overseeing public procurement.  
The most prominent is the Procurement Act and Regulations which makes provision for 
sanctions and debarment of mischievous bidders. Then there is the Corruption Act that 
sees to errant public officials or bidders and their debarment.   
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The inclusion of preferential procurement in the Constitution is evidence of the need for 
economic reform encompassing the majority of citizens in South Africa.  Thus the 
success of preferential procurement as a policy tool is in the interest of the public at 
large and therefore the integrity of the procurement system should be jealously 
guarded. Public officials should uphold the integrity of the public procurement system 
and if not, legislated-penalties as provided for in the Regulations 2011,30 need to be 
enforced on bidders and public officials found to be in breach thereof. It does not make 
sense that tender irregularities are not dealt with in terms of the law. This will mean, if 
an irregularity occurs, contracts should be cancelled, damages claimed (if any) and if 
necessary those found guilty should be excluded from government contracts and public 
officials should meet with the might of the law. As it is corrupt bidders cannot thrive if 
there are no public officials on the take. Moreover corrupt officials put strain on the 
public purse because the government is vicariously liable to compensate for their 
malfeasance.31 
 
Furthermore there is too much emphasis on investigating corruption and not enough on 
how to prevent the practice. This is so because lack of capacity and funds has seen 
some of these anti-corruption initiatives lapse into redundancy.32 The most vigilant 
amongst these forums is the SIU which has accounted for most of the shocking 
revelations with regard to corruption in public procurement.  This unit has conclusively 
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found that corruption flourished in the department of correctional services (DCS) with 
bid rigging, and over-pricing, but the NPA has not embarked on any prosecutions.     
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis has undertaken a survey of preferential procurement and found that the 
success of the policy tool is very much dependent on whether those willful practices are 
contained. This has to start with those in the public service striving for the success of 
broad-based BEE in the interest of those disadvantaged by the past. Public officials 
should ensure that preferential procurement as a policy tool is conducive to delivering 
the promised economic equality to black people. This can only be realised through a 
cogent regulatory framework, which must be enforced with honesty and without biased.  
It stands to reason that the success of preferential procurement will depend to a large 
extent on the ethics of those that over-see the processes of tendering. Consequently 
this will be easier to realise if public officials are barred from having business interests 
whilst employed by the state. Whilst the status quo remains, self-interest in procurement 
gain will be difficult to curb and the proper proliferation of BEE will be undermined. 
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